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ABSTRACT

This publication is a viewer's guide for a 1979 CBS summer television series on Asia. It is also designed to be used independently of the TV series. The TV series included a mixture of lectures and interviews, complemented by examples of Asian art, music, and dance. The guide supplements each of the thirty programs in the series with maps, visuals, and background materials. Part one of the guide includes an introduction to each program, followed by suggestions for discussion questions and further reading. Books which can be considered as texts for the series are indicated by an asterisk. The suggested discussion questions raise issues addressed in the programs and in the readings. Part two, a special section on "Asia, Yesterday and Today," is written by Fay Willey of Newsweek, and provides a capsule summary of the history of 19 Asian nations along with a detailed review of recent political, social, and economic trends in each country. The profiles are intended to be read in conjunction with the appropriate program in the series. (Author/RM)

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ASIA: Half the Human Race

A VIEWER'S GUIDE

Terry E. Lautz, Editor
with Asia, Yesterday and Today
by Fay Willey

SO 013 318

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PREFACE

Asia: Half the Human Race — A Viewer's Guide has been prepared for the 1979 CBS Summer Semester television series. This series comes at a time when the two billion of Asia are experiencing dramatic changes. China is seeking to modernize, while Japan is learning to cope with the results of modernization. Vietnam seeks to dominate Indochina, while the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become a powerful regional force. Indira Gandhi's authoritarian regime has been rejected, while Afghanistan has experienced a Communist revolution.

From an American point of view, the United States is leaving an era of war in Asia—World War II, Korea, Vietnam—and entering an era of trade and diplomacy. The United States and China have established diplomatic relations after a thirty-year hiatus, and we have more trade with Asia than with any other area of the world.

ASIA: HALF THE HUMAN RACE will include a mixture of lectures and interviews, complemented by examples of Asian art, music, and dance. The series is moderated by Robert B. Oxnam, director of The Asia Society's Washington Center and its China Council. Distinguished guest speakers include authors, journalists, business-people, and scholars.

The Viewers Guide represents the work of many people: Maureen Aung-Thwin, Richard Bush, Lionel Landry, Peter Grace, Melissa Page, Timothy Plummer, Susan Rhodes, Mary Ann Siegfried and Herbert Spivack, all with The Asia Society, were most generous with their time and their expertise. Thanks are also due to Nancy Hoepli of the Foreign Policy Association, Cynthia Morehouse of the Council on International and Public Affairs, and Philip Oldenburg of Columbia University for their assistance. Many of the program summaries are adapted from introductions written by Robert B. Oxnam.

March 1979
New York, New York

Terry E. Lautz
Program Associate
The China Council

INTRODUCTION: USING THE VIEWER'S GUIDE

Asia: Half the Human Race—A Viewer's Guide accompanies the 1979 CBS Summer Semester television series. This thirty-part series is broadcast May 14 through July 20, Monday, Wednesday, and Friday mornings on CBS television (check local listings for time). ASIA: HALF THE HUMAN RACE is produced for CBS by Bergen Community College with The Asia Society as consultant. Academic credit is available through Bergen Community College, Office of Public Media Programming, 400 Paramus Road, Paramus, New Jersey 07652.

The guide for ASIA: HALF THE HUMAN RACE supplements each of the thirty programs with maps, visuals, and background materials. It is also designed to have a life apart from the television series.

Part One of the Viewer's Guide includes an introduction to each program, followed by suggestions for discussion questions and further reading. Books which can be considered as texts for the series are indicated by an asterisk. The questions raise issues addressed in the programs and in the readings.

Part Two, a special section on "Asia, Yesterday and Today," is written by Fay Willey of *Newsweek*, and provides a capsule summary of the history of nineteen Asian nations, along with a detailed review of recent political, social, and economic trends in each country. Willey's profiles should be read in conjunction with the appropriate program in the series.

The best single source on current affairs in Asia is the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, a weekly magazine published in Hong Kong. For more detailed background materials, area handbooks on each of the countries of Asia are available through the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ABOUT THE GUEST SPEAKERS

A. DOAK BARNETT is Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution. He is a member of the Editorial Board of *Foreign Affairs* and *The China Quarterly*. Mr. Barnett is the author of *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition to the Post-Mao Era.*

MARK E. BUCHMAN is Senior Vice President of the International Division of Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Director of the Far East America Council.

JEROME A. COHEN is Professor of Law and Associate Dean of the Harvard Law School. He also serves as Director of East Asian Legal Studies at Harvard, and is the co-author of *Taiwan and American Policy: The Dilemma in U.S.-China Relations.*

JAMES P. GRANT is President of the Overseas Development Council. He formerly served as UNRRA representative in North China, Special Assistant to the Director of the U.S. Economic Aid Mission to China, and as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

MARSHALL GREEN was designated by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger as Coordinator of Population Affairs on August 25, 1975. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1969 to 1973, and is former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and Australia.

SELIG HARRISON is Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He formerly served as Managing Editor of the *New Republic* and on the Editorial Board of *The Washington Post.* Mr. Harrison is the author of *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy.*

ROBERT H. HOWE is Executive Vice President of the Ansor Corporation. He is a Director of The Philippine-American Chamber of Commerce, The American Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, and The American-ASEAN Trade Council.

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KAZUO NUKAZAWA is Visiting Research Fellow at The Rockefeller Foundation. He previously served as Senior Assistant Director of the Economic Cooperation Department of Keidanren. He is the author of *Restructurization of French Industry.*

PHILIP K. OLDENBURG is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University. He is the author of *Big City Government in India: Councilor, Administrator and Citizen in Delhi.*

ROBERT B. OXNAM is Director of the China Council and the Washington Center of The Asia Society, Inc. He is a member of the Editorial Board of *Contemporary China*, and is co-editor of *Dragon and Eagle.* Dr. Oxnam served as primary consultant and host of this television series.

HERBERT PASSIN is Chairman of the Sociology Department at Columbia University. He served as a consultant to the Ford Foundation and the Rand Corporation. Professor Passin is the author of *Society and Education in Japan.*

HUGH T. PATRICK is Professor of Far Eastern Economics at Yale University. He is a member of the Board of Directors of The Japan Society, and the author of *Japanese Industrialization and Its Social Consequences.*

SUSANNE HOEBER RUDOLPH is Chairperson of the Political Science Department at the University of Chicago. A former Vice President of the American Political Science Association, Dr. Rudolph is the author of *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India.*

ROBERT M. SHAPLEN is Far Eastern correspondent for *The New Yorker.* He formerly served as Chief of the Far East Bureau of *Newsweek.* Mr. Shaplen is the author of *The Road to War: Vietnam 1965-1970* and *Time Out of Hand: Revolution and Reaction in Southeast Asia.*

RICHARD L. SNEIDER is the former American Ambassador to Korea. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and Senior East Asia staff member of the National Security Council. Mr. Sneider is the co-author of *North Korea: Case Study of a Soviet Satellite.*

PHILLIPS TALBOT is President of The Asia Society. He previously served as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and U.S. Ambassador to Greece. Dr. Talbot's published works include *India and America* and *South Asia in the World.*

ROSS TERRILL is Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University. A Contributing Editor to *Atlantic Monthly*, Dr. Terrill is the author of *The Future of China: After Mao* and *800,000,000: The Real China.*

SEYMOUR TOPPING is Managing Editor of *The New York Times*, previously serving as Chief Far East Correspondent and Foreign Editor. Mr. Topping is the author of *Journey Between Two Chinas.*

LYMAN P. VAN SLYKE is Associate Professor of History at Stanford University. He formerly served as Director of the Stanford Center for East Asian Studies, and is the author of *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History.*

LAWRENCE A. VEIT is International Economist and Manager at Brown Brothers Harriman & Company. He formerly served as U.S. Treasury Representative for India and Nepal, and is the author of *India's Second Revolution.*

EZRA F. VOGEL is Chairman of the Council on East Asian Studies and Professor of Sociology at Harvard University. He is the author of *Japan as Number One* and *Japan's New Middle Class.*

THEODORE H. WHITE is an author and journalist. He was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for *The Making of the President—1960.* Mr. White also wrote *Thunder Out of China* and *In Search of History.* He previously served as Far East correspondent for *Time* and Editor of *New Republic.*

ALEXANDER WOODSIDE is Professor of History at the University of British Columbia. He is the author of *Vietnam and the Chinese Model* and *Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam.*

DONALD S. ZAGORIA is Professor of Government at Hunter College of the City University of New York. He is a member of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the author of *Vietnam Triangle: Moscow/Peking/Hanoi and the War in Vietnam.*

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
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Map designed by Atsushi Moriyasu

Part One

PROGRAMS

I. ASIA: PAST AND FUTURE

1 Program for May 14, 1979

INTRODUCTION

Lecture by Robert B. Oxnam, the China Council of The Asia Society

This first program introduces us to the series as a whole. The title, "ASIA: HALF THE HUMAN RACE," implies that Asia is an area of the world that deserves to be taken seriously, more seriously than most Westerners have in the past. Throughout the series, we shall develop several themes, all of which underscore this central point: Asia must be placed higher on the world's agenda.

To understand Asia and its place in the world today, we must first come to understand the rich and varied civilizations, which flowed out of India and China and spread through the rest of the continent and islands of the region. Dating back over 4,000 years, Asia's traditional societies have had a greater and more varied experience with bureaucracy, law, taxation, urban life, social control, farming, art, literature, and music than any other region on earth. Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Taoism, and powerful offshoots of Islam have influenced their cultures. Yesterday's various traditions have an enduring influence on today's Asia—even in a country like China where traditional roots sustain revolutionary trees.

Second, we must come to see the enormous diversity of Asia. From a bird's-eye view, we see the three great regions—Northeast Asia with the strong impact of China, South Asia under the traditional imprint of India, and Southeast Asia with its great array of influences. Looking more closely, we see more than twenty countries and the myriad smaller segments, right down to the village and the family which are the key units for a large proportion of the 2 billion people of the region. This diversity is a fact of life in today's Asia—prompting a variety of routes to nationalism and modernization, sometimes producing shaky alliances among countries such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and often provoking bitter disputes like those between Russia and China, China and Vietnam.

Third, we must see the tremendous dynamism—particularly economic dynamism—in Asia. Certainly Asia has problems of poverty and disease. But the current mood is upbeat, and many of the problems are being addressed, even in the more underdeveloped countries like Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. India and China have entered the ranks of more rapidly developing nations, and countries like Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, the Philippines, and Japan have boasted very rapid growth rates and have burst upon the world trade scene as major factors.

And finally, we must see Asia as a crucial pivot in future world affairs. The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. still hover around Asia's rim, while many Asian nations are becoming key military factors on their own. Battles still rage in Asia—most notably in Southeast Asia—and several dangerous flashpoints like Korea still exist. In economic terms, Asia's gigantic population forces the world to take note, for successes and failures in feeding these populations will have echoes around the globe. And Asians are experimenting with new approaches to development in agricultural genetics, in population control, health delivery systems, and economic cooperation. Once again the world is taking note.

For all of these reasons, Asia *will* play an increasingly important role in American lives. We hope that this series helps you to better understand the other half of the human race that occupies Asia.

QUESTIONS

1. Define the terms "traditional" and "modern." How useful are these terms in describing different Asian countries? What limitations do they have as concepts?
2. In light of Asia's tremendous diversity, how valid is the concept of "Asia"? Do India and Japan, for example, have certain cultural or psychological factors in common?
3. Some critics believe that President Carter's concept of "human rights" is culturally biased. Given the fact that Asian cultures are very different from the West, would you agree?

FURTHER READING

Norton Ginsberg, ed., *The Pattern of Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1958). A basic introduction to the geography of Asia.

Rhoads Murphey, *The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977). Insightful comparison of differing reactions to Western imperialism in India and China.

Lloyd and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967). A major scholarly work on the relationship between tradition and modernity in India. Deals with the politics of caste, the influence of Gandhi, and the transformation of law.

Sherman E. Lee, *A History of Far Eastern Art* (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1964). An excellent survey of East, Southeast, and South Asian art.

2 Program for May 16, 1979

MISUNDERSTANDING ASIA? MISUNDERSTANDING AMERICA?

Interview with Ross Terrill, Harvard University and Theodore H. White, Author

Today's program addresses a major theme of this series: the past, present, and future of Asian-American relations. In the past, we have been involved in Asia militarily and economically, but there has also been an emotional dimension to our relations.

In reviewing the military record of the last four decades, we find that since the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United States has been involved in three major Asian wars—World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Today, although we are no longer at war in Asia, the U.S. retains strong naval and air forces in the Pacific and still has ground troops stationed in South Korea. Strategically, Asia remains very important, while militarily it remains quite volatile with thousands of miles of border tensions between China and the Soviet Union, China and Vietnam, North Korea and South Korea, and Cambodia and Thailand.

As for economic relations, we see thaf American trade with Asia grew slowly from the time of the nineteenth century clipper ships to the end of World War II. But, over the past thirty years, American trade with Asia has grown by leaps and bounds. Currently, the Asian region is our most important trading area in the world and we have particularly strong trading links with Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Asia is a source of important raw materials, ranging from rubber and jute to oil and minerals, but it is also an important source of high-technology goods. The best examples are the optics and electronic industries. In the future, some of the greatest potentials and some of the greatest problems in Asian-American relations may come in the realm of trade.

The realm of mutual knowledge and understanding between Asians and Americans has often become intertwined with emotional issues. Although we have sometimes come together over the past century, our images of Asians and their images of us have often been stereotyped and fragmentary, swinging like a pendulum between extremes of love and hate.

American images of China drawn from the 1930s and 1940s offer an example of the emotional nature of these perceptions: Charlie Chan, the Chinese super-sleuth; Fu Manchu, the Chinese demon who thrived on torture; and the characters of *The Good Earth*, heroic Chinese peasants with certain rugged individualist overtones.

There is a clear challenge for both sides—to find the military balance that will bring us closer to peace, to explore the positive economic benefits in Asian-American trade while avoiding new forms of commercial warfare, and to move beyond limited knowledge and stereotypes to a greater understanding of each other's cultures and societies.

QUESTIONS

1. Over the years, China has probably held more fascination for Americans than any other country in Asia. How would you explain this in light of the history between the two countries?
2. In light of the recent outbreak of hostilities between China and Vietnam, a Vietnamese official is said to have remarked: "Vietnam is the graveyard of foreign aggressors." How is the extraordinarily persistent pattern of foreign invasion of the Indochina peninsula by countries as diverse as France, Japan, China, and the United States to be explained? Is this pattern likely to continue, and why?

3. Are there any broad trends in the history of American politices toward Asia? Have we entered a period of more realistic understanding?

FURTHER READING

David Halberstam, *The Best and the Brightest* (New York: Random House, 1972). Describes the foreign policy advisers for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations and argues that their perceptions of the cold war and communism led directly to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War.

Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967). Describes the history of American relations with Japan and China, emphasizing the importance of successive images and stereotypes.

Harold R. Isaacs, *Images of Asia: American Views of China and India* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). (Originally published as *Scratches On Our Minds.*) A thought-provoking history of American attitudes and images of China and India which examines how such perceptions are acquired.

3 Program for May 18, 1979

ROOTS OF MODERN ASIA: THE NORTH AND EAST

Interview with Ezra F. Vogel, Harvard University

This program will focus on the history, culture, and development of Northeast Asia, one of the three major regions of Asia. The next two programs will explore South and Southeast Asia.

The most populous area in the world lies within the northern and eastern regions of Asia: an estimated 1 billion people live in China, 115 million in Japan, 50 million in the two Koreas, 17 million in Taiwan, and 4 million in Hong Kong. These populations are supported by comparatively small amounts of arable land. For example, while China's population is four times larger than that of the United States, China's arable land is only one-half the size of U.S. cultivated land. Northeast Asia's traditional economy has been labor-intensive (relying heavily on human muscle power), and the growing of rice—the most prevalent crop—in flooded paddy fields is especially arduous and time-consuming work. In the traditional societies of Northeast Asia, the family rather than the individual, the state, or the church has been the most important social unit.

Northeast Asia is often described as the "Sinic world," because of the dominant cultural influences of China. Chinese civilization, which dates back over 4,000 years, had considerable impact on its neighbors, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam. The Chinese considered themselves to be at the center of the civilized world. In the heyday of the Chinese empire, the emperor received annual tribute missions from each of the outlying countries, considered "barbarians" in Chinese terms, and in return the barbarians were permitted to trade. These tributary missions stimulated the flow of Chinese culture to the outside, including Chinese art and literature, the Confucian philosophy of government, the Chinese written language, and even Chinese cuisine.

But China's influence was like the two poles of a magnet, both attracting and repelling the countries around China. The Japanese responded to these forces by selecting and refining certain features of Chinese civilization, such as Ch'an Buddhism (which the Japanese translate as Zen), and mixing with them certain features which were uniquely Japanese, such as the Samurai warrior tradition.

In more recent history, each of the countries of Northeast Asia has followed its own path to nationalism and modernization. Indeed, as a result of these differences, we have seen tensions and even warfare in the region. Witness the two wars between Japan and China (1894-95 and 1937-45), the Korean conflict (1950-53), and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. One feature that these countries have in common, aside from massive social changes in the twentieth century, is their rapid economic growth and foreign trade, most noticeable in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

Seoul, Korea, 1973

QUESTIONS

1. What are the essential characteristics of the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean civilizations?
2. What led to different culture patterns in North and East Asia from those found in the West?
3. During the nineteenth century, Japan was far more successful than China in responding to Western imperialism. Why?

FURTHER READING

James B. Crowley, ed., *Modern East Asia: Essays in Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt Brace

Jovanovich, 1971). An excellent collection of essays on both China and Japan since about 1800.

*John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: Tradition and Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973). Three Harvard scholars examine the history and culture of China, Japan, and Korea.

Marius B. Jansen, *Japan and China from War to Peace 1894-1972* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1975). An impressive modern history which compares the interactions between China and Japan as they responded to the modern world.

4 Program for May 21, 1979

ROOTS OF MODERN ASIA: THE SOUTH

Lecture by Susanne Hoeber Rudolph, University of Chicago

Just as Northeast Asia has been heavily influenced by China, the history of South Asia has been shaped by India, the world's second most populous country. South Asia, which forms the underbelly of the Asian continent, today encompasses several countries—Afghanistan and Pakistan to the west, Nepal and Bhutan to the north, Bangladesh and Burma to the east, and Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) to the south. Further to the north are the Soviet Union and China, Asia's two Communist giants, while to the south, the area is bracketed by the huge expanse of the Indian Ocean.

The key themes of this series are reflected in the history, culture, and politics of South Asia. One theme is the diversity of Asia. The geography of the area ranges from the peaks of the Himalayas over 25,000 feet high, to the jungle lowlands of the southern subcontinent. The climate contrasts a dry season, especially in the deserts to the north and west, and annual monsoon rains that drench the entire area. The region is ethnically diverse, varying from the mountain tribes of Nepal to the Tamils of South India.

A second theme concerns the mix of tradition and modernization. South Asia is one of the cradles of world civilization. Out of India came two great religions, Buddhism and Hinduism. A third major religion, Islam was introduced in the eighth century. These religions are still a fundamental fact of life for the more than one billion people who live in South Asia. Other forces of tradition persist—the caste system, the village structure, and cultural and art forms. But the forces of modernization have also been potent, leading to the growth of cities like New Delhi, the vast green revolution in agriculture, and the development of education and increased literacy. Indeed a major aspect of contemporary South Asia is the interplay of traditional and modern forces in new and often successful combinations.

A third theme bears on the importance of this region in world affairs. South Asia finds itself in the strategic calculations of other powers like China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. And as domestic situations shift within South Asia, so do international circumstances—witness the pro-Soviet stance of Afghanistan, the more assertive position of India, and the very uncertain position of neighboring Iran. South Asia, like the other parts of Asia, is critical to future patterns of world politics.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the essential characteristics of Indian and South Asian civilizations?
2. What were the philosophical antecedents in Indian civilization for Mahatma Gandhi's twentieth century belief in non-violent resistance?
3. Hinduism has coexisted and been influenced by Buddhism, Jainism, tribal religions, Islam, and Christianity. How is this religious diversity in South Asia to be explained?

FURTHER READING

*Arthur L. Basham, *The Wonder That Was India* (New York: Grove Press, 1959). A topical approach to the history and culture of the Indian subcontinent before the coming of the Muslims.

Barbara J. Harrison, ed., *Learning About India: An Annotated Guide for Nonspecialists* (New York: Foreign Area Materials Center, 1977). An excellent guide to books, audio-visual materials, source materials, and museum collections, especially useful to teachers.

Richard Lannoy, *The Speaking Tree: A Study of Indian Culture and Society* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1974). A fascinating exploration of the roots of Indian thought and civilization.

Joseph Schwartzberg, ed., *Historical Atlas of South Asia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). A comprehensive reference work of extremely high quality.

5 Program for May 23, 1979

ROOTS OF MODERN ASIA: THE SOUTHEAST

Lecture by David Morell, Princeton University

Throughout Southeast Asia today, ancient traditions and the cultural heritage of the past retain great significance. From Bangkok to Djakarta or Manila, not to mention the thousands of rural villages of the region, concepts of religion, social hierarchy, ethnicity, and family influence the thoughts and the actions of millions of people.

At the same time, powerful social changes are now surging through the countries of Southeast Asia as tradition and modernity fuse in a complex blend. The subtle and explicit impacts of the West and Japan, the apparently irresistible seduction of commercial modernization, the growing immersion of Southeast Asia's youth in a world culture, and the pressures for revolutionary restructuring of traditional political systems are all eroding the patterns of the past. This process is especially evident in the region's great urban centers, but reaches out into the vast rural hinterland as well.

Social change and economic transformation have produced explosive tensions as individuals, institutions, and nations search for new concepts of legitimacy, authority, identity, and status adequate for modern life. Resistance to such change is enormous, however, and the pursuit of order often takes the form of repression and violence.

Despite the region's enormous diversity, the impacts of modernization in each country have been similar. From the island nations (Indonesia, the Philippines, East Malaysia) to the mainland (Burma, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore); from the Buddhist countries to those of Islamic or Christian heritage; from the hill areas to the fertile alluvial valleys; from the ethnically Chinese cities to the countryside, much appears relatively modern—attractive buildings (and ugly ones); heavy traffic; air conditioning; tin roofs; corporate organizations; and government plans. Yet traditional values and aspirations resound through the substance of these modern forms.

The heritage of the past remains strongest in the region's thousands of rural villages, where "the other eighty percent" of the population still resides. Life revolves around agricultural cycles and the central focus of social action is the temple or mosque. Even so, social change and modernization by now have penetrated even the most remote villages, at least to some extent.

But the cities have changed even more rapidly, leaving the villages further and further behind. Today, the confluence of economic and political power rests overwhelmingly in the great cities of Southeast Asia—Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Djakarta, Hanoi. Each of these serves at the center of government power, the heart of national culture and religious heritage, the source of communications, education and modernity, the core of economic and commercial control. As income gaps have widened rather than narrowed over the past two decades, ethnic, social, and economic tensions have increased, and questions of meaningful political participation have been raised.

Change is both evident and inevitable; but while much of the past is no longer appropriate to the present, new concepts and new patterns of interaction have yet to be created. This is the paramount challenge facing the countries of Southeast Asia.



Imperial Palace, Bangkok

QUESTIONS

1. What are the essential characteristics of life, society, culture, and religion in the traditional societies of Southeast Asia?
2. Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity have been the predominant religions of Southeast Asia. What role has religion played in the life of Southeast Asian societies?
3. There have typically been two views of peasants—either as active and rebellious, or docile and resigned. How would you describe peasant life in different Southeast Asian cultures? What factors determined the political consciousness of a peasant?

FURTHER READING

Clifford Geertz, *Agricultural Involution: The Processes of Ecological Change in Indonesia* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), especially Chapters 2 and 6. Offers an unusual perspective on modernization and change in rural Southeast Asia.

D.G.E. Hall, *A History of Southeast Asia*, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968). Still the standard work on Southeast Asian history.

Michael Moerman, *Agricultural Change and Peasant Choice in a Thai Village* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), pp. 3-16, 33-87, 185-193. An excellent interpretation of the impact of introducing tractors into a Southeast Asian village.

*David J. Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History* (New York: Praeger, 1971), pp. 3-8 ("Introduction"), 11-21 ("The Peasant World"), and 337-413 ("The Preoccupations of Independence").

II. JAPAN AND NORTHEAST ASIA

6 Program for May 25, 1979

LEGACIES OF TRADITIONAL JAPAN

Lecture by Herbert Passin, Columbia University

The island nation of Japan will be the subject of the next five programs. The themes will include Japan's traditional history, its modernization and expansionism of the late nineteenth century, its rapid recovery after defeat in World War II, its present and future roles, and its place in U.S.-Asia relations.

Herbert Passin's lecture on legacies of traditional Japan first introduces basic information about geography, population, and language.

Japan's total land area is the size of California. Yet 85 percent of the land surface is mountainous, leaving only 15 percent of the land for agriculture. The four main islands are Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido—no part of Japan is more than 100 miles from the sea. The Japanese have virtually no natural resources for modern industry.

Japan's geographic isolation offers one explanation for its distinctive history. Prior to World War II, Japan was never conquered by foreigners, and was seriously endangered only once—by the Mongols in the thirteenth century. This meant that traditions were able to survive. On the other hand, their insularity made the Japanese very conscious of, but not opposed to, borrowing from other cultures.

The most important foreign influence came from China, particularly during China's Sui and T'ang dynasties. The vast influx of Chinese culture during this period included Buddhism, the Confucian system of government, other aspects of Chinese philosophy, the Chinese system of writing with ideographs, and art and music. The Chinese form of government was used to centralize power and to institutionalize a ruling elite.

Without question, traditional concepts of society and culture continue to affect contemporary values in Japan. The interplay between the past and the present is often complex and ambiguous. In fact, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between old and new since traditional society had many "modern" features—the strong emphasis on literacy and education during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is one example. Today's lecture will describe some of these legacies which can be traced in the historical and archaeological record back over 2,500 years.

A Festival Day in Japan

QUESTIONS

1. The position of the emperor in Japan has been continuous for almost 2,000 years. What has been the significance of the emperor's position in Japanese culture and politics?
2. What role has geographic isolation played in Japan's history?
3. Buddhism originated in India and reached Japan by way of China in the sixth century. What was the appeal of Buddhism in Japan and how was it adapted?
4. Describe the role of the warrior class—the samurai—in Japanese history. What effect, if any, does the martial tradition have on Japanese culture today?

FURTHER READING

Ruth F. Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1946). A classic study of Japanese attitudes and values.

*John W. Hall, *Japan: From Prehistory to Modern Times* (New York: Dell, 1971). A straightforward and readable introduction which emphasizes Japan's pre-modern institutional history.

Donald Keene, ed., *Anthology of Japanese Literature From the Earliest Era to the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (New York: Grove Press, 1955). An excellent selection of translations from the poems, plays, and novels. Keene's introduction reviews the history of Japanese literature.

H. Paul Varley, *Japanese Culture: A Short History* (New York: Praeger, 1973). Surveys the development of Japanese culture, including art, literature, theatre, and thought.

7 Program for May 28, 1979

JAPAN: MODERNIZATION TO ULTRA-NATIONALISM

Lecture by Herbert Passin, Columbia University

Why was Japan able to modernize so rapidly in the late nineteenth century? Herbert Passin mentions six reasons: (1) The samurai were a dedicated, hereditary elite who had strong motives for changing the status quo; (2) Japan felt a strong sense of threat from the outside world, particularly after the arrival of U.S. Commodore Perry and his black ships in 1853; (3) prior to modernization. Japan had the most advanced educational system of any non-Western society, including a high rate of literacy; (4) Japan's ethnic, racial, religious, and cultural homogeneity served the cause of unity; (5) the institution of the emperor was used to help achieve unity; and (6) the traditional culture had strong "achievement orientation"—hard work was a virtue, the individual identified with the group, and there was a strong sense of competitiveness with other groups.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Japan experimented with democracy but became increasingly authoritarian. The government looked to Germany and Austria, rather than to the United States or England, for political models. The motives for this were complex but included the goal of becoming strong enough to avoid being conquered by the West and the demand for parity and equality in order to put an end to unequal treaties, Western control of customs, and Western extra-territorial courts. The main slogans of the time were *fukoku kyohei*—"rich country, strong military"—and *bunmei kaika*—"civilization and enlightenment."

The other explanation for authoritarian tendencies is that Japan's modernization took place during the age of imperialism. In late nineteenth century terms, achieving equality seemed to mean being an equal with imperial powers like England, Russia, and France. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) led to Japan's acquisition of Taiwan, the Russo-Japanese War (1904-05) was followed by Japan's annexation of Korea in 1910, and during World War I, Japan took over German possessions in Asia and the Pacific.

The Great Depression of the early 1930s stifled the liberalism of the 1920s leading to the military totalitarianism of the late thirties and forties. Japan's quest for natural resources, and the fear that other powers would block this effort, contributed to the decision to invade China in 1937 and to attack the United States in 1941.

QUESTIONS

1. Japan launched a modernization program after the 1868 Meiji Restoration, and won wars against China in 1895 and Russia in 1905. How was Japan able to modernize so rapidly?
2. What political, economic, and social factors contributed to the rise of militarism in Japan during the 1930s?
3. How did the leaders of the nineteenth century Meiji Restoration define democracy? What did they use as models, and what cultural traditions led them to believe that democracy could be achieved?

FURTHER READING

*W.G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan* (New York: Praeger, 1963). Stresses Japan's social, economic, and political history from the early nineteenth century to postwar Japan.

Hugh Borton, *Japan's Modern century From Perry to 1970*, 2nd ed. (New York: Ronald Press Edition, 1970). A well-written book which includes a good description of the Occupation after World War II.

Marius B. Jansen, ed., *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965). A collection of essays by well-known specialists on Japan's growth since 1854.

George B. Sansom, *The Western World and Japan: A Study in the Interaction of European and Asiatic Cultures* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950). A classic study which emphasizes the lasting importance of Japanese tradition and the selective nature of Westernization in Japan.

8 Program for May 30, 1979

THE EMERGENCE OF TODAY'S JAPAN

Interview with Hugh T. Patrick, Yale University and Ezra F. Vogel, Harvard University

Japan's 115 million people enjoy the highest living standard in Asia. It is now the world's third largest economy, after the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and the third largest democracy after the U.S. and India.

Its big cities are ultra-modern, its railroads are the fastest in the world, and its ships carry Japanese goods to all points around the globe. Many nations import large quantities of Japanese products, ranging from cameras to cars; indeed Japan ranks as America's second trading partner in the world, after Canada. The problems facing Japan today are similar to those of other advanced industrial countries—inflation, urban congestion, and industrial pollution, along with increased material wealth.

Today's program will seek to explain this remarkable postwar economic growth. Japan rose like a phoenix from the ashes of World War II. The original purpose of the Allied Occupation, headed by General Douglas MacArthur, was to make Japan peaceful and democratic. The Occupation touched almost every aspect of Japanese life—its constitution and politics, its school system, its economic structure, and later, its agrarian society and land ownership. The new constitution revoked the divine status of the emperor but not the emperor himself, and it also removed Japan's right to wage war.

With the outbreak of the Korean War and the onset of the cold war in 1950, the Occupation's purpose was reconsidered. The United States encouraged Japanese corporations to develop Japan into an economic ally. A military alliance was concluded in 1952. Japan's re-emergence was due in large part to the revival of pre-war institutions and traditions. Social values, the role of government, and the organization of Japanese industry were just some of the factors that have led this cramped island nation, with almost no natural resources, to become an economic giant.

QUESTIONS

1. Was the American occupation of Japan after World War II an unqualified success?
2. Japan is an industrialized nation with extremely limited natural resources. Nevertheless, the yen is the strongest currency in the world and Japanese interest rates are among the lowest in the world. How has this been accomplished?
3. Japanese women received the right to vote in the 1947 Constitution. What effect has this had on politics and society in Japan?
4. How was Japan able to recover and develop so rapidly after the devastation of World War II?

FURTHER READING

Ronald Butow, *Japan's Decision to Surrender* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954). A careful study of the events leading to the ending of World War II.

Herbert Feis, *Japan Subdued: The Atomic Bomb and the End of the War in the Pacific* (Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1961). A survey of both Japanese and Western attitudes regarding the American decision to use the atom bomb.

James W. Morley, *Dilemmas of Growth in Prewar Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971). A collection of essays on early twentieth century Japanese democracy.

John Toland, *The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945* (New York: Random House, 1970). A vivid popular history of the war in the Pacific between Japan and the United States.

9 Program for June 1, 1979

WHITHER JAPAN?

Interview with Kazuo Nukazawa, Keidanren (Federation of Industrial Organizations) and Ezra F. Vogel, Harvard University

The past three programs have examined the broad sweep of Japanese history—the legacies of 2,000 years of tradition, the sweeping changes of modernization, the rise of ultra-nationalism in the 100 years leading up to World War II, and the extraordinary economic growth since the war. Some of the explanations for Japan's growth include the transformation of society and economy during the Allied Occupation (1946-52), the tremendous influence of the Japanese business corporation over many aspects of life, the heavy involvement of the government in industry, and the persistence of traditional values which help support organization, discipline, savings, and productivity.

This program will look more closely at today's Japan and ahead to Japan's future. One major debate concerns the future of Japan's industrial growth. Some argue that Japanese business society, best typified by close ties between powerful corporations and government, is a dynamic and viable approach that should be continued. Others disagree, pointing to the problems of industrial growth including pollution and rampant urban sprawl, and advocate less growth—perhaps even zero-growth.

Another question is how well Japan will be able to survive future economic shocks. The 1970s began with what the Japanese called the "Nixon shocks"—the surprise opening to China, the increase in American tariffs, and devaluation of the dollar. Other shocks came in the mid-1970s, particularly oil price increases and growing protectionism from American and other consumers of Japanese goods. Recognizing these problems, the Japanese have increasingly mixed diplomacy and economics.

Japan has pursued an "all-directions" foreign policy which, in theory, favors no one. This may prove more difficult in the future. As the United States lowered its military posture in Asia, announcing a withdrawal of ground troops from Korea, Japan has begun to question the wisdom of relying on the protection of others. Another factor raising doubts in Japanese minds is increased Soviet military presence in Northeast Asia. Reassessment of Japan's defense policies and the 1978 signing of a friendship treaty with China over Soviet objections are just two signs that Japan's profile in foreign affairs may become more and more visible in the years to come.

Japan's Emperor Hirohito and Wife an 50th Anniversary of Enthronement (1976)

QUESTIONS

1. Article 9 of Japan's 1947 Constitution states that "the Japanese people forever renounce war as the sovereign right of the nation." Nevertheless, Japan will spend an estimated $10 billion for defense in 1979. What are the implications if Japan decides to rearm?
2. Have the Japanese succeeded in mixing elements of traditional culture and Western life? What tensions exist between the two? What traditional attitudes have persisted?
3. The Liberal Democratic Party has dominated Japan's national politics for the past twenty-five years. Does Japan still have a two-party system of government?

FURTHER READING

*Edwin O. Reischauer, *The Japanese* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977). A look at social and political attitudes which make Japan what it is today.

Robert J. Smith, *Kurusu: The Price of Progress in a Japanese Village 1951-1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978). An example of the social changes faced by an industrialized Japan.

Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class: The Salary Man and His Family in a Tokyo Suburb*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). A case study of modern urban life in Japan.

10 Program for June 4, 1979

JAPAN, ASIA, AND THE UNITED STATES

Interview with Kazuo Nukazawa, Keidanren (Federation of Industrial Organizations) and Hugh T. Patrick, Yale University

Today's program is last in a series of five dealing with Japan. Japan's postwar experience typifies many of the aspirations of the rest of Asia—rapid economic growth to the point that it is now the world's third most industrialized country, a powerful sense of nationalism now turned to economic rather than military ends, and a proven commitment to democracy—making it the world's third largest democracy. But Japan's 115 million people are now confronting some difficult issues—how much to emphasize continued rapid growth, how to handle pollution and inflation, how to acquire oil and energy supplies in their resource-poor country, how to find satisfying mixes of traditional and modern values.

In today's program we look at another dimension of Japan—its external relations with the United States, with various Asian powers, and with other Asian nations. U.S.-Japanese relations have shifted radically over the past half-century. In World War II we were bitter enemies and the very words *kamikaze* and *banzai* evoked fear and hatred. During the postwar Occupation, the Japanese responded very positively to General Douglas MacArthur, and policies of socio-economic reform and liberalization prompted new bonds of friendship between the two countries.

Since the late 1940s, Japan has operated under an American "nuclear umbrella," with American air and naval bases, and without a major offensive military force of its own. Clearly Japan—in security terms and in terms of trade, estimated at $37 billion in 1978—is our most important partner in the Pacific, just as we are Japan's most important ally in the world. But the relationship has its problems. Earlier disagreements over American bases and nuclear weapons, and recent disputes in the realm of trade, raise questions about the future.

But the Tokyo-Washington connection is only part of the story. Some have suggested that we have left the era of a two-sided cold war and entered a new era of four-power politics in Asia—Russia, China, the United States, and Japan. It is an era with difficult diplomatic, commercial, and strategic relationships among all four nations—witness Tokyo's recent trade agreement and friendship treaty with Peking, and the subsequent souring of Tokyo-Moscow relations. One must also look beyond the giant powers to the other countries of Asia where Tokyo is developing important political and economic relationships, particularly in Southeast Asia.

QUESTIONS

1. The annual increase in U.S.-Japan trade exceeds the total of U.S. trade with mainland China, yet we seem unable to resolve our trade problems with Japan. Why?
2. Japan is the United States' single most important ally in Asia, but we hear relatively little about Japan in our press. Why?
3. The U.S.-Japan relationship has evolved from client state to interdependence. What are the prospects for the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance?
4. How will the normalization of U.S.-China relations affect U.S. relations with Japan?

FURTHER READING

M. Blaker, *Japanese International Negotiating Style* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Changes in the handling of Japanese foreign policy over the last century.

J.E. Endicott, *Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical and Strategic* (New York: Praeger, 1975). A look at the alternatives to nuclear development.

W.L. Neuman, *America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1963). Reviews the shifts in Japan-America relations between 1853 and 1945.

Robert Scalapino, ed., *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). A study of Japanese attitudes and their effect on foreign relations.

11 Program for June 6, 1979

KOREA: CROSSROADS OF ASIA

Interview with Richard L. Sneider, former U.S. Ambassador to Korea and Donald S. Zagoria, Hunter College

For most Americans, Korea evokes memories of a bloody war. For those too young to remember the Korean War of 1950-53, we now have the television program "M.A.S.H." where humor offers a counterpoint to the human misery of a Korean battlefield hospital.

Although there is no war today in Korea, these military images remind us that Korea remains a flashpoint in Asia. Since the late 1940s, Korea has been divided into a Communist north supported by the U.S.S.R. and China, and a non-Communist south supported by the U.S. and Japan. In the 1970s, there have been efforts to open negotiations between the two Koreas, but there have also been border incidents along the thirty-eighth parallel.

The Koreans have lived with military tension throughout much of their history. Korean civilization evolved under the powerful shadow of imperial China, to which Korea sent tribute missions every year. Korean culture became a fascinating mixture of foreign and domestic influences, sometimes producing stunningly original art forms. (A major exhibition of Korean art will appear in seven cities in the U.S. during 1979-81.) From 1910-46, Korea came under the influence of an increasingly powerful Japan. Not until after World War II did Korea assume its present divided form.

North Korea is a tightly controlled Communist state under its ruler for the past thirty years, Kim Il Sung. Although once closely affiliated with the Soviet Union, North Korea now leans more closely toward Peking. Economically, it is a poor country—far behind South Korea—but its military strength has been increased in recent years.

South Korea, by contrast, ranks with Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore as another economic success story in Asia. Seoul is a modern city which spearheads South Korea's growth as a major exporter and attractive investment for foreign capital. South Korea is the world's fourteenth largest economy.

Both Koreas face many difficult questions. What about human rights under South Korea's leader, Park Chung Hee? What about the American policy of troop withdrawal—will it lead to instability and perhaps a North Korean invasion? All Koreans share the ideal of a unified nation—can the Korean situation ever be resolved?

QUESTIONS

1. Should the United States withdraw its military forces from South Korea? Should ground forces by significantly reduced, as now planned by the Carter administration?
2. Are there limits to South Korea's spectacular economic growth? What are the non-economic factors which will influence future economic development?
3. What would be the advantages and disadvantages of unification of North and South Korea from the perspectives of these two countries? What would be the advantages for the Soviet Union, China, and the United States?
4. North Korea's Kim Il Sung has been the center of a personality cult for many years. What purpose does the personality cult serve in a Communist society? Compare Kim Il Sung and South Korea's Park Chung Hee as leaders.

FURTHER READING

William E. Henthorn, *A History of Korea* (New York: The Free Press, 1971). A survey of Korean history from the pre-historic period to the end of the Yi dynasty in 1910. Henthorn offers his own interpretations of Korea's ethical systems, art and literature, social structure, and educational methods.

Michael Keon, *Korean Phoenix: A Nation From the Ashes* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall International, 1977). A journalistic account of the accomplishments of Korea under the leadership of President Park Chung Hee.

Evelyn McCune, *The Arts of Korea* (Rutland, Vt.: Charles E. Tuttle, 1962). An intelligent survey of Korean arts, including painting, metal work, sculpture, and ceramics.

III. CHINA

12 Program for June 8, 1979

LEGACIES OF IMPERIAL CHINA

Lecture by Lyman P. Van Slyke, Stanford University

No matter how new or revolutionary a society may feel itself to be, legacies of the past are bequeathed to later times. No nation, no people can cancel all the many claims of its past upon its present and future.

For China, one obvious but often overlooked determinant of the present is the physical legacies of the past. Van Slyke describes China's geographical extent, developed through a process of expansion, migration, and consolidation. Another factor is population, which experienced major growth between 1779 and 1850 from about 275 million to 430 million. This pre-modern population explosion is the foundation of the nearly one billion citizens of China today, one-fourth of the world's population. Ethnically, the Chinese people are far more uniform than is the case with Americans. Minorities account for only 5 percent of the total population; the 95 percent majority is known as "Han Chinese."

Another part of the mosaic of past and present is the relation between the people and the land of China. China continues to be land-poor, with only some 15 percent of her vast area suitable for cultivation. Large areas—hills, mountains, arid zones—are very thinly populated, while the plains, river valleys, and lowlands are among the world's most densely inhabited regions. All this means that highly labor-intensive agriculture is essential to get the largest possible yields. Approximately 80 percent of the population must produce enough to feed both itself and the other 20 percent.

A final element which continues to influence the present is regional diversity. Chinese have traditionally identified with their local community, their province, and their region. They still do, even as these sentiments now exist alongside feelings of nationalism. Differences of dialect and distinctive cuisines are only two of the many ways in which regionalism exerts itself. Regional diversity and a strong sense of local loyalty are still major facts of life in China.

Equally important are China's cultural legacies—the beliefs, values, attitudes, and ways in which the society has functioned. One of China's most powerful legacies is the sense of continuity with the past, and collective memories of China's historic greatness. A second attitude is that China is and should be a single political unit. This conviction has remained unshaken ever since the first unification of China in 220 B.C. The idea of "two Chinas" runs counter to one of the most deeply held beliefs shared by politically articulate Chinese of all ages. One might almost as well ask a devout Christian to accept the principle of "two Gods."

A third persistent belief is that the individual finds fulfillment by playing out prescribed roles as a member of organized social groups, and that the structure of such groups is essentially authoritarian and hierarchical. To this day, for most Chinese individualism smacks of anarchy, selfishness, and irresponsibility. A final cultural legacy is the Chinese written language, the most powerful unifying factor of all. These non-phonetic written graphs or characters, uniform throughout China, permit a nationwide communication system that helped to create a single and singular empire.

The legacies bequeathed by the imperial past to the socialist present in China are rich, complex, and contradictory. Much has changed, but in the course of 4,000 years, the world's most enduring and most populous civilization has left an indelible record deeply imprinted, in many ways, on every Chinese.

QUESTIONS

1. China has been faced with the problem of feeding a large population with comparatively little arable land for several centuries. How has this fact shaped Chinese society and influenced the course of Chinese history?
2. What accounts for the remarkable longevity of traditional China as a political entity for over 2,000 years?
3. For several hundred years, the Chinese bureaucracy was recruited through an examination system that was open to almost anyone. What were the strengths and weaknesses of this system?

FURTHER READING

Jean Chesneaux, "Secret Societies in China's Historical Evolution," in Chesneaux, ed., *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840-1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972), pp. 1-12. A description of China's persistent tradition of popular resistance to established authority.

*John K. Fairbank, *China: The People's Middle Kingdom and the U.S.A.* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967). Especially Part I, three essays on "China's Revolution in the Light of Her Past."

John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), Chapters 1-5. Well-written background information on key elements of Chinese civilization and culture.

Charles O. Hucker, *China to 1850: A Short History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1978). A straightforward chronological introduction to the history of traditional Chinese civilization.

13 Program for June 11, 1979

CHINA: IMPERIALISM, NATIONALISM, COMMUNISM

Lecture by Lyman P. Van Slyke, Stanford University

China's revolution has been perhaps the most immense and sustained upheaval in human history. And it is a revolution that is still far from finished. One way to understand these vast changes is to take note of two kinds of forces: those arising from within China itself, and those assailing China from without.

Internally, as early as the 1790s, the 150-year-old Ch'ing dynasty was already beginning to show the familiar signs of dynastic decline, including the gradual loss of imperial vigor; neglect of vital irrigation, flood control, and transportation works; an idle army going soft on garrison duty; corruption and self-interest on the rise. These factors, plus a doubling of the population, led to a massive rebellion in 1850 which shook the dynasty and threatened to topple it.

From the outside, ever-increasing numbers of foreigners sought trade with China during the early 1800s. When the British required something to exchange for Chinese tea, they stumbled on opium. The opium issue then became a lightning rod for a clash between two world views, as the aggressive, free-trading, industrializing West confronted the insular, self-sufficient, and agrarian attitudes of the Chinese. The result of two "Opium Wars" (1840-42 and 1858-60) was a series of "Unequal Treaties." These treaties created a group of treaty ports and foreign leaseholds, exempted foreigners from Chinese law, and allowed foreigners the freedom of religious propagation.

When the Ch'ing dynasty finally collapsed in 1911, it marked the end of a system of government which has persisted in China since 220 B.C., one of the longest lived political forms in world history.

China's search for a new order during the first half of the twentieth century encompassed three revolutionary waves. First came the Republican Revolution of 1911-12, associated with Sun Yat-sen, which delivered the final blow to the Manchu Ch'ing dynasty. The second wave came in 1927 and led to the supremacy of Chaing Kai-shek and the Nationalist Party (the Kuomintang). The third revolution reached its culmination in 1949 when the forces of the Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung, swept the defeated Nationalists from the mainland and announced the creation of the People's Republic of China.

The transition from the imperial system to the world's largest socialist nation was a painful ordeal. The early years were plagued by the disorder of the warlords. Domestic frustrations were compounded by increasingly blatant Japanese imperialism. One reaction was the "May Fourth Movement," a political awakening of cultural iconoclasm and nationalist protest named after the day in 1919 when it erupted in Peking.

Out of the same ferment came the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 1921. In a marriage of convenience, the Nationalists and Communists allied, but they split in 1927 after the success of the Northern Expedition. Chiang Kai-shek never quite destroyed the Communists, and they fled to remote mountainous rural areas, where they began to build a new movement from the ashes of the old.



China's Chou En-lai (1898-1976)

Having nowhere else to turn, the Chinese Communists turned to the peasant. Through a combination of ideology, practical reforms, and physical pressure, the Communists achieved substantial success. For their part, the Nationalists concentrated on exterminating the Communists once and for all, and forced them onto the 6,000-mile Long March in 1934. The Japanese army, however, refused to allow Chaing Kai-shek the luxury of eliminating the Communists before dealing with Japan.

The eight years of war between China and Japan (1937-45) was a disaster for the Nationalists and an opportunity successfully grasped by the Chinese Communists. This was largely because the Communists had learned how to control and mobilize the peasantry, how to enlist their sympathy and active support. By contrast, the Nationalists had never learned to trust the peasantry or how to organize them effectively.

After World War II, the United States sought to help China and Chaing Kai-shek to find a negotiated solution and to avoid open civil war with the Communists. But corruption, war weariness, and the terrible effects of uncontrolled inflation all eroded confidence in the Nationalist cause. The tide turned and became an implacably rising, engulfing flood. The Nationalists finally fled to their island refuge of Taiwan, and Mao Tse-tung announced the founding of the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the internal and external factors which led to the collapse of the traditional Chinese empire in 1911?
2. What similarities and differences did Chaing Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung have as political leaders?
3. Was anti-Japanese nationalism more important than social reforms in building popular support for the Communists from 1937-45? How would you explain the factors leading to the success of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949?
4. How did Mao solve the problem of adapting Marxism to the needs of Chinese nationalism?

FURTHER READING

Lucien Bianco, *Origins of the Chinese Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971). A balanced and well-written treatment for the general reader, stressing the deepening social crises overtaking China during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

W.J.F. Jenner, ed., *Modern Chinese Stories* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). A collection of short stories which reflect the revolutionaries of the twentieth century.

Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York: Grove Press, 1971). A classic introduction to Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese revolution, written in 1938.

14 Program for June 13, 1979

MAO'S CHINA

Interview with A. Doak Barnett, The Brookings Institution and Victor Hao Li, Stanford University

This program is the third in a series on China. It focuses on the history of Mao's China from 1949 to 1976.

China's 1 billion people see 1949 as a key turning point, the date when Mao Tse-tung's Communists won the civil war and forced Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists to retreat to the island of Taiwan. A new chapter in the Chinese revolution had begun under a new government called the

People's Republic of China (PRC). The dominant leaders for the next twenty-seven years were Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Communist Party, and Chou En-lai, Premier of the government.

The quarter century of Mao's China was a turbulent era, filled with remarkable accomplishments and equally remarkable setbacks. In the 1950s, under a period of cooperation between China and the Soviet Union, the Chinese carried out land reform, collectivized agriculture into various units including the large communes, and gave a strong push to industrial production. During these years, China began to recover from the disruptions and ferments of the early twentieth century—to provide food for most of the population, to greatly expand literacy, and to establish a unified national government. But it was also a decade of tension on China's borders, beginning with the Korean War of 1950-53, and continuing with the split between Moscow and Peking in 1960.

Chinese Modernization Poster

The 1960s was a decade of upheaval. In the early sixties, China sought to recover from Mao's Great Leap Forward, an attempt to modernize and communize overnight which ended in economic disaster. The late 1960s brought the spectacle of the Cultural Revolution, a movement which shut down the schools, brought out the Red Guards, led to the brink of civil war, and called in the army to restore order.

The early 1970s ushered in an effort to put China back together again—to open the schools, restrain the army, and prime the economy. But this was also a period of rapid change and uncertainty, ranging from border clashes with the Russians to fundamentally changed relations with the United States and Japan. These and other tensions in Chinese society assumed acute form when both Chou En-lai and Mao Tse-tung died in 1976.

QUESTIONS

1. After embracing the Soviet Union as an ally and model in the early 1950s, a deep split developed between China and the U.S.S.R. Why?
2. After winning the civil war in 1949, the Chinese Communists faced the dilemma of creating and running a socialist society. How was this attempted and how successful has the attempt been? Is failure inherent in the very success of revolution?
3. The Cultural Revolution caused massive disruptions in Chinese society during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Why did the Cultural Revolution take place? Did it have any positive social or political results?

FURTHER READING

William Hinton, *Fanshen: A Documentary of Revolution in a Chinese Village* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966). Vivid eye-witness account of the Communist land reform movement in a North China village.

Maurice Meisner, *Mao's China: A History of the People's Republic* (New York: The Free Press, 1978). A comprehensive political history of the 1949-76 period which centers on the tasks of building a socialist society.

Dick Wilson, ed., *Mao Tse-tung in the Scales of History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Scholarly assessments of Mao as a philosopher, Marxist, political leader, soldier, teacher, economist, patriot, statesman, and as a Chinese.

15 Program for June 15, 1979

CHINA AFTER MAO

Interview with A. Doak Barnett, The Brookings Institution and Victor Hao Li, Stanford University

This program brings the story of China up to the present—looking at the years since 1976, the years of China after Mao.

Nineteen seventy-six was a dramatic dividing line for China. The month of January brought the death of Premier Chou En-lai, cosmopolitan statesman and diplomat. In February, Hua Kuo-feng was unexpectedly appointed as acting premier. Major riots occurred in Peking's T'ien-an-men square in April. July saw a devastating earthquake in north China, with huge losses of life and property, foreshadowing the political upheaval ahead—the death in September of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, leader of the Communist revolution since the mid-1930s. This was followed by the purge of the so-called "Gang of Four" (Mao's widow and three radical cohorts), and the appointment of Hua Kuo-feng as new party chairman in October.

Since then, China has embarked on a massive new campaign to modernize the country under the slogan of "four modernizations"—industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national defense. The ensuing changes have been readily apparent:

*Schools and universities now emphasize rigorous testing and entrance examinations.

*Many workers have received wage increases and bonuses, and factories are stressing production standards and worker discipline.

*Foreign trade is booming with huge contracts for such high-technology items as computers, jet aircraft, and steel mills, as well as such consumer goods as coca-cola, imported mainly for foreign tourists.

*China's new openness to the outside world has been characterized by new treaties with Japan and normalized relations with Washington, but also by new military clashes on the Vietnam border and continued tensions with the Soviet Union.

The most powerful politician behind all this is Vice Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a tough survivor of two purges and fifty years of Communist revolution.

Post-Mao China is clearly a different era from Mao's China. But will it last? What are the prospects—and the problems—for the future?

QUESTIONS

1. China' future development as a modern power depends heavily on internal political stability. What are the prospects?
2. The great bulk of China's population, perhaps 800 million people, live in the countryside. What do we know about how these people have reacted to China's "great leap outward" and efforts to modernize by the year 2000.
3. Why do the Chinese use wall posters to express political views? Is there any connection between modernization and democracy in China?
4. China has launched a campaign to modernize agriculture, industry. science and technology, and defense. What will determine the success or the failure of China's "four modernizations" program?

FURTHER READING

Gordon Bennett, *Huadong: The Story of a Chinese Commune* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1978). Describes the government, economy, society, and culture of a commune near the southern city of Canton.

Ross Terrill, ed., *The China Difference* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979). Sixteen American China specialists examine Chinese values and how they have changed in the realms of culture, society, and politics.

James R. Townsend, *Politics in China*, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979). Describes the structure and evolution of the political system in the PRC.

16 Program for June 18, 1979

TAIWAN

Interview with Jeroma A. Cohen, Harvard University and James Chieh Hsiung, New York University

American attention has been focused on the island of Taiwan several times in the past thirty years. The first occasion was during the late 1940s as Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists retreated to the island after losing the mainland to the Chinese Communists. In 1950, President Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to protect the Nationalists. During the 1950s, a mutual defense treaty was signed between the United States and Taiwan, and a crisis over two offshore islands led to the brink of war with the Chinese Communists. The year 1975 marked the death of Chiang Kai-shek, leader of the Nationalist movement since the 1920s.

Taiwan captured our attention once again in the late 1970s when there were riots in the capital city of Taipei to protest President Carter's decision to normalize relations with Peking. New unofficial relations between the U.S. and Taiwan were established in early 1979 with sub-diplomatic organizations, continued trade and cultural relations, and continued American sale of defensive weapons to Taiwan. Taiwan remains quite important to the United States. In commercial terms alone, U.S.-Taiwan trade exceeded $7 billion in 1978.

But Taiwan deserves our attention for other reasons as well. First, Americans wonder about the future security of this island of 17 million people. Taiwan has substantial armed forces and a potent array of defensive weapons including interceptor aircraft, missiles, and amphibious craft. But Taiwan's ability to defend itself remains a concern.

Another important topic is Taiwan's economy. Taiwan today is a vigorous economic success story. Its growth rate continues at 8-10 percent a year, its foreign trade extends across Asia, Europe, and the United States, and its per capita income is one of the highest in Asia. Can such growth be continued?

Finally, we wonder about Taiwan's future political and diplomatic roles. Will the island remain stable after the death of the present ruler, Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, now in his late sixties? Will the future rulers seek to establish Taiwan as an independent country? Will they seek to deal with China in more militant ways, for example, establishing an alliance with the Soviets or developing nuclear weapons? Or will they try to find some kind of economic, and perhaps political, accommodation with mainland China?

QUESTIONS

1. Some observers have suggested that Taiwan might some day relinquish its claim to represent all of China and attempt to establish itself as a separate legal entity. What are the chances of this happening? How would the Communist Chinese react?
2. How has the relationship between native Taiwanese and the Chinese mainlanders, who have dominated Taiwan since 1949, changed over the past three decades?
3. What similarities and differences are there between Chinese culture in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China?
4. What are the prospects of Taiwan's being able to survive as an international nonentity, lacking formal diplomatic ties with most of the world?

FURTHER READING

Hungdah Chiu, ed., *China and the Taiwan Issue* (New York: Praeger, 1979). A collection of documents concerning Taiwan's history, political, and economic developments, including U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Ralph N. Clough, *Island China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978). Traces Taiwan's political history, economic development, and foreign relations in the post-World War II period. Includes an analysis of Taiwan's role in U.S.-China relations.

George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement, 1895-1945* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1974) and *Formosa Betrayed* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965). The history of Taiwan under Japanese and early Chinese Nationalist rule, sympathetic to the Taiwanese point of view.

17 Program for June 20, 1979

DRAGON AND EAGLE

Interview with Jerome A. Cohen, Harvard University and Winston Lord, Council on Foreign Relations

The 1970s has been a decade in which enormous attention was focused on U.S.-China relations: 1971—an American ping-pong team opens up a new era; 1972—President Nixon's famous voyage to China sets off a wave of fascination with things Chinese in America; the mid-1970s—U.S.-China trade begins to pick up with items like Boeing jet aircraft, and Americans begin traveling to China by the tens of thousands. Then December 15, 1978—President Carter announces normalization of relations between Peking and Washington. And early 1979—China's Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing makes a widely publicized trip to the United States.

The 1970s make a striking contrast to the years of the 1950s and 1960s. In the early 1950s, Chinese troops and American GIs battled in Korea. Images of hatred were popular in both countries. In the 1960s, the Vietnam conflict led many to believe that the United States and China were on a collision course. Fortunately, we avoided that collision. And indeed it was the border collision between China and Russia in the late 1960s that set the stage for the Nixon-Mao meeting and for the eventual normalization of relations.

But now that we have normalized diplomatic relations, there are still many unresolved questions. First, what about trade? A lot of businesspeople are excited about the China market—after all, a billion people is an impressive market—but many economic analysts are warning that China trade may develop slowly, and that the Chinese may not be able to pay for large amounts of American technology.

Second, what about arms sales? Should we seek to develop closer military relations with the Chinese? Should we sell them such advanced defensive technology as electronic surveillance equipment, anti-tank weapons, computers, and rapid transport vehicles?

Finally, how should we deal with China in big power relations? Should we tilt toward China—playing the "China card" as some would put it? Or should we seek to keep a more balanced position between Peking and Moscow? All these questions are on the post-normalization agenda between Washington and Peking.

QUESTIONS

1. In what ways has China been an issue in American domestic politics during the twentieth century?
2. What were the circumstances which led to normalization of U.S.-China relations on January 1, 1979?
3. What does the United States stand to gain (strategically, diplomatically, economically) now that it has diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China? What dangers do you see in the new relationship?

FURTHER READING

Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1971). Considers how American statesmen, from Caleb Cushing in the 1840s to Richard Nixon in the 1970s, developed U.S. China policy.

Harry Harding, *China and the U.S.: Normalization and Beyond* (New York: Foreign Policy Association and the China Council of The Asia Society, 1979). This pamphlet lucidly surveys the new context of U.S.-China relations, identifies the major issues, and describes the benefits and the problems likely to arise from U.S. policy.

Michel Oksenberg and Robert B. Oxnam, eds., *Dragon and Eagle: United States-China Relations, Past and Future* (New York: Basic Books, 1978). A series of articles by thirteen specialists, offering historical background and critical commentary on bilateral issues ranging from trade to cultural exchange.

Barbara W. Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911-45* (New York: Macmillan, 1971). The story of twentieth century Chinese-American relations through World War II, exemplified by the career of General Joseph Stilwell.

IV. INDIA AND SOUTH ASIA

18 Program for June 22, 1979

INDIA: LEGACIES OF THE PAST

Lecture by Philip K. Oldenburg, Columbia University

The line between being *bound* by tradition and being *rich* in traditions is a thin one, and Oldenburg argues that India is firmly on the side of having a rich and productive tradition. Even the most "backward" traditions have "modern" elements, and seemingly irrational beliefs turn out to have a good deal of common sense on closer examination. It is misleading to think of India in terms of "tradition" versus "modernity" since we tend to believe that (1) "tradition" represents a frozen pattern without change, and (2) "traditional" means irrational while "modern" means rational, logical, and scientific. Indeed, change is an essential part of India's tradition.

Even the caste system has proven remarkably resilient to the challenge of the modern world and has survived because of its ability to adapt. Caste still determines to a large extent occupation, marriage, and social position, but castes have banded together to form associations to lobby the government, found private colleges, and provide other social services. While untouchables are still

Eighth Century Ten-armed Ganesha, Central India subjected to considerable social and economic discrimination, it is legally forbidden to discriminate against untouchables in education, public hiring, or entry into public places. New categories of jobs are not monopolized by any particular caste; urban living patterns show little evidence of caste restrictions; and in a democratic system where numbers count, the higher caste candidates bend their knee to the lower castes.

The seemingly irrational practice of having large families actually makes sense because security in old age can only be provided by a son. Since one son may be unsuccessful and another may not survive, there must be at least three male infants, or at least six children (girls leave their parents after marriage and cannot help their aged parents). Having several sons represents the *only* chance for a poor villager, typically a man with no land or only a tiny plot of land, to improve his family's economic and social position. Even a slight chance of improving one's lot is better than none, so having more children is a rational choice.

Other aspects of the Indian tradition are strikingly modern. There is a deep and long heritage of religious toleration, for example. Non-violence and reverence for life is an idea that has roots in India which go back 2,500 years. And the sacred cow is a valuable, ecologically efficient resource as a producer of oxen, as well as a source of dung used for fertilizer, cooking fuel, and housing construction.

The legacies of British colonial rule in India also have positive and negative aspects. The English are proud of introducing modern institutions of law, education, and government, and of their progress in preventing famine and wiping out disease. But on the other side of the balance sheet, along with their democratic ideals, the British left a legacy of authoritarian rule by police and bureaucracy. Britain-oriented economic development stifled the growth of Indian industry, to cite another example. And a national identity was forged in spite of the British, whose tendency to rule through local groups contributed to the tragedy of the 1947 partition of the country into India and Pakistan.

QUESTIONS

1. What were the positive and the negative results of British colonial rule in India? How would you assess the colonial experience from an Indian point of view?
2. How flexible has Indian tradition been in meeting change? In what ways has tradition been inflexible?
3. India is a country of great religious, linguistic, and cultural diversity. What then are the unifying factors of Indian civilization?
4. Describe the evolution of Indian nationalism and the roles played by Gandhi and Nehru.

FURTHER READING

Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Freedom at Midnight* (New York: Avon Books, 1976). A dramatic account of the 1947 transition from British rule to Indian independence, with descriptive biographies of Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, and Mountbatten.

*Beatrice Pitney Lamb, *India: A World in Transition*, 4th ed. (New York: Praeger, 1975). A balanced general introduction to Indian culture, history, politics, and society.

Walter C. Neale and John Adams, 2nd ed. *India, The Search for Unity, Democracy and Progress* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1976). A useful and satisfying book on contemporary India which discusses its drive for economic, social, and political modernization and the constraints upon the development process.

Richard L. Park, ed., *Change and the Persistence of Tradition in India: Five Lectures* (Ann Arbor: Center for South and Southeast Asian Studies, University of Michigan, 1971). Examines in what ways Indian tradition has been flexible and inflexible.

*Stanley Wolpert, *A New History of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977). The most recent and very readable survey of the whole of Indian history.

19 Program for June 25, 1979

INDEPENDENCE TO EMERGENCY

Lecture by Philip K. Oldenburg, Columbia University

In the early morning hours of June 26, 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency in India. The press was censored, political opponents were jailed without trial, public meetings were banned, price and wage control measures were enacted. Twenty months later, Gandhi submitted her government to an election, was defeated, and a new government headed by Moraji Desai set about dismantling the authoritarian apparatus and policies of Mrs. Gandhi's regime.

Is the true nature of the Indian government authoritarian or democratic? Has the political system returned to normalcy with Desai's Janata Party? Or has the slide toward authoritarian government merely been halted for the time being?

On the authoritarian side, the laws which the British had used to lock up nationalist leaders were retained by those same leaders when they became rulers after Independence. The new leaders also followed the essentials of the form of government which had evolved under the British—a federal system with the balance of power securely with the central government. The constitution listed certain "fundamental rights," but also had provisions for the declaration of a state of Emergency when India was threatened externally or internally. Finally, the emphasis of the new constitution was on building a unified state.

Despite these authoritarian elements, India's democratic heritage is based on a broad-based nationalist movement. The Indian National Congress was founded in 1885 and led to limited self-government under the British. After World War I, Mahatma Gandhi, an England-trained lawyer who adopted peasant dress, transformed the Congress and led a nationalist movement which reached down to the poorest Indians. Tried and tested democratic procedures were continued by Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first leader after Independence.

Other features of the British Raj have contributed to India's democratic ethos. Freedom of expression and the press was usually respected by the British. During the latter part of British rule, the importance of law, due process, and an independent judiciary was unquestioned. Legislative councils and democratic governments at the provincial and city level had been introduced gradually over the years. Thus by 1947, democracy was a habit in India.

The concept of *swaraj*, literally "self-rule" or independence, has been central to the history of Indian nationalism. India has guarded her political and economic independence jealously and will not be dependent on any single power or power bloc. *Swaraj* means that Indian problems will be solved in Indian fashion, and Indian development will be based on Indian resources.

Several basic challenges have pushed the political system toward authoritarian and democratic solutions: (1) the question of how to relate to an ever more complex world of states; (2) the challenge of national integration; (3) the challenge of economic development; and (4) the challenge of eliminating social and economic inequality.

Oldenburg concludes that the Indian democratic heritage will keep India away from the tragic route of coup and counter-coup which so many other countries have taken.

QUESTIONS

1. Is economic and social justice more important than legal or constitutional justice? How does one define equality in India? How much mobility and equality is allowed by the caste system?
2. How does one explain Indira Gandhi's Emergency—was it necessary? What were its effects?
3. India achieved independence from the British in 1947. What has independence meant for India? Would most Indians agree that economic self-reliance is in their best interest as a nation?

FURTHER READING

Francine R. Frankel, *India's Political Economy 1947-77: The Gradual Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978). A first-rate analysis of India's developmental process—its successes and its shortcomings.

Henry Hart, *Indira Gandhi's India* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976). Includes a description of the Emergency period.

Richard L. Park and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. *India's Political System* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978). Describes foreign policy, party politics, the developmental process, and India's position as an emerging world power.

Lawrence A. Veit, *India's Second Revolution: The Dimensions of Development* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1976). Provides a useful overview of post-independence developments.

C.D. Wadswa, ed., *Some Problems of India's Economic Policy* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978). Essays by leading Indian and foreign economists on several aspects of Indian economic development.

20 Program for June 27, 1979

INDIA, ASIA, AND THE UNITED STATES

Interview with Phillips Talbot, The Asia Society and Lawrence A. Veit, Brown Brothers Harriman

Our previous two programs have surveyed Indian history and contemporary affairs, from the traditional society and British colonial experience through the 1977 rejection of Mrs. Gandhi and her Emergency decrees. Today, we turn our attention to another set of issues—India's role in world affairs, relations to other Asian countries, and her relations with the United States. Once again, this underscores a major theme in our series—the importance of Asia in a global perspective and the rapidly changing political and economic relations in the Asian region.

A quick glimpse of a map of the region will show how strategic India's position is in the world. One can visualize a huge triangle with the Soviets and Chinese to the north, and the Americans with a significant naval presence in the Indian Ocean to the south. The Soviets are also increasing their naval forces in the Indian Ocean. Within the triangle, India's Prime Minister Desai and Foreign Minister Vajpayee have structured an even-handed policy that favors no one, Americans, Chinese, or Soviets. In pursuing this policy, India has sought to establish mutually beneficial relations with all three foreign powers. President Carter visited New Delhi in early 1978, Foreign Minister Vajpayee went to Peking in early 1979, and Premier Aleksei Kosygin toured India a month later. Although India's earlier conflicts with Pakistan and China have quieted, other South Asian problems are worrisome—the pro-Soviet coup in Afghanistan and the Iranian revolution are two examples. As a symbol of India's intent to play more independent foreign policy roles, the country entered the nuclear club with an atomic device explosion in 1974. India plans to launch its first satellite during 1979.

Several questions loom over the future of U.S.-India relations. Can both countries count on closer ties in the post-Emergency era, or will there be a new round of tensions ahead? The stability of the Janata government is another unknown in this equation. India, which has been a recipient of U.S. aid for many years, now has achieved grain self-sufficiency and has joined the ranks of the more rapidly developing countries. This fact puts the relations between the two nations on a very different footing.

As an increasingly developed and independent power, India's future will influence the stability of the region and even the rest of the world in the years to come.

QUESTIONS

1. What were the underlying causes of India's conflict with China? What are the motives for improving relations between the two countries?
2. India exploded its first atomic bomb in 1974. If India decides to develop a large nuclear weapons program in the future, would this have a stablizing or destabilizing effect on world peace?
3. India has advocated that the superpowers keep their forces out of the Indian Ocean. Would such a "zone of peace" be in the interests of the United States? (The U.S. currently has a naval base on the South Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia.)

FURTHER READING

William J. Barnds, "South Asia," in James N. Rosenau et al., *World Politics* (New York: The Free Press, 1976). Surveys the international relations of the separate countries of South Asia and the South Asia region as a whole.

Stephen P. Cohen and Richard L. Park, *India: Emergent Power?* (New York: National Strategic Information Center, 1978). Clearly written assessment of the strategic implications of India's growing power.

Selig S. Harrison, "The Pakistan Alliance: Case History of a Mistake," in Harrison, *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1978), pp. 260-77. A critical appraisal of U.S. policy in South Asia, focusing on the U.S.-Pakistan military alliance.

Ashok Kapur, *India's Nuclear Option: Atomic Diplomacy and Decision Making* (New York: Praeger, 1976). Examines India's nuclear policy in an historical perspective. India is seen as a methodical planner in a world of international nuclear diplomacy and strategy.

John W. Mellor, ed., *India: A Rising Middle Power* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979). A collection of essays on present outlook and future perspectives on India's economic and political development.

21 Program for June 29, 1979

AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN

Lecture by Selig Harrison, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The destinies of Afghanistan and Pakistan are closely intertwined because the boundary line between the two countries, inherited from the colonial period, is an artificial frontier which cuts right through ethnic and tribal homelands. The tribal group that dominates Afghanistan, the Pushtuns, also lives in adjacent areas of northwest Pakistan. Another important ethnic group, the Baluch, occupies areas that straddle the Afghan border with southwest Pakistan. From 1973 to 1977, a bitter guerrilla war raged in the Baluch areas of Pakistan.

Both countries have existed in their present form for a relatively short time.

Afghanistan

Prior to the eighteenth century, the Moghul Empire to the east and the Persian Empire to the west embraced what is present-day Afghanistan. Ahmad Shah Durrani then united the Pushtun tribes in 1747 and established an Afghan Empire reaching into the north Indian plains as far as the Indus River. But the Afghan Empire had just been founded when Great Britain arrived on the scene in India, and quickly moved into the vacuum created by the collapse of the Moghul Empire.

The British Raj in India pursued a "Forward Policy" on the Northwest Frontier by pushing Afghanistan's boundaries back to the edge of the plains and by attempting to install pro-British kings in the capital city of Kabul. British policy resulted in three abortive "Afghan wars," but it did have a deterrent effect on Russian expansion into central Asia. It also resulted in the establishment of the so-called Durand Line in 1893, a controversial boundary between Afghanistan and British India. Afghanistan protested when the Durand Line became the border when Pakistan was created in 1947.

Afghanistan's Communist revolution in April 1978 marked a turn toward closer relations with the neighboring Soviet Union. Just how stable is the new regime? Harrison sees a strong and unified leadership, popular new economic policies, and considerable aid from Moscow as indications that the regime should not be dismissed too blithely.

Pakistan

The essential issue now confronting Pakistan is how to define its national identity and how to unite its four disparate ethnic groups: the Punjabis, the Sindhis, the Pushtuns, and the Baluch. A related issue concerns the nature of an Islamic state. The present leader, General Zia ul Haq, has sided with the traditionalists who favor orthodox Islamic policies.

Pakistan has existed only since 1947 when it was created as the result of the partition of British India, something which helps explain why Pakistan's politics are so deeply divided. The idea of Pakistan was promoted mainly by Moslems in the Hindu-dominated provinces of pre-1947 India, and the Moslem League leaders and Pushtun and Baluch leaders were deeply suspicious of each other from the start. The Pushtun and Baluch leaders say that they have since become reconciled to a united Pakistan and merely want to avoid exploitation by the dominant Punjabis.

American Policy

American policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan has been distorted by various misperceptions of South Asia's politics. Between 1954 and 1965, the United States provided Pakistan with substantial military aid in hopes of making Pakistan an ally against the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan, however, wanted this aid not as an anti-Communist ally but rather to build up its power against India and Afghanistan. The U.S. policy antagonized India and Afghanistan, and the

Soviet Union became the principal military supplier to both these countries. India was big enough to absorb its dependence on Moscow, but in the case of Afghanistan, it contributed to the growth of the political forces that staged the April 1978 revolution.

The best course for the United States to follow, states Harrison, is to concentrate on helping Pakistan to survive economically while avoiding entangling political and military alliances that would only aggravate intra-regional tensions. In the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, American policy should be based on a recognition of the limits of American power in a world where revolutionary change is now the rule rather than the exception.

QUESTIONS

1. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have many tribal and ethnic groups within their borders. What problems does this present for the governments of these two countries?
2. Pakistan has moved in the direction of creating an Islamic republic. Can Islam provide the basis for a modern political state?
3. In Pakistan, and in many other Asian nations, the military has played a central role in political matters. Why?
4. What is Afghanistan's strategic importance? How does Afghanistan's close relations with the Soviet Union alter the power balance in that part of the world?

FURTHER READING

Chaudhri Muhammed Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), especially Chapters 1 and 2. Describes the genesis of Pakistan from the viewpoint of a Pakistani nationalist who presided over the drafting of the first national Constitution and served as prime minister.

Leonard Binder, *Religion and Politics in Pakistan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961). Lucid analysis of the roots of religious and political tensions which go back to the formative years of Pakistan's national existence.

Louis Dupree, *Afghanistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). The best general introduction to modern Afghanistan prior to the 1978 Communist revolution.

Selig S. Harrison, "After the Afghan Coup," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1978, pp. 136-60. A report on the 1978 Communist revolution in Afghanistan and its impact in Pakistan.

Charles Miller, *Khyber, British India's Northwest Frontier: The Story of an Imperial Migraine* (New York: MacMillan Press, 1977). A journalistic but balanced account of the British involvement in Afghanistan.

Qawwali Music from Pakistan

22 Program for July 2, 1979

BANGLADESH, NEPAL, SRI LANKA, BURMA

Lecture by James P. Grant, Overseas Development Council

The four nations that ring India are the topic of today's program—Nepal to the north, Bangladesh and Burma to the east, and Sri Lanka to the south. James Grant's lecture on these countries will complete this segment of five programs on India and South Asia.

Like the rest of Asia, the history and culture of these four countries differ enormously. Nepal, a country of dramatic beauty capped by the world's highest mountains, is ruled by a monarch and has a rigid social structure. It remains a buffer zone between the two giants of India and China. Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan until it became a separate country in 1971) with a population of 85 million living in the most impoverished circumstances imaginable, continues to grow at a very rapid rate. Burma was colonized by the British and has had its share of difficulties since independence in 1948. Under an authoritarian and aging General Ne Win, Burma has struggled to maintain internal unity while it seeks to develop a neutral path to a socialistic economy. Finally, Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) is an island nation of 14 million which presently has a new sense of political openness, but is plagued with serious economic problems, in part because of overdependence on exports of rubber, tea, and coconuts.

Despite their differences, one can see certain common trends among these four nations. First, all are seeking to maintain some degree of independence among the various powers in the region. Their leaders spend a great deal of time attempting to balance their relations among Peking, Moscow, New Delhi, London, Tokyo, and Washington.

Second, these four countries collectively are among the most undeveloped in Asia. They are struggling with rapidly growing populations, with floods and famines, with slow development of industry, and with irregular growth of trade. In dealing with these problems, there have been some significant advances in recent years. Nevertheless, they present a striking contrast to the many other Asian countries which are experiencing rapid economic growth and more successful modernization. They present a huge challenge, in both economic and human terms, to their governments and to those of more fortunate nations.

QUESTIONS

1. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once predicted Bangladesh would be "an economic basket-case." Has this been borne out?
2. Some Nepalese complain about neighboring India's "brown colonialism." How independent can a small land-locked kingdom be vis-a-vis its two immense border-sharers, India and the People's Republic of China?
3. Sri Lanka's development process has been marred by periods of violence. Are development and violence inseparable?
4. The larger part—some say 75 percent—of Burma's economy is now carried on illegally, that is, through a huge black market. Why do you think this happens?

FURTHER READING

Paul R. Brass and Marcus Franda, *Radical Politics in South Asia* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1973). Solid coverage of post-independence political developments in the countries of South Asia.

Manning Nash, *Golden Road to Modernity: Village Life in Contemporary Burma* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1965). Excellent account of village life in upper Burma.

Leo Rose, *Nepal: Strategy for Survival* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). Analytical study of an Asian monarchy in a changing world.

Howard Wriggins, *Ceylon: The Dilemmas of a New Nation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). Good basic historical and political background on the country now known as Sri Lanka.

Shway Yoe (pseudonym of J.G. Scott), *The Burman: His Life and Notions* (London: Macmillan, 1910). The best known and most readable on life in Burma at the turn of the century.

V. SOUTHEAST ASIA

23 Program for July 4, 1979

INDOCHINA I

Lecture by Alexander Woodside, University of British Columbia

Our habit of referring to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—the three countries of eastern mainland Southeast Asia—as "Indochina" is only about 100 years old. The French colonized the three countries between 1862 and 1893, and placed them under one administrative framework headed by a French governor general who lived in Hanoi. Actually, the histories, cultures, languages, and ethnic structures of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos are quite different from each other, and the concept of "Indochina" is something of a mirage.

Vietnam has been heavily influenced by Chinese civilization and was under Chinese control from 111 B.C. to 939 A.D. After breaking free of Chinese rule, about 1,000 years ago, the Vietnamese continued to look to China as a political, cultural, and technological model. Until 1919, Vietnamese upper class schoolboys tried to pass civil service examinations based on the Confucian classics in order to become government bureaucrats. The capital of Vietnam in the 1800s—the city of Hue in central Vietnam—was even deliberately built as a small-scale copy of Peking. But the Vietnamese were also fiercely independent, and their borrowing from China was always subtly selective.

Cambodia and Laos, by contrast, have belonged culturally to the Indian sphere of influence, not the Chinese sphere. The 3 million people of Laos have many ethnic divisions, but the principal Thai-Lao group had far more in common with Siam than with Vietnam, in everything from their Buddhism to their political practices. As for Cambodia, between the ninth and fourteenth centuries, it was one of the most powerful states in the world as the Khmer empire of Angkor. Angkor Wat, the largest religious building in the world, was the city temple of Angkor. But since 1351 A.D., when Thai armies conquered Angkor, Cambodian civilization has been in decline. For the past 600 years, Cambodia has been squeezed between the expansion of Vietnam on its east and Thailand on its west, and has won the painful reputation of being the Poland of Southeast Asia.

When the French imposed colonialism upon Indochina, they focused economically on Cochinchina (southern Vietnam), turning it into one of the great rice production and rice export regions of the world, but at the cost of social polarization between landlords and landless peasants. When young Vietnamese went to Europe, they quickly learned how different conditions were there from conditions back home.

Ho Chi Minh was one of these youths, educated in France during World War I. Inspired by Woodrow Wilson's ideal of national self-determination, in 1919 the young Ho petitioned the Allied powers at Versailles to grant Vietnam autonomy. He was ignored. In 1930, Ho and other Vietnamese exiles created the Indochina Communist Party in Hong Kong, even though they had no significant following in Cambodia and Laos. The Vietnamese Communists, profiting from their greater numbers and their head start at being nationalists, have dominated their Cambodian and Laos colleagues.

The Japanese occupation of Indochina in 1941 portended the collapse of French rule in Indochina, and permitted the Communists to create a nationalist coalition, the Viet Minh. When the United States tried after 1954 to prevent a Communist victory in southern Vietnam, it had very little long-term chance against an Asian nationalist movement whose moral and political qualities were as potent as those of the Vietnamese Communists.

Young Vietnamese Girl and Baby Sister in Refugee Camp on the Gulf of Thailand

QUESTIONS

1. Vietnam borrowed heavily from Chinese culture over the centuries. How did the Vietnamese manage to maintain a separate, very distinctive cultural identity?
2. In what ways did French colonialism affect the cultures and societies of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia?
3. How would you explain America's deep involvement in the Vietnam War?

FURTHER READING

Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam* (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1972). Describes the roots of the Vietnamese revolution and the American experience in Vietnam.

Gerald C. Hickey, *Village in Vietnam* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). Life in a village in the delta region of South Vietnam.

Robert Shaplen, *The Lost Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). Discusses the early U.S. involvement in Vietnam from the 1940s.

*David J. Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1971). Chapters on Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos survey the history and development of nationalism in each.

24 Program for July 6, 1979

INDOCHINA II

Interview with Robert M. Shaplen, *The New Yorker* and Alexander Woodside, University of British Columbia

In the last program, Professor Alexander Woodside offered an overview of the history of the three countries which the French called Indochina. Cambodia and Laos are relatively unpopulated, with a total of only 10 million people. By contrast, Vietnam has a population of more than 50 million people. This makes Vietnam the world's third largest Communist country, after China and the Soviet Union, and the sixteenth most populous country in the world.

Today's program will look at recent events in these nations and speculate about future developments. Only yesterday, it seems, the United States was mired in the Vietnam War, although the date of the collapse of U.S.-backed South Vietnam was spring 1975. The total cost to the United States was 57,000 lives and $150 billion.

Since then, Vietnam has achieved the reunification it sought with the south. But heavy floods have ravaged the war-torn economy in the north, and the south has experienced difficulties in pressing collectivization of agriculture and nationalization of industry. These problems have been compounded by the exodus of ethnic Chinese and a two-front war with Cambodia and China.

The conditions in Vietnam were quite positive compared to Cambodia in 1975-78, where the Pol Pot regime literally evacuated the city of Phnom Penh and refugees told stories of starvation, forced marches, and mass killings. Laos, ruled by a Marxist coalition which is closely allied with Vietnam, faces huge problems—emigration of many Laotians to Thailand, continued clashes between government forces and Meo tribesmen, topped off by severe floods and drought.

In foreign affairs, the Indochina region has again become the focus of world attention. Hanoi and Moscow signed a treaty in late 1978, while Peking continued it support for Cambodia. In the dry season of late 1978,Vietnam launched a quick attack into Cambodia, overcame the main Pol Pot forces, and established a pro-Hanoi government in Phnom Penh. Tensions between Hanoi and Peking, festering with border clashes and alleged persecution of Chinese in Vietnam, suddenly exploded in early 1979. China invaded Vietnam, the war lasted a few weeks, and China withdrew, claiming that it had sufficiently "punished" Vietnam.

Nonetheless, the over-arching question facing the Indochina countries is whether they will achieve economic modernization and self-sufficiency in food. "If these governments do not win new triumphs in their rice fields," notes Alexander Woodside, "the glory they have recently won through their anti-colonial warfare will slowly but certainly slip through their fingers."

QUESTIONS

1. Now that the United States has established diplomatic relations with China, should it also "normalize" relations with Vietnam?
2. China supported North Vietnam in its war against the United States. How does one account for the fact that China and Vietnam are now bitter enemies?
3. What pressures and problems has the flow of refugees from Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia created for their Asian neighbors (Thailand, Malaysia, China) and for the United States?
4. Vietnam's approach to building socialism tends to resemble the Soviet model of development rather than the Maoist. Given Vietnam's geographic and cultural proximity to China, and the historical links between the Chinese and Vietnamese Communist movements, how can the Vietnamese affinity for Soviet methods be accounted for?

FURTHER READING

Gareth Porter, "Vietnam's Long Road to Socialism," in *Current History*, December 1975, pp. 209-12, 226-28. Describes events during the takeover period in Vietnam.

William S. Turley, "Vietnam Since Reunification," *Problems of Communism*, XXVI, March-April, 1977, pp. 36-54. Recent leadership and policy changes.

Joseph Zasloff et al., eds., *Communism in Indochina* (New York: D.C. Heath & Co., 1975). A series of papers on the nature of communism in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

25 Program for July 9, 1979

ASEAN I: THAILAND, MALAYSIA, SINGAPORE

Interview with David Morell, Princeton University and Robert M. Shaplen, *The New Yorker*

ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, consists of a band of five countries. The three nations along the Asian mainland—Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore—are discussed in this program. The two island nations—the Philippines and Indonesia—are the subjects of the next two programs.

The five countries of ASEAN have a number of things in common. They have joined together on their own initiative as anti-Communist nations. All of them keep a watchful eye on the northern countries of Vietnam and China. They remember well the past century of domination by Western powers and Japan. They seek economic cooperation among themselves, and want to act as a cooperative unit in dealing with the outside world, much like the European Economic Community. They all have relatively impressive economic growth rates, averaging 6-10 percent a year.

Thus, the ASEAN countries reflect two of the key themes in this series of programs: economic growth and dynamism in Asia. But these nations also point to another theme—the diversity of Asian nationalism. Asia is not a single unit and even its regions cannot be summarized in a single breath. Each of these countries has its own unique history, culture, languages, and political traditions.

Thailand (formerly called Siam) is the only country in Southeast Asia to escape colonialism. Its historic unity has rested on its monarchy, its sense of nationhood, and its religion of Buddhism. Thailand received a strong push toward modernization under its monarchy in the nineteenth century. But its twentieth century history has been punctuated by a series of military governments; the present regime is headed by a General Kriangsak.

Malaysia is an ethnic patchwork of native Malays living side by side with Chinese and Indian population. After a century of British rule, Malaya became independent in 1957, and became the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 when it acquired more territory. Rich in natural resources, Malaysia has half of the world's tin and rubber. But filled with racial and economic tensions, Malaysia's 12 million are held together by some slippery political compromises.

Singapore has a population of only 2 million people, but is a remarkable economic cinderella story. Independent from Britain since the late 1950s, Singapore has been a separate country since 1965 under a popular but controversial leader, Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore has almost no natural resources, yet its trade has skyrocketed as its manufactured goods and refined oil flow out, and foreign capital flows in.

Threats to stability—insurgency, rural revolution, student unrest, ethnic conflict—have been experienced by all three countries. But Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore have all sought political stability in different ways.

QUESTIONS

1. What are the prospects that the members of ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia) will develop into an explicit military alliance?
2. How have Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore been able to achieve and maintain high per capita income growth?
3. What are the prospects for closer economic cooperation among the ASEAN countries? Compare ASEAN with the ECC (European Economic Community).

FURTHER READING

Stanley S. Bedlington, *Malaysia and Singapore: The Building of New States* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978). Recounts the shared and separate histories of these two nations.

William Bradley et al., *Thailand: Domino by Default? The 1976 Coup and Implications for U.S. Policy* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978).

William R. Roff, *The Origins of Malay Nationalism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). An important book on the dynamics of anti-colonialism and Islam in creating Malay nationalism. (No longer in print, but available in most university libraries.)

David A. Wilson, *Politics in Thailand* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966). Analyzes the structure of Thai political power, the concept of kingship, traditional bureaucracy, and the role of the government.

26 Program for July 11, 1979

ASEAN II: THE PHILIPPINES

Interview with Robert H. Howe, Ansor Corporation and Robert M. Shaplen, *The New Yorker*

This program deals with the Philippines, an island nation of 44 million people. This is the second in a series of three programs on the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

While much of Asia seems remote to Americans, we seem to have a stronger sense of identification with the Philippines. It's an understandable feeling. In 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American War, the Philippines came under American control after several centuries of Spanish domination. Overnight, the U.S. became an Asian power, and the Philippines was our first foothold.

Most Filipinos cling to their Catholic religion from Spain, but the web of ties to the U.S. developed steadily during the early twentieth century. In 1936, Philippine's patriot Manuel Quezon won the right to self-rule by persistent pressure on Washington, but he died before seeing his dream realized. World War II intervened, making Filipinos and American G.I.s blood brothers on the battlefield—1 million Filipino soldiers and civilians died in the war against Japan. Eventually, the Allies turned the tide and the war produced heroes, including General Douglas MacArthur and Ferdinand Marcos, the current president of the Philippines.

Marcos was duly elected in 1965. But in 1972 he declared martial-law, arresting many opponents and limiting basic freedoms. Marcos, and his wife Imelda, hold sway over the Filipino population. They claim that they have brought a "New Society" into being, but their critics cry "dictatorship."

The Philippines thus arouse basic issues for Americans. We feel a close affinity, sometimes characterized as a "special relationship." But we seem caught between concerns for trade and military bases (including Subic Bay and Clark Air Force Base), and concerns for human rights, including freedom of speech and right-to-due process.

A number of other questions are raised in trying to understand the Philippines. Is it a success story for the green revolution, or a disaster for urban dwellers? Is it a nation of basic unity, or a country being torn apart by disparate elements from liberal Catholics to the Muslim minority? And what of the Philippine's relations with the United States, China, Japan, and the other nations of ASEAN?

QUESTIONS

1. President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines has been accused of abusing human rights. In the Philippines and in other Asian countries, are there universal standards for human rights or do Americans unfairly apply their own Western liberal standards?
2. Marcos declared martial law in the Philippines in 1972. Was this move necessary, and has Marcos' attempt to restructure the political system been successful?
3. Is the conflict in the southern Philippines between Christians and Muslims jeopardizing vital social and economic progress elsewhere in the country?
4. Many regional dialects are spoken in different areas of the Philippines. The Marcos

government has introduced a program to make Tagalog the national language. What problems and what benefits will this policy create for Philippine society?

FURTHER READING

O.D. Corpuz, *The Philippines* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966). A general history of the Philippines from pre-Hispanic times up to the martial-law period.

John Nance, *The Gentle Tasaday: A Stone Age People in the Philippines Rain Forest* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977). The dramatic story of the discovery of a primitive tribe and the efforts of the Philippine government to protect them from the outside world.

*David J. Steinberg, ed., *In Search of Southeast Asia: A Modern History* (New York: Praeger, 1971). Chapters on the Philippines, especially concerning the colonial period and the rise of nationalism.

27 Program for July 13, 1979

ASEAN III: INDONESIA

Interview with Robert M. Shaplen, *The New Yorker*

We conclude our programs on the countries of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, by focusing on Indonesia. Indonesia is an island country, with six main islands and some 13,000 smaller islands, stretching for over 3,000 miles along the equator. By the fifteenth century, the people of these islands had been deeply influenced by Islam, and today Indonesia, with its population of 140 million, is the largest Muslim country in the world. From the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries, Indonesia came under Dutch control; then during World War II, it was occupied by Japan. Not until 1950 did Indonesia achieve full independence under its first president, Sukarno.

Culturally, Indonesia retains strong links to its rich past in art, dance, and music. Indonesian gamelan music introduces each program in this series.

Politically, the country is ruled by a former general, Suharto, who took over in 1966 after anti-Communist riots, and who was elected president in 1968. Although Suharto was re-elected in 1978, his regime has been the target of massive student protests over corruption and inadequate economic development. Military backing for Suharto continues, although he has sought to curry public favor by releasing political prisoners.

The economy has shown a solid growth rate, and Indonesia is rich in natural resources, including oil. But severe problems plague Indonesia's economy, particularly population growth, 40 percent illiteracy, 10-15 percent inflation, and high unemployment—sometimes up to 40 percent in rural areas. Military influence is evident even in the economy; the state oil monopoly, Pertamina, is run by generals.

In world affairs, Indonesia works closely with ASEAN, while trying to stay non-aligned in big power politics. The past influence of the Indonesian Communist Party, decimated in the civil strife of the mid-1960s, has left many Indonesians wary of their Communist neighbors to the north—China and Vietnam.

Thus, Indonesia is a country in transition in the Southeast Asian region which is experiencing rapid change. With the world's fifth largest population, and a tremendous potential for economic development, it demands our attention and deserves our understanding.

QUESTIONS

1. Indonesia's geography makes for particularly difficult administrative and communications problems. Can you identify some of them?
2. What is "infrastructure" in a nation's economy? Why is it important? What problems do Third World countries like Indonesia face in its development?
3. In countries like Indonesia, what are some of the elements that must exist before political democracy can take root?

FURTHER READING

Clifford Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960). An excellent account of Javanese life, culture, and religion.

Willard A. Hanna, *Bali Profile: People, Events, Circumstances, 1001-1976* (Hanover, N.H.: American Universities Field Staff, 1976). A descriptive history of Bali; includes a chapter on basic beliefs and customs.

George M. Kahin, ed., *Governments and Politics of Southeast Asia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1964). Somewhat dated, but still useful for historical background.

Datus C. Smith, *The Land and People of Indonesia*, rev. ed. (New York: J.B. Lippincott, 1972). General introduction to Indonesia's geography, history, and culture; intended for highschool students, but useful for others.

VI. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

28 Program for July 16, 1979

THE ASIAN REGION IN THE YEAR 2000

Interview with James P. Grant, Overseas Development Council

The last three programs of this series will focus on the future of Asia. Today's program will examine the question, "What will Asia be like in the year 2000?" Many Asian people are asking themselves the same question, but the answers vary a great deal from one country to the next.

The Chinese government has outlined a future of rapid economic growth, setting the goal of modernizing by the year 2000. Some Japanese, however, now advocate zero growth in order to avoid the dangers of too much development. In another approach to the future, Muslims in Pakistan have urged a rejection of modern social and economic mores, and measures have been taken to enact strict Islamic law. There is considerable economic dynamism in Asia, but there is certainly no set consensus about the future.

Asia is experiencing rapid political and social changes as well, but toward what? Certain rigidly authoritarian regimes have relaxed control, most notably in India since the termination of Indira Gandhi's Emergency and in China since the liberalization of the post-Mao era. But few Asian countries—Japan being a striking exception—have followed the path to Western-style democracy. Socially, Asia is diverse and complex, and explosive tensions have grown as the contrast between the lives of new elites and urban and rural poor becomes more sharply drawn.

Economically, the future seems most unclear. The past thirty years have seen rapid growth in many Asian countries, spearheaded by Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan;

but there has also been substantial growth in other countries with larger populations, like India and China. China is a nuclear power and India is scheduled to launch her first satellite in June 1979. The green revolution in agriculture has achieved major advances through the introduction of new seed strains, chemical fertilizers, and irrigation to increase food production. But significant economic problems remain in many Asian countries—ghastly urban slums, massive famines, terrible floods, often compounded by corruption, exploitation, or war.

How will the forces of tradition and modernization continue to interact as we move toward the future in Asia? What will be the roles of nationalism, communism, democracy, economic growth, and regional and global alliances? Where is Asia going?

Shanghai Factory Worker

QUESTIONS

1. How will the nations of Asia handle the problems of population, food, health, and energy over the next twenty years?
2. What are some of the different models of development being followed by Asian countries? Why have some been more successful than others?
3. Several Communist nations are now bitter enemies, and traditional rivalries seem far more important than ideology. How strong is the appeal of communism today in different non-Communist Asian countries?
4. Many Asian countries are ruled by authoritarian (both Communist and non-Communist) regimes. Are such countries more effective in modernizing than more democratically inclined governments?

FURTHER READING

J.L.S. Girling, "Southeast Asia and the Great Powers," *Pacific Community* (vol. 9, No. 2, January 1978), pp. 199-211. A brief review of the relations emerging in 1978 between the regional countries and various great powers.

Selig S. Harrison, *China, Oil and Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). Discusses the international political implications of the development of China's oil potential.

The Japan Foundation, *Cultural Exchange Between Japan and Southeast Asia: Dialogue; Southeast Asia and Japan* (Tokyo: The Japan Foundation, 1977). Proposals for bilateral economic and cultural projects.

29 Program for July 18, 1979

ASIA AND THE WORLD IN THE YEAR 2000

Interview with Mark E. Buchman, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and Phillips Talbot, The Asia Society

Throughout this series we have emphasized the diversity of Asia, focusing on the various regions and countries of Asia, and seeing both traditional civilizations and contemporary affairs. But in these last few shows, we are stepping back and looking at the bigger picture, trying to see the shape of Asia over the next couple of decades. Last time we looked at Asia in terms of economic development. Now we are focusing on Asia's place in future world affairs—in political, commercial, and strategic terms.

In terms of political weight, only a few Asian countries—Japan, China, and perhaps India—have that vague quality called international clout. But several other countries may deserve watching in this respect—the Philippines, Indonesia, Korea, and Vietnam among them. One would guess that a Western newspaper in the year 2000 would have considerable information about these countries.

In terms of international commerce, Asia is growing with great speed. The big success stories so far seem to be in East and Southeast Asia—Singapore, the Philippines, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and the greatest economic superstar of all, Japan. One wonders where the future Asian success stories will occur—China? India? Indonesia? What will all this growth mean for U.S. trade? Can we overcome trade deficits which have mounted rapidly in our dealings with various Asian nations?

In terms of world issues, Asia seems caught in between—both part of the problem and part of the solution. Asia has every tragic circumstance known to modern man—poverty, disease, floods and droughts, inflation, and even unchecked above-ground nuclear testing. Yet the Asian approaches to these questions deserve real attention—the Rice Research Institute in the Philippines, the green revolution in much of South Asia, the barefoot doctor movement in China, and the emergence of regional economic efforts like ASEAN.

Finally, Asia is in a transitional period from an age of imperialism to an age of multipower politics with several countries in strategic juxtaposition. The superpowers are still there—Soviet troops, tanks, planes, and warships; and American naval and air forces. But Asian countries have put together formidable armies of their own—in China, Korea, Thailand, Vietnam, and even a growing self-defense force in Japan. How will this new mix of forces evolve for the rest of this century?

QUESTIONS

1. Will it be possible to find a global approach to international relations and to economic needs by the year 2000?
2. What is the likelihood that China will be able to "modernize" and become a major power by the year 2000, as she now plans to do?
3. Is Asia likely to be the scene of major change over the next two decades? Where might such changes be most likely to occur?

FURTHER READING

Drew Middleton, *The Duel of the Giants: China and Russia in Asia* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978). A military affairs expert traces the roots of the Sino-Soviet conflict and weighs the chances for war between the two countries.

I.G. Patel, *The Widening Gap: Development in the 1970s* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). Contends that the gap is widening between the developed and lesser developed countries.

Ezra F. Vogel, *Japan As Number One* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979). Argues that Japan has coped with the problems of modern society better than we and that there are lessons to be learned.

30 Program for July 20, 1979

U.S.-ASIA RELATIONS IN THE YEAR 2000

Interview with Marshall Green, former U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and Seymour Topping, *The New York Times*

Today's program looks ahead to the subject of U.S.-Asia relations in the year 2000, a mere two decades from now.

U.S.-Asia relations has been a major theme of "ASIA: HALF THE HUMAN RACE." The historical record has left a mixed legacy. There have been some very positive moments in these relations, such as the U.S. rebuilding of Japan after World War II and the new openings to China in the 1970s. And there have been many other periods of tragedy and bloodshed—World War II, the Korean War, and Vietnam. Yet despite these radical shifts between war and peace, Americans have often formed close ties with the various nations and peoples of Asia.

Because of great distances and equally great barriers, certain Asian-American relationships have been subject to emotional cycles of hate and love. Emotions and politics have often been confused and stereotypes have been generated on both sides of the Pacific, particularly in our encounters with the Japanese, the Indians, and the Chinese. Our mutual Asian and American perceptions will have to be based on reality if our future relations are to avoid some of the pitfalls of the past.

The links between Asia's future and America's future seem very strong. In the 1970s, for example, Asia surpassed Europe as America's largest trading area in the world. Over the past decade every American president has visited Asia (Jimmy Carter went to India in 1978), and many Asian leaders, including Emperor Hirohito of Japan, have reciprocated by coming to Washington. But there are problems as well. For example, the United States has no diplomatic relations with Vietnam, North Korea, Cambodia, and Laos. Despite the withdrawal of forces after the Vietnam War, the U.S. maintains a military presence in Asia. Over 20,000 ground troops are stationed in South Korea, and U.S. naval and air force presence remains in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, and Diego Garcia (in the South Indian Ocean).

The task now is to find appropriate paths for U.S.-Asia relations in the years and decades to come, paths which move between our historical extremes of involvement in Asian wars and isolation from Asian affairs.

QUESTIONS

1. Is it possible for the United States to pursue a policy of even-handedness with both the U.S.S.R. and China? Is it recommendable?
2. What are the prospects for relations among the four big powers in Asia—the U.S., Japan, U.S.S.R., and China—in the year 2000?
3. Is a military alliance with China or Japan in our interest? Should we aid one or both countries in building up their armed forces significantly? Should we add to their nuclear capabilities?

FURTHER READING

A. Doak Barnett, *China and the Major Powers in East Asia* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977). One of America's senior China specialists surveys China's relations with the U.S., the Soviet Union, and Japan, and evaluates the possibility of a four-power equilibrium in East Asia.

Selig S. Harrison, *The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy* (New York: The Free Press, 1978). Combines analysis of the roots of Asian nationalism and the American experience in Asia; includes recommendations on future American policy.

William Watts, G. Packard, R. Clough, and R. Oxnam, *Japan, Korea and China: American Perceptions and Policies* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1979). Presents three recent public opinion polls and analyzes various policy alternatives for the United States.

Part Two

ASIA, YESTERDAY AND TODAY

by Fay Willey

AFGHANISTAN

Political Status: *In existence as a state since 1747 and fully independent since 1919. Democratic Republic since April 1978.*
Leadership: *Nur Muhammad Taraki, President.*
Population: *20 million (as stated by government; census never taken).*
Area: *249,999 square miles.*
Capital: *Kabul.*

Kābul
ANISTAN
Arabian Sea

HISTORY

In ancient times, Afghanistan was part of the Persian empire and then of the empire of Alexander the Great. Thereafter, it passed through the hands of many dynasties, until in the eleventh century, most of the region fell to a ruling family whose capital was Ghazni. The Mongols invaded 200 years later. In the sixteenth century, the area became an outer province of the Indian Mughal realm. Most of Afghanistan was conquered in the eighteenth century by the Afghan leader Ahmad Shah Durrani, who also established brief control over portions of Iran and Pakistan.

The nineteenth century saw Britain and Russia vying for hegemony in Afghanistan because of its strategic position astride routes between Europe and Asia. The British invaded in 1838 and again in 1879; after the latter conflict, they were the dominant influence in Afghanistan until 1919 when Amir Amanullah asserted Afghanistan's independent control of its own foreign affairs. He also tried to introduce a number of internal reforms which led to his overthrow in 1929. After a period of internal unrest, the Durrani dynasty again ruled the country. Afghanistan observed neutrality during World War II.

Following the war, Afghanistan accepted aid from both the U.S. and the Soviet Union, although as the closer power, the U.S.S.R. exerted the greater influence. In 1973, Afghan King Muhammad Zahir Shah was overthrown by his cousin and brother-in-law, Prince Muhammad Daoud, and the monarchy was abolished. Daoud, who became president, was himself overthrown and killed in a leftist coup in April 1978. Since then, Afghanistan has turned decisively toward partnership with the U.S.S.R.

AFGHANISTAN TODAY

In April 1978, a left-wing coup overthrew the government of President Muhammad Daoud. Fierce fighting took place in the capital of Kabul, and Daoud was killed along with key aides and members of his family. A new government was formed by Nur Muhammad Taraki, leader of the pro-Soviet Khalq Party, and the Soviet Union became the first nation to extend diplomatic recognition to the Taraki regime. Taraki's coup altered the strategic balance in southwest Asia.

In interviews with Western newsmen, Taraki refused to term his party Communist, calling it "active positive neutrality." His declared aim was to take power from the hands of aristocrats and institute reforms that would benefit the masses. The government announced a variety of controversial programs, among them a land redistribution plan, regulation of profits, a ban on usurious money lending, and regulation of the dowry system.

Within a few weeks of assuming office, the Taraki government signed agreements with the U.S.S.R. on projects ranging from mining to highway construction. The already considerable Soviet presence expanded rapidly and an estimated 5,000 Russian advisers were soon at work in Afghanistan. Nearly every ministry took on Soviet aides, and in the armed forces Russian advisers were reportedly present down to the battalion level. In December 1978, Taraki journeyed to Moscow to sign a twenty-year treaty of friendship with Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev.

Taraki's close ties with the U.S.S.R. are a concern to Western strategists and Afghanistan's Asian neighbors. For centuries, they point out, Russia has sought access to warm water ports. If Afghanistan were to become a Soviet satellite, the Russians would be closer to that goal. Pakistan fears that the Soviets might back Afghan support for tribal insurgents within its own borders. And if the Soviets do extend an arm into the Indian Ocean, they will be strategically located along the sea lanes that carry Middle Eastern oil to the West and to Japan.

The degree of Afghan independence from Soviet control is a matter of heated debate among Western experts. Some believe that Taraki runs a puppet government while others credit him with a certain freedom of action. To date, the Taraki regime has not managed to assert its authority over the entire nation of Afghanistan. Afghan tribesmen have traditionally been opposed to the central government. In addition, many Muslim religious leaders are hostile to Taraki's pro-Soviet posture, leftist programs, and heavy-handed law enforcement policies. In mountainous eastern Afghanistan along the Pakistan border, Afghans are resisting the government with arms, and helicopter gunships and Soviet-made fighters have reportedly been used to attack insurgent villages.

In February 1979, one group of Afghan Muslim rebels kidnapped U.S. Ambassador Adolph Dubs with the intention of bargaining for concessions from the Taraki government. Ignoring pleas from American officials, Afghan security men and their Soviet advisers attempted to free Dubs by force. Dubs was killed in the crossfire.

If Taraki can bring the tribes under control, he still faces a formidable task. Afghanistan remains one of the most underdeveloped nations in the world. Health standards are appallingly low, infant mortality is high, and life expectancy is less than forty years. Only one adult in ten is literate. There is no rail system and little industry. Taraki's planners are currently working on a five-year development plan. Even with Soviet help, however, the modernization of Afghanistan will be easier to outline than to achieve.

BANGLADESH



Political Status: *Independence proclaimed March 26, 1971 and achieved December 16, 1971. Martial-law since August 15, 1975.*
Leadership: *General Ziaur Rahman, President.*
Population: *85 million.*
Area: *55,126 square miles.*
Capital: *Dacca.*

HISTORY

Bengal was part of India's Mughal empire, and later, of British India. Yet the Bengalis maintained a unique identity, with their own language, literature, and traditions. An accident of history made East Bengal into East Pakistan: when the British left the subcontinent in 1947, East Bengal, as a predominantly Muslim area, became part of the new country of Pakistan. A thousand miles of Indian territory separated the two wings of Pakistan.

As citizens of East Pakistan, the Bengalis expected to be treated equally with West Pakistanis, but they felt themselves discriminated against. West Pakistanis controlled most of the vital posts in Pakistan's government, and profits from East Pakistan's jute and tea exports were used to build industry in West Pakistan. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war, Bengalis claimed that the nation's armed forces were used to protect West Pakistan, leaving them vulnerable to possible Indian attack.

Resentment in East Pakistan mounted steadily over the years. In Pakistan's first countrywide general elections in late 1970, the Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, won all but two of East Pakistan's parliamentary seats on a platform calling for regional autonomy. The Awami League victory gave it a majority in the national legislature, thus entitling Mujib to the prime ministership. But Pakistan's military rulers refused to accept the election results.

When negotiations over the formation of a government broke down, Pakistani authorities decided to crush the East Pakistan autonomy movement. They arrested Mujib, outlawed the Awami League, and launched a reign of terror in the major cities of East Pakistan. For eight months, Bengali insurgents kept up a determined guerrilla struggle, during the course of which an estimated 1 to 3 million people were killed and nearly 10 million fled to India. In December 1971, the outbreak of open warfare led India's armed forces to intervene on the side of the insurgents.

Indian troops quickly defeated the Pakistani Army in the East. On December 16, 1971, the independent country of Bangladesh, which had been proclaimed by the insurgents the previous March, came into existence. Pakistan released Mujib, who returned to Dacca to assume control of the new government.

Mujib's program called for socialism, secularism, and democracy. A charismatic leader in opposition, he proved to be a poor administrator in office. Lawlessness, corruption, and mismanagement compounded Bangladesh's grave economic problems. In January 1975, Mujib took absolute power and outlawed all political organizations except his Awami League. Mujib was killed in a military coup seven months later. After several more coups and abortive coups, General Ziaur Rahman became chief martial law administrator in 1976. He assumed the presidency in 1977 and was confirmed in that position by elections in 1978.

BANGLADESH TODAY

Few nations in history embarked on independence with handicaps as monumental as those of Bangladesh. In an area the size of Iowa, it contains as many people as the entire United States west of the Mississippi, and lacks the means to feed them. Henry Kissinger termed Bangladesh an "international basket case"; for its first few years, that description appeared apt if not charitable. In 1979, the outlook has changed. Under the leadership of forty-three year-old General Ziaur Rahman, Bangladesh has been making significant gains.

Since he took power in November 1976 after a series of military coups, Zia has earned a reputation for hard work and incorruptibility. Observers credit him with establishing order and spurring economic growth—a record markedly different from that of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh's first president. Zia's stated aim is to build a consensus in order to confront the country's difficulties and gradually to restore democratic government. To make contact with his fellow citizens, four-fifths of whom are illiterate, Zia has made a point of traveling extensively throughout Bangladesh.

Zia has taken several tentative steps in the direction of more democratic government. Although martial law remained in force, Bangladesh held presidential elections in June 1978. Bangladeshis were offered a choice between Zia and General M.A.G. Osmany, who commanded the army during the 1971 war of independence. One major difference between the two candidates was that Zia favored a strong presidential system of government, while Osmany backed a parliamentary form. Half the country's eligible voters cast presidential ballots, and Zia won 77 percent—an outcome which seemed to reflect Zia's widespread popularity. Osmany appeared to suffer from his association with the Awami League, which ruled during the Mujib era.

Zia hopes to reduce the political confusion caused by Bangladesh's multiplicity of parties by carving out a centrist position and rallying factions to it. He has founded the coalition Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and parliamentary elections were held in early 1979. A dozen opposition parties challenged Zia by announcing that they would not participate in the elections unless he met five conditions. Zia refused the demand to resign from the military, but he compromised on others—easing press restrictions, freeing many political detainees, and promising to lift martial law within a week after parliament opened. He also agreed to more substantial powers for parliament, although he made it clear he did not intend to become a figurehead president. Opposition candidates campaigned vigorously, but Zia's BNP won a two-thirds majority of the parliamentary seats. An Awami League faction came in a distant second, followed by the Muslim League.

Zia's economic policy has been one of his strong points. In place of Mujib's emphasis on socialism, the Zia administration has begun to denationalize sectors of commerce and industry, while private enterprise and foreign investment have been encouraged. The government seeks to stimulate agricultural production with subsidies and credits to pay for high-yield seeds, chemical fertilizer, and pesticides. Combined with good weather, these policies have enabled Bangladesh to make economic headway. A July 1978 survey reported that in the fiscal year 1977-78, gross domestic product rose 8 percent, food grain production 13 percent, and exports, 17 percent—admittedly from a modest base.

Internationally, Bangladesh has few problems. It enjoys good relations with its neighbors, and in recent months, Zia has visited half a dozen Asian states to foster warmer ties. Relations between Dacca and Rangoon were strained in 1978 when 200,000 Muslims fled from Burma into Bangladesh, claiming persecution. The refugees imposed a heavy burden on Bangladesh, and repatriation to Burma was still going on in early 1979.

The massive challenge to Bangladesh remains its poverty and underdevelopment. Twenty percent of all its children die before age five, and life expectancy is forty-five years. Fifty percent of the nation's families are undernourished. More than a third of the labor force is unemployed or underemployed. Current population is 85 million and growing at an estimated 2.8 percent per year. Only $1.2 billion in annual foreign aid enables Bangladesh to survive. Economists believe that for the country to become viable, it must reduce its birth rate, improve literacy, build extensive water-control projects for agriculture, and develop export-oriented industries.

How to pay for Bangladesh's economic development is a daunting question. And the establishment of democracy in the face of contentious factions and a politicized army is an ambitious goal. Although General Zia has begun to attack Bangladesh's key problems, the success of his campaign remains in doubt.

BURMA



Political Status: *Independent republic since January 4, 1948.*
Leadership: *U Ne Win, President.*
Population: *34 million.*
Area: *261,789 square miles.*
Capital: *Rangoon.*

HISTORY

Located west of Thailand and east of India across the Bay of Bengal, Burma has been an Asian crossroad throughout its history. In the eleventh century, Anawrahta, King of Burma, united contending small states of the area into a single empire. The capital city of Pagan fell to the Mongols 200 years later, and again regional kingdoms sprang up. During the eighteenth century, the Burmese ruler, Alaungpaya, and his successors pursued aggressive policies that won them control of the Indian state of Assam—and thus brought them into conflict with the British. Burma lost three Anglo-Burmese wars in the nineteenth century, and in 1886, Britain made Burma a province of India.

Burmese guerrillas fought the British for several years. Not long after guerrilla fighting died down, a Burmese nationalist movement began to agitate for constitutional reforms. But not until 1937 did Britain finally separate Burma from India. During World War II, Japan occupied Burma and held out the promise of independence to Burmese nationalists. After flirting with the Japanese for a time, the nationalists ultimately turned against them and joined forces with the British. With the defeat of Japan in 1945, negotiations for a transfer of power took place between British and Burmese representatives. Burma became independent in 1948.

Seated Buddha,
11th Century A.D.

The Anti-Facist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), a nationalist coalition, emerged as independent Burma's most powerful political group. Its leader, U Nu, served as prime minister from 1948 to 1958. Burma's Communists broke with the League and began an armed insurrection that continues to this day. Factional disputes also shook the League, and U Nu resigned in favor of General Ne Win in 1958. Elections in 1960 returned U Nu to power, but only briefly. In 1962, Ne Win staged a coup d'état; he has ruled Burma ever since.

BURMA TODAY

For the past seventeen years, strongman Ne Win has propelled Burma along its own "road to socialism." Burma has stood aloof from the rest of Asia in its desire to remain neutral and nonaligned. Authoritarian military leadership and a drive for self-sufficiency have resulted in a stagnant economy. At the same time, insurgents of many tribal and ideological factions control large portions of the countryside.

After General Ne Win came to power by coup d'état in early 1962, he initially exercised all legislative, judicial, and executive powers himself. In 1974, a new constitution made Burma a one-party state under his Burmese Socialist Program Party (BSPP), with Ne Win as president. Since the early days of his rule, Ne Win has effectively sealed Burma off from the outside world; foreign visitors are few, and Burmese are usually discouraged from contact with them. The government has suppressed organized domestic opposition, including dissenters within its own BSPP.

The economy is centrally planned, with the state responsible for the organization of production and distribution—a system which has led to severe dislocations. Production of goods with state controlled prices has slowed to an essential minimum, and even the agricultural sector is not performing as well as in the past. Once the world's leading rice merchant, Burma now exports only a fraction of the amount of rice it annually sold abroad in the early 1960s—or even before World War II. There is little money for capital investment. Stores are often empty of necessities, and "black markets" account for perhaps 50 percent or more of the nation's economy.

For decades, insurgent groups have prevented the Burmese government from controlling much of the countryside, and Ne Win has had no more success in eliminating them than his predecessors. While some insurgents are tribal rebels (such as the Shans and Kachins) demanding political autonomy, others are guerrillas more interested in the profitable business of smuggling jewels, art, and opium than in political goals. The largest insurgent group is the Burma Communist Party, which commands an estimated 20,000 guerrilla regulars. Based along Burma's 1200-mile border with China, the Communists mount continuous hit-and-run raids as well as major military operations, and receive substantial aid from the People's Republic of China.

Ne Win has courted China in an effort to convince its leaders to abandon the Burmese Communists. He has made numerous visits to Peking in recent years, and last autumn, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing journeyed to Rangoon as part of a tour of Southeast Asia. But Ne Win has been unable to convince Peking to end its backing for the Burmese Communists. China's intention seems to be to cultivate both good state relations with its neighbors and good party relations with local Communist parties.

One of Burma's chief problems is how to unite its many disparate ethnic groups. In early 1978, for example, 200,000 Muslims fled from Arakan to Bangladesh claiming persecution; they presented the Dacca government with an enormous economic burden. A bilateral accord was reached during the summer of 1978 under which Burma promised to repatriate the refugees, but as of early 1979, most of them were still living in camps set up by Bangladesh authorities.

Burma has shown signs of looking outward. For several years, Burma has accepted aid from a number of countries and has contemplated joint ventures with foreign countries. The economy has also shown indications of improvement. The growth rate in 1978 was 4.1 percent, compared with the previous year's 2.7 percent. Future development hinges on internal unity, however, and political succession may prove to be a thorny issue. Ne Win is sixty-eight and reportedly ailing. So far as outsiders can determine, he has made no definite provision for a political heir after he passes from the scene.

CAMBODIA

Political Status: *Independent since November 9, 1953.*
Communist-led since April 17, 1975.
Leadership: *Heng Samrin, President.*
Population: *7 million.*
Area: *69,898 square miles.*
Capital: *Phnom Penh.*



HISTORY

Nearly 2,000 years ago, the Kingdoms of Funan and Chenla were united into what is now Cambodia. Heavily influenced by the culture of India, the dominant Khmers built the beautiful complex of shrines and temples at Angkor in the ninth century. By the early thirteenth century, the Khmer empire controlled Cambodia as well as much of the area that comprises today's Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos, and Thailand.

The increasingly powerful Thais eventually conquered Angkor. Then, the Vietnamese began to assert themselves to the east. Between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries, Khmer kings often came under the hegemony of the Thais and the Vietnamese. In 1863, France made what was left of the Khmer empire a French protectorate. Following World War II, Cambodia became autonomous under the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk and achieved independence in 1953.

Sihanouk abdicated in 1955, organized his own political movement, and dominated national politics. Sihanouk's chief claim was to keep his country independent of its neighbors. But with war raging in South Vietnam between U.S.-backed non-Communist governments and Communist-led forces, it became increasingly difficult for Cambodia to remain neutral.

In March 1970, Sihanouk was overthrown in a coup led by his army chief, Lon Nol. Following the coup, the United States and South Vietnam mounted a massive invasion of Cambodia in an effort to smash Communist sanctuaries along the border. In fact, the U.S. had secretly bombed eastern Cambodia since March 1969. Mirroring the situation in South Vietnam, the Cambodian Communists (the Khmer Rouge) and their Vietnamese counterparts steadily gained the upper hand in Cambodia. In April 1975, Phnom Penh fell to the Communists. Suhanouk returned from exile in China and briefly served as nominal chief of state. Cambodia was renamed Democratic Kampuchea, and Communist leader Pol Pot became its prime minister. His regime, earning the reputation as one of the most brutal in modern world history, ended in December 1978 when Vietnam invaded Kampuchea.

CAMBODIA TODAY

One of the tragedies of the twentieth century has taken place in Cambodia. Under the rule of Communist leader Pol Pot, purges and neglect cost untold thousands—perhaps millions—of lives. Pol Pot was overthrown by a Vietnamese invasion early in 1979, and Vietnam's army continues to occupy Cambodia to back a new regime led by Heng Samrin.

When Pol Pot came to power in 1975, it was his avowed aim to "do away with all vestiges of the past." To create a primitive Communist society, the government drove much of the nation's urban population into the countryside. According to foreigners stationed in Phnom Penh at the time, the city's 3 million citizens were expelled from their homes with little warning, and even hospitals were emptied. Khmer Rouge officials maintained a brutal pace of march, clubbing or shooting those who lagged. Many children, the sick, and the elderly died of exhaustion.

Once in the countryside, Cambodians were forced into communes where they cultivated rice and constructed irrigation projects. According to refugees, regulations were enforced with the death penalty. In a series of draconian measures, the government abolished money and banking, mail service and newspapers, and all but the most rudimentary education. Cities stood virtually deserted. When Finland's ambassador to China visited Phnom Penh in January 1978, he found a ghost town with shops closed and vegetables growing in the streets. Phnom Penh's population had dropped to an estimated 20,000.

Pol Pot's regime executed former military officers and government officials, as well as wealthy businessmen. The discovery of a plot to overthrow Pol Pot triggered a further purge to ensure the elimination of anyone with Vietnamese connections or even remote links to the pre-Communist government. Since Cambodia was effectively sealed off from the outside world after April 1975, it is impossible to know how many died under the Pol Pot regime. By the end of 1978, however, estimates of human rights organizations and foreign governments ranged from several hundred thousand to 2.5 million.

Cambodian and Vietnamese Communists had sometimes collaborated, but historic rivalries between the two nations soon resurfaced. The Cambodian Communists became convinced (evidently with reason) that Vietnam aimed to topple Pol Pot and install a regime more amenable to Vietnamese control. After frequent border incidents, large-scale fighting began at the close of 1977. Vietnam carved out enclaves in Cambodia where it trained an estimated 25,000 dissident Cambodian refugees as troops. By June 1978, U.S. intelligence sources reported that the Vietnamese were bombing and strafing Khmer Rouge army units. China resupplied the 90,000-man Cambodian army, while the U.S.S.R. sent large quantities of new arms to Vietnam. In November, Hanoi made an alliance with Moscow, partly to discourage China from moving against Vietnam if and when the Vietnamese invaded Cambodia.

In early December, Radio Hanoi announced that a Kampuchea National United Front for National Salvation (KNUFNS) had been formed in the "liberated zone" of eastern Cambodia. The Front pledged to oust Pol Pot and to restore normal family life and freedoms. Late in December, 100,000 Vietnamese troops knifed toward Phnom Penh, followed by units representing the Front. In a two-week blitzkrieg, the Vietnamese seized Cambodia's major towns and forced Pol Pot and his troops to retreat to the countryside. Norodom Sihanouk, the former Cambodian monarch who had been under detention, was evacuated to China. He flew to the United Nations where he denounced both Vietnam and the Pol Pot regime.

Following the fall of Phnom Penh, the Front appointed an eight-man People's Revolutionary Council to govern the country. Heng Samrin, a Cambodian Communist who had defected to Vietnam in 1978, became president. Heng Samrin's council appears to be just a facade behind which Vietnam dictates policy. Cambodia signed a treaty with Vietnam in February 1979, legitimizing the presence of Vietnamese troops.

Weeks after the overthrow of his regime, Pol Pot and his remaining forces continued strong attacks against the Vietnamese, apparently supplied by the Chinese through Thailand. Whether life for Cambodians will greatly improve under the rule of Heng Samrin is a critical question. Whatever the answer, it is clear that Vietnam has realized a centuries-old ambition to control its neighbor, Cambodia.

CHINA

Political Status: *Communist People's Republic since October 1, 1949.*
Leadership: *Yeh Chien-ying, head of state.*
Hua Kuo-feng, Prime Minister.
Area: *3,691,795 square miles (excluding Taiwan).*
Population: *1 billion.*
Capital: *Peking.*



HISTORY

China boasts the world's oldest continuous civilization. Its first written records date from the Shang dynasty (1766-1122 B.C.), which developed beautiful bronze sculptures and vessels. The doctrine of the "mandate of Heaven" was formulated under the Chou dynasty (c. 1122-256 B.C.). This central concept held that the ruler was invested with power and authority only so long as he ruled conscientiously and retained the approval of Heaven. During the late Chou period, China spawned contending schools of thought, including Confucianism and Taoism.

The state of Ch'in unified China under Shih Huang-ti, who became the first emperor in 221 B.C. He ruthlessly centralized the government and embraced the philosophy of Legalism. To fend off nomads to the north, he enlarged previous fortifications to form the Great Wall. The political system he created functioned almost continuously for the next 2,000 years.

During the ensuing Han dynasty (206-220 A.D.), the Chinese expanded their empire as far as central Asia and into Korea and Vietnam. The Han also saw the arrival from India of Buddhism. A period of disunity followed the collapse of the Han. But beginning in the seventh century, a reunified China under the T'ang again enlarged its territory and enjoyed a golden age of culture that extended into the Sung era. The Mongols invaded China in the thirteenth century and founded the Yuan dynasty, thus becoming the first foreigners to conquer all of China. The famed Marco Polo traveled throughout China during the reign of Mongol emperor Kublai Khan.

Yuan rule was harsh, and the Chinese rebelled and restored native control under the Ming dynasty in 1368. The zenith of Ming power came in the early fifteenth century when Chinese fleets roamed as far as East Africa. Many neighboring states acknowledged China's preeminence by paying tribute to the Ming emperors. But a combination of internal corruption, domestic rebellion, and foreign pressure weakened the Ming. In 1644, they were replaced by China's last dynasty, the Ch'ing.

Founded by the Manchus, who originated to the northeast of China, the Ch'ing dynasty embraced Chinese culture, and under its rule the nation expanded to include more land than ever before in its history, incorporating China proper as well as Sinkiang, Tibet, Mongolia, Manchuria, and Taiwan. The Chinese viewed their country as the center of the world. Their scientific and technical accomplishments were considerable, and Western ideas of modernization were of limited interest to them. In the nineteenth century, however, Western powers issued demands for increased trade with China, and the Ch'ing dynasty was too weak to resist. Britain, France, Russia, the United States, Germany, and Japan won special privileges and carved out spheres of influence in China. A far more serious threat to the dynasty, the Taiping rebellion, wracked the country for fifteen years until it was crushed in 1865.

The challenge posed by Western imperialism and the Taiping rebellion led some members of the Chinese elite to urge reform. But it was a case of too little too late, and reformers like Sun Yat-sen agitated for the end of the dynasty. Imperial rule finally collapsed in 1911, but the formation of a republican government offered no solution to China's problems. Much of China reverted

T'ang Dynasty Horse, 618-907

to regionalism, and for the next two decades, provincial warlords vied with each other for control of the nation.

The Chinese Communist Party, founded in 1921, cooperated with Sun's Nationalist Party in an effort to throw off foreign influence and unify China. But following the death of Sun, Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek ended the shaky alliance with the Communists. Chiang formed a Nationalist government at Nanking in 1927 and began to organize a series of military "extermination campaigns" aimed at wiping out a newly proclaimed Chinese Soviet Republic in Kiangsi province. In 1934, the Communists embarked on a year-long, 6,000-mile retreat that came to be known as the Long March. They established their new headquarters in the caves of Yenan.

A clash between Chinese and Japanese forces near Peking in 1937 marked the opening of hostilities with Japan. The Nationalists and Communists formed a united front to oppose the Japanese, but it was an uneasy alliance. The Communists gained steadily in strength and influence during World War II, while Chiang's Nationalists proved ineffective both militarily and politically. Following the surrender of Japan, the U.S. made unsuccessful efforts to forge a genuine coalition between the rival Chinese factions. Civil war broke out in China in 1947. By October 1949, the Communists had defeated the Nationalists, who retreated to the offshore island of Taiwan. In Peking, Chinese Communist leader Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China.

CHINA TODAY

China will celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic in October 1979. As that date approaches, the nation has embarked on a monumental project—modernization. Under pragmatic leaders who have assumed power since the death of Mao Tse-tung, China's millions hope to transform their vast land into a powerful, modern state by the year 2000. "This revolution is second to none of the past revolutions . . . in vastness of scale, extremes of change, complexity of tasks, and far-reaching consequences," Peking's *People's Daily* recently wrote. If anything, that assessment was an understatement, for China's "new Long March" is shaking the very foundations of Maoist society.

The decision to launch an all-out modernization campaign in China is as controversial as it is historic. For years, the Chinese Communist Party has been torn by conflict between supporters of two rival approaches to economic and social development. Westerners have dubbed these approaches "radical" and "moderate," and in his final years, China's Chairman Mao Tse-tung backed the radical position, while Prime Minister Chou En-lai favored the moderate stance.

Members of both camps want to develop China's economy and avoid the social inequities generated by modernization. But the radicals believe that China must continue its evolution toward communism through constant social upheaval. They wish to prevent foreign influences and the emergence of an intellectual or economic elite. Moderates give top priority to economic development. To achieve it, they say, China must have internal stability. It must also be willing to learn from foreign achievements and to allow a degree of economic and social inequality.

Chou En-lai's death in January 1976 triggered a titanic struggle between the two camps. Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing, and other leading radicals were apparently determined to prevent Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing, a moderate, from stepping into Chou's shoes. Hua Kuo-feng, a party leader little known in the West, was chosen Chou's successor. When demonstrations broke out in Peking's Tienanmen Square over radical attempts to discourage public mourning for the popular Chou, the radicals used the occasion to discredit Teng and remove him from all his posts. Mao died the following September, and his widow and her three radical allies—the "Gang of Four"—were arrested. Hua then stepped into the vacant party chairmanship. In the ensuing months, thousands of radicals were purged from office, while Teng and other moderates were rehabilitated. Many of them had been in disgrace since the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, a turbulent radical campaign.

Hua and Teng appear to have reached a consensus on China's priorities. Addressing a meeting of the National People's Congress (China's nominal legislature) in March 1978, Hua declared that the government was committed to four modernizations—of agriculture, industry, defense, and science and technology. He laid down ambitious economic targets and asserted that it was China's goal to be a modern nation by the end of this century. The government launched a massive propaganda campaign to win public backing for the program and editorials called for development at an even faster pace. "The question isn't whether to carry through the four modernizations by the end of the century," *People's Daily* asserted. "The point is . . . to reach this objective in shorter time." At a meeting of its Central Committee in December, the Communist Party decreed that "socialist modernization," not political struggle, should be the country's chief preoccupation.

Along with their development campaign, China's post-Mao leaders have eased the stern controls that bound society. Legal experts are reforming the law code to end arbitrary arrest and detention and to protect defendants. Rights are being restored to millions of former landlords and wealthy villagers who were discriminated against during the Cultural Revolution.

Managers may use pay raises, bonuses, and other material incentives to encourage productivity. The regime is phasing out Mao's program of sending youths to the countryside for a period of manual labor.Citizens are urged to learn English as a useful tool, and China has made arrangements to send several thousand students to the West for training. Factories are stepping up production of consumer goods and marketing colorful clothing and other items which were previously regarded as "decadent and bourgeois." Performing arts troupes have broadened their repertoires to include traditional tales about imperial heroes and ancient goddesses, and foreign groups like the Boston Symphony have been invited to China.

The speed and scope of these developments has created stress within the Communist Party hierarchy. For one thing, a number of leaders sympathetic to the radical position remain in power from the local to the national level. In addition, Hua Kuo-feng shows signs of being more cautious in his approach to modernization than is Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Now seventy-four, Teng evidently sees it as his duty to commit China irrevocably to modernization before he passes from the scene. To this end, Teng and his followers have struck out in several directions. With the aim of discrediting the radical position, party spokesmen have reduced Mao from the status of demi-god to mere mortal by asserting that he could—and did—make mistakes. Teng has arranged for many of his own

Peasant on Commune in South China

proteges to be appointed to powerful posts in the party, the government, and the army. He has also moved relentlessly to purge or immobilize those who oppose his policies.

Teng's drive took a dramatic turn late in 1978 with the launching of a wall-poster campaign in Peking. In recent years, wall posters have served as powerful weapons in China's political infighting. By inspiring or backing the writing of political posters, Teng evidently hoped to achieve at least two results. One was to weaken any remaining authority of the "Gang of Four." Another was to enlist the support of intellectuals for the modernization drive. Day after day, posters appeared on the walls of the capital. They call Mao's judgment into question, attacked Teng's rivals, and demanded rehabilitation for important moderates who had been ousted in Mao's final years. Western analysts began to speculate that Teng might be aiming to unseat Hua and take the prime ministership for himself.

Teng denied any such ambition. "I am too old," he told a visiting Japanese politician. Whatever Teng's true feelings about the prime ministership, party debate over the issue raised by the posters went on for a full month. By the time the Central Committee met in December, Teng had won a significant victory. Although there were no ousters from the Politburo, four moderates were added to the roster, increasing Teng's majority. The Communist Party posthumously rehabilitated P'eng Teh-huai, the defense minister purged by Mao in 1959, as well as Tao Chu, the party's fourth-ranked leader until his fall during the Cultural Revolution. One new Politburo appointee, Hu Yao-pang, was named party secretary general. Many Western experts believed that the aging Teng might be grooming Hu as his successor.

The poster campaign also set off a groundswell of public comment. Along stretches of Peking sidewalks that came to be known collectively as "democracy wall," citizens put up many posters that reflected deep personal discontent. One linked Maoism with superstition and argued that economic progress in America had been the result of casting superstition aside. Another criticized the National People's Congress as a rubber-stamp body. City youths whom Mao had assigned to work on communes lobbied to return to town. An open letter to President Jimmy Carter demanded rights for China's citizens.

Poster readers engaged visiting foreigners who came to see democracy wall in lively conversations about government and life in the West. Asked whether the posters had gone too far, Teng defended them. "It is necessary for some time for us to be urged along by them," he declared. Nonetheless, the government let citizens know that there were limits to its tolerance. The most inflammatory posters were ripped down, demonstrations were discouraged, and when disgruntled young people from the countryside began rioting in Shanghai, authorities sternly warned them that they would be punished.


UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
MONGOLIA
HEILUNGKIANG
Harbin
Ch'ang-ch'un
KIRIN
Shen-yang
LIAONING
NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
PEKING MUNICIPALITY
Peking
TIENTSIN MUNICIPALITY
Tientsin
INNER MONGOLIAN A.R.
Hu-ho-hao-t'e
SINKIANG UIGHUR A.R.
Urumchi
AFGHANISTAN
JAMMU AND KASHMIR
KANSU
NINGSIA HUI A.R.
Yin-ch'uan
TSINGHAI
Hsi-ning
Lan-chou
SHENSI
Sian
SHANSI
T'ai-yuan
HOPEH
Shih-chia-chuang
Tsinan
SHANTUNG
YELLOW SEA
Cheng-chou
HONAN
ANHWEI
Ho-fei
KIANGSU
Nanking
SHANGHAI MUNICIPALITY
Shanghai
Hangchow
TIBETAN A.R.
SZECHWAN
Ch'eng-tu
HUPEH
Wu-ch'ang
CHEKIANG
EAST CHINA SEA
SIKKIM
Lhasa
NEPAL
INDIA
BHUTAN
INDIA
Nan-ch'ang
Ch'ang-sha
HUNAN
KIANGSI
Foochow
FUKIEN
FORMOSA STRAIT
Taipei
TAIWAN
KWEICHOW
Kuei-yang
K'un-ming
YUNNAN
KWANGSI CHUANG A.R.
KWANGTUNG
Canton
Nan-ning
HONG KONG (U.K.)
MACAO (Port.)
SOUTH CHINA SEA
HAINAN
PHILIPPINES
BURMA
NORTH VIETNAM
LAOS
THAILAND
KEY
International boundary
Province boundary
A.R. Autonomous region
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MILES

Modernization itself has won enthusiastic public backing, for though China has made immense strides since 1949, it remains in many ways a backward and undeveloped land. With a population of nearly 1 billion, China's gross national product is estimated at one-fifth that of the United States. China produces 15,000 automobiles a year, compared to 9.2 million in America. While the U.S. employs 340,000 computers, China uses 2,000. Chinese farms own only 225,000 tractors, compared with 4.4 million in the U.S. It takes three-quarters of China's work force to produce the country's food: U.S. farmers account for only 3.3 percent of the work force. There are 700,000 TV sets in China, as against 133 million in America. The Chinese life expectancy is 65, eight years shorter than that of Americans. Chinese get by with an estimated 30 square feet of residential living space per person; Americans have 15 times that amount. The Chinese worker spends 67 days earning a bicycle, compared with 1½ days for a U.S. worker.

In his 1978 report to the National People's Congress, Chairman Hua unveiled the specifics of China's new economic programs. In the next eight years, Hua declared, the government will build or complete 120 large-scale projects including iron and steel complexes, coal mines, oil fields, trunk railroads, and harbors. Hua envisioned that by 1985, China will produce 60 million tons of steel annually, nearly double current production. He announced that a "solid foundation" will be laid for the mechanization of 85 percent of all major farm processes. Planned revenue and capital investment expenditures will be as much for the eight-year period as China's total since 1950.

To meet these ambitious targets, China's leaders have reversed Mao's policy of national self-reliance and have sent officials scurrying to Western nations in search of technology, loans, and investment capital. Industrial plants top China's shopping list. The government hopes to buy whole steel mills, nuclear power plants, and petrochemical and fertilizer industries. It is seeking computers, aircraft, and hospital, mining, and farm equipment. Japanese firms have signed up to build an entire steel facility near Shanghai, while a German consortium has agreed to develop coal mines in the northeast. Intercontinental Hotels has contracted to build hotels worth $500 million, and U.S. companies are bargaining for offshore oil exploration and drilling rights. By early 1979, China was discussing foreign economic deals totaling an estimated $70 billion.

Although China has abandoned long-held opposition to borrowing money abroad, it may nonetheless encounter difficulty rounding up funds to pay for what it wants. Peking earns only $2 billion to $3 billion a year in foreign exchange, and its exports may be unable to keep pace with its growing obligations. One solution the Chinese seem willing to try is compensation deals by which investors are repaid in goods rather than in cash. Given the size of China's purchases in the West and the limitations on Chinese monetary resources, however, many U.S. experts have begun to speculate that Peking may have to slow the planned pace of development or cut back somewhat on economic goals.

The decision to seek international help for the Chinese modernization program is a key factor influencing Peking's foreign policy. China feels threatened by the more modern and powerful Soviet Union. Sino-Russian rivalry has its roots in pre-Communist history, and it is exacerbated by the fact that both Moscow and Peking claim to be the true practitioner of Marxism-Leninism. China has repeatedly denounced the U.S.S.R. as "the most dangerous source of new world war," especially in view of the heavy Russian military buildup along the disputed Sino-Soviet border. To counter Soviet influence, China is conducting a vigorous foreign policy around the globe.

The most dramatic development in China's diplomatic crusade has been its recent rapprochement with the U.S. In December 1978, Chinese Chairman Hua Kuo-feng and President Carter announced in their respective capitals that China and the United States would establish formal diplomatic ties on January 1, 1979. The move came nearly seven years after President Richard Nixon's historic journey to Peking. President Carter declared that American recognition of the People's Republic as the government of China meant "recognizing simple reality." Although the U.S. severed diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist government of Taiwan, Carter pledged to maintain commercial, cultural, and other links with the island, and he stressed that the U.S. would "continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue." The United States also asserted that it would sell defensive weapons to the Nationalists. In a separate statement, the PRC declared that "the way of bringing Taiwan back to the embrace of the motherland . . . is entirely China's internal affair."

The opening of Sino-American relations was followed by a whirlwind visit to America by Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing. During his trip, Teng signed agreements broadening Sino-American trade, scientific, educational, and cultural ties. He sought to assure U.S. Congressmen that Chinese intentions toward Taiwan were peaceful, but he refused to rule out the use of force to reuinfy Taiwan with the mainland. Teng also used his tour as a platform for warning Americans about the dangers of Soviet "hegemonism" and made it clear that he would welcome the U.S. as an anti-Soviet ally. He also announced that China might have to teach neighboring Vietnam "some necessary lessons."

In stops at Atlanta, Houston, and Seattle, Teng inspected modern factories and other American technological achievements such as the Johnson Space Center. Following the Teng trip, U.S. Treasury Secretary W. Michael Blumenthal flew to Peking to be present at the March 1 opening of the U.S. embassy. While in China, Blumenthal settled with Chinese officials two long-standing bilateral issues: American financial claims against the PRC and frozen Chinese assets in the U.S.

China's campaign against Soviet influence extends to Europe and Africa. Peking has repeatedly warned NATO nations to keep up their guard against the Soviets, and Chinese military officers are shopping in Western Europe for advanced weapons. To the outrage of the Russians, China has made overtures in Eastern Europe as well. Chairman Hua toured Rumania and Yugoslavia during the summer of 1978, thus becoming the first top PRC leader ever to visit the region. In Africa, China encourages friendly relations by means of military assistance, economic-aid projects, and leadership visits. Early this year, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien paid diplomatic calls in Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zaire.

Peking places special emphasis on its ties in Asia, where the Soviet Union has been trying for years to promote a security arrangement aimed against China. In 1978, the Chinese signed a peace and friendship treaty with Japan that formally ended four decades of hostility between the two nations. Teng Hsiao-p'ing journeyed to Tokyo in October to exchange the documents of ratification.

The Chinese maintain close relations with the Pakistanis and have recently finished construction of a strategic highway linking Sinkiang Province to Pakistan. China is slowly mending its rift with India, with which it fought a 1962 border war. Teng made a ten-day visit to Southeast Asia late in 1978 in the hope of undercutting Soviet and Vietnamese diplomatic efforts there. Cordially received in Thailand, Teng was greeted more warily in Singapore and Malaysia, as both nations fear that China may stir up trouble in their ethnic Chinese communities.

In early 1979, Vietnam provoked the Chinese into making one of their rare military moves. Under Communist governments, Vietnam and China have cooperated in recent years; nonetheless, ill-feeling between the two nations dates back many centuries. Today's Vietnam is determined not to be dominated by China. The Chinese believe that Hanoi has drawn dangerously close to Moscow, especially by signing a long-term bilateral friendship pact in November 1978. China accuses Vietnam of persecuting ethnic Chinese residents and driving 180,000 of them over the border into southern China. Peking also fears that Hanoi plans to establish an unfriendly Indochina federation by taking over Laos and Cambodia, and China was embarrassed and angered in January when Vietnam's armed forces overthrew Cambodian leader Pol Pot, a Chinese ally. Border incidents have also heightened tensions between China and Vietnam.

Ignoring Soviet warnings and American expressions of concern, the Chinese invaded Vietnam on February 17 with 80,000 ground troops. Peking declared that its intent was to punish the Vietnamese and that the strike would be "limited in time and space." Vietnam refused to commit its elite units to battle, and the Chinese succeeded in taking five provincial capitals. The Soviets blustered but declined to become directly involved. Two-and-a-half weeks after the invasion began, China announced that its armies were withdrawing from Vietnam, having "attained the goals set for them."

Since Peking never spelled out those invasion goals, it is difficult to assess the results of the incursion from China's point of view. On the one hand, China's move has raised questions in the minds of Western and Asian leaders about the PRC's foreign policy aims and predictibility. And the invasion has certainly poisoned relations between China and Vietnam for years to come. On the other hand, China dealt Vietnam an economic blow by damaging its northernmost reaches. In effect, Peking has warned Hanoi that future Vietnamese actions which displease China may trigger another military strike. And although China is not yet a modern nation, it has put the Russians on notice that it is a power to be reckoned with. In Chinese eyes, that alone is a significant achievement.

INDIA

Political Status: *Independent since August 15, 1947. A republic since January 26, 1950.*
Leadership: *Sanjiva Reddy, President.*
Morarji Desai, Prime Minister.
Area: *1,269,338 square miles.*
Population: *640 million.*
Capital: *New Delhi.*

U.S.S.R.
CHINA
AFGH.
PAKISTAN
NEPAL
New Delhi
BURMA
INDIA
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
SRI LANKA
Indian Ocean

HISTORY

India is the home of one of the oldest, most significant civilizations in the world. In the fourth century B.C., Chandragupta Maurya established the subcontinent's first empire in what today is Bihar. During the reign of his grandson, Asoka, the Mauryan empire stretched from Afghanistan to Bengal south of the Himalayas, except for southernmost India.

After Asoka died, his empire disintegrated into lesser kingdoms, and for more than 500 years, India was disunited. The Gupta empire rose in the fourth century A.D. in approximately the same area the Mauryans had ruled. The most famous Gupta monarch, Chandragupta II, was both a strong political leader and a great patron of the arts. Attacks by the Huns, however, undermined the Gupta empire in the fifth century. Arab Muslim forces began to invade in the 700s, although their political power extended no farther east than the lower Indus Valley. Turkish Muslims made more serious penetrations in the twelfth century and established a sultanate at Delhi. At its zenith, the Delhi sultanate brought much of the subcontinent under Muslim control.

In 1398, Timur (Tamerlane) marched on Delhi, sacked it, and then withdrew. The Mughal monarch Babur, a descendent of both Timur and Genghis Khan, invaded India in the early 1500s and founded the Mughal Empire (1526-1761). Building on Babur's achievements, his grandson Akbar conquered further territory and proved to be the greatest Mughal ruler. (Akbar's grandson, Shah Jahan, was the monarch who erected the Taj Mahal.) Mughal power declined in the seventeenth century, and the Hindu Marathas carved out a kingdom of their own in western India.

Portugal's Vasco da Gama reached India in 1498. The Portuguese and then the Dutch soon set up trading posts. In the seventeenth century, the British East India Company was granted trading privileges by the Mughals. As the French contended with the British for influence in India the British government joined the East India Company in establishing ever-wider control there. By 1818, Britain had become the subcontinent's dominant foreign power, ruling both directly and through local princes.

The changes brought about in India by British-led Westernization created a tinderbox of resentments. In 1857, Indian soldiers mutinied and touched off a year-long revolt. The British crushed the uprising, but the event was a watershed. The British government abolished the East India Company and took full control of Indian affairs.

Along with other colonial areas, India began to agitate against foreign intervention. The Indian National Congress, established in 1885, became a forum for discussion about the need for social and political reform. Similarly, the Muslim League was formed in 1906. Britain gave in to demands for increasing local participation in government but showed no intention of withdrawing from India. As nationalist feelings deepened, the Congress became the strongest Indian political force. Under the leadership of Congress's Mahatma Gandhi, Indians embarked on a non-violent campaign of non-cooperation aimed at the British. At the same time, a Muslim separatist movement began to crystallize.

The outbreak of World War II led Britain to offer India postwar independence, provided the subcontinent would cooperate in the war effort. The Congress responded by demanding the immediate departure of the British, and the government interned Congress leaders for a time. At

Yamini Krishnamurti (South Indian Dance)

war's end, Britain's Labor government decided to relinquish India. The British were prepared to accept the idea of a unified nation that would include both Hindus and Muslims. When efforts to achieve that failed, Britain announced that it would grant independence to two states—India and Pakistan—on August 15, 1947.

The communal conflict and migration that accompanied partition took an estimated half million lives. The border state of Kashmir became the object of confrontation between India and Pakistan. India's spiritual father, Mahatma Gandhi, was killed by a Hindu fanatic in 1948.

Jawaharlal Nehru led the first independent Indian government. Nehru died in 1964, and Lal Bahadur Shastri became prime minister until his own death less than two years later. Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi, was chosen to head the Congress and won elections in 1967. The Congress split, but Mrs. Gandhi won again at the polls in 1971. She declared a state of Emergency in 1975 and assumed near-dictatorial powers. By 1977, Mrs. Gandhi felt confident enough to submit her government to a national vote. She was defeated by the Janata coalition party which still rules India in 1979.


INDIA
C H I N A
(T I B E T)
Jammu & Kashmir
Srinagar
Himachal Pradesh
Punjab
Chandigarh
Haryana
Delhi
Uttar Pradesh
Jaipur
Rajasthan
Agra
Lucknow
Kanpur
Allahabad
Varanasi
Patna
R. Ganges
Bihar
N.E.F.A.
Assam
Shillong
Imphal
Tripura
W. Bengal
Calcutta
Jamshedpur
Jabalpur
Indore
Ahmedabad
Baroda
Gujarat
Madhya Pradesh
BURMA
Surat
Nagpur
Maharashtra
Orissa
Cuttack
Bombay
Poona
Sholapur
Hyderabad
Andhra Pradesh
Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
Goa
Mysore
Bangalore
Madras
Pondicherry
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Trivandrum
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Nicobar Islands
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INDIA TODAY

India made political headlines in 1977. When Prime Minister Indira Gandhi gave Indian voters a chance to express their views after twenty-one months of Emergency rule, they promptly rejected her government in favor of the Janata party. The election ended the dominance of Mrs. Gandhi and her Congress party and appeared to mark the dawn of a new era. In 1979, however, Mrs. Gandhi has again emerged as a political contender, and the Janata government is gravely hampered by internal dissension.

Mrs. Gandhi's humiliation at the polls was of her own making. During the Emergency period, she alienated many Indians by imprisoning political opponents, backing a nationwide campaign of forced sterilization, and allowing her son, Sanjay Gandhi, to exercise broad and arbitrary political power. The Janata government repealed most of the authoritarian measures (including press censorship) introduced by Mrs. Gandhi, and launched official inquiries into her record with an eye toward prosecuting her.

Mrs. Gandhi made it clear, however, that she could not be counted out of the political game. Rallying what was left of her followers, she broke with the Congress party in January 1978 and established her own group, Congress (I)—for Indira. She remained unrepentant about her own record. "We have said we were sorry for whatever excesses might have been committed by some local officials," she told a rally in Maharashtra. But, she added, "today's problems are too urgent to dwell upon the past."

Mrs. Gandhi focused her primary attention on the south of India, where she retained a good measure of support. As a result of her efforts, Congress (I) won a majority in February 1978 state elections in Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, defeating both Congress regulars and Janata.

Judicial inquiry has kept the Gandhi Emergency period in the headlines. Refusing to cooperate with the official commission investigating charges against her, Mrs. Gandhi was cited for contempt. The commission reported its preliminary findings to parliament in May 1978; it found the state of Emergency unwarranted and accused Mrs. Gandhi of arbitrary rule. In July, the government filed charges against her for abuse of authority, detention of public personalities, and harassment of officials attempting to collect information sought by parliament about the business activities of Sanjay Gandhi.

The Janata government, meantime, has sailed into rough seas. The party that defeated Mrs. Gandhi was a hastily constructed coalition of five contentious factions. Based mainly in the north of India, Janata lacks a history of cooperation or unified policy goals. Janata has won a number of by-elections in the north, but there are also strong rivalries among its three top leaders—eighty-three-year-old Prime Minister Morarji Desai, and cabinet ministers Charan Singh and Jagjivan Ram, ages seventy-seven and seventy-one.

In June 1978, Home Minister Singh precipitated a crisis in Janata that lasted for seven months and diverted the attention of most party leaders from important national issues. The primary reason for Singh's action may have been his continuing ambition to be prime minister. Singh and an ally, Health Minister Raj Narain, attacked Prime Minister Desai's leadership on a variety of questions from the decision-making process to agricultural policy and the handling of the Gandhi issue (Singh urged the immediate arrest of Mrs. Gandhi). Desai's response was to oust both Singh and Narain from his Cabinet.

The party crisis worsened when Singh accused Desai of preventing an investigation of alleged business misdealings by his son Kanti and demanded an inquiry. Throughout the summer and autumn, negotiations between Janata factions produced no solution. The country was treated to the spectacle of nominal allies making charges and countercharges, and of Janata officials resigning—and sometimes withdrawing their resignations.

Janata's disarray was grist for the mill of Indira Gandhi. In autumn 1978, she arranged to be nominated to run in a parliamentary by-election in Karnataka. The seat—Chikmagalur—was chosen because of its record of having been solidly behind her in past elections. Though she could not speak the local language, Mrs. Gandhi campaigned energetically. Prime Minister Desai warned that her election would be a threat to democracy, and high-ranking members of Janata visited the district to back the government candidate. Even so, Mrs. Gandhi won an overwhelming mandate. She returned to parliament as head of the largest party in the lower house after Janata itself. In the words of one Janata supporter, her victory brought her "back to the gates of power."

Mrs. Gandhi's arrival in parliament was stormy. Her critics greeted her with boos and cries of "skunk" and "murderess." ~~A day later, a parliamentary~~ committee charged her with contempt of parliament for an alleged offense committed in 1975. Mrs. Gandhi was expelled from parliament in December and sent to jail for the remaining days of the legislative session. The sentence only served to arouse her supporters, who mounted noisy demonstrations. In the meantime, her increasing power has led many Congress leaders to conclude that unity negotiations with Congress (I) are in their own best interest. Observers expect that Mrs. Gandhi will run again in a parliamentary by-election, although Emergency period charges are still pending against her.

Pressing his campaign against Desai, Charan Singh staged a rally of half a million of his political supporters in late December. Not long after that show of strength, Janata intermediaries arranged a compromise between Singh and Desai. Singh returned to the cabinet as finance minister and deputy prime minister. His rival, Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram, was also named deputy prime minister. In the short run, the arrangement papered over party differences—but tensions still run high, and fresh Janata infighting over both policy issues and personalities could erupt again. That, in turn, could aid Congress (I).

In foreign policy, the Janata government has enjoyed some success. India has strengthened relations with the United States and China without straining ties with the Soviet Union. President Carter and Prime Minister Desai exchanged friendly visits in 1978. Each leader seemed comfortable with the other's stated commitment to moral values and human rights.

The nuclear issue, however, is a source of disagreement between India and the U.S. India conducted its first atomic test in 1974. Under law, the United States cannot supply nuclear fuel to foreign nations beyond 1980 unless they submit to inspection of all their nuclear facilities. (Inspection is intended to guard against diversion and reprocessing of nuclear fuel into weapons-grade material.) Desai refuses to agree to comprehensive inspections, and future U.S. nuclear shipments are in doubt. India has argued that U.S. worries about "proliferation" are fundamentally hypocritical; it claims that the "vertical proliferation" of ever-growing superpower nuclear stockpiles presents a greater threat to world peace than one atomic explosion in India.

Indian Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee paid a visit to Peking in February 1979, the first by a high Indian official since the 1962 Sino-Indian border war. India continued to object to China's occupation of 14,000 square miles of what New Delhi considers Indian territory as well as to Chinese support for Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Vajpayee cut short his Chinese stay as a protest against China's invasion of Vietnam, but he announced that progress had been made in improving bilateral ties. Among other things, he reported that China had declared that its backing for rebels on India's northeast frontier was "a thing of the past."

The Soviet Union objected to India's moves toward China, but Moscow and New Delhi maintain a cordial relationship. The Russians agreed to build a new steel mill for India, and the two countries have settled a dispute over the exchange rate of their currencies. India remains suspicious of the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and of the activities of Soviet-backed Cubans in Africa. Even so, Prime Minister Desai played host to Soviet Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin in March 1979.

Relations with Pakistan, India's long-time adversary, have improved. In early 1978, Vajpayee made India's first high-level visit to Islamabad in many years. India and Pakistan agreed on a joint hydroelectric project in Kashmir, and cultural and commercial contacts were widened. India protested the opening of a highway linking Pakistan and China, however, on grounds that part of it passed through disputed Kashmir.

Domestically, Desai's government has fared less well. Both supporters and rivals of Desai describe him as an unbending man determined to push his own pet projects. A campaign which has raised many doubts is Desai's drive to end consumption of alcoholic beverages. As critics see it, many matters are far more pressing than drinking. One is the problem of communal violence. Since the end of the Emergency period, there has been a marked increase in rioting between Hindus and Muslims as well as between low and higher caste Indians. The government's inability to halt such outbreaks has led to disillusionment with Janata on the part of many Muslims and untouchables.

The Indian economy is developing at a moderate pace. Gross domestic product in 1978-79 is expected to grow by 3 percent. Four years of good monsoons have boosted agricultural output to record highs. Irrigation projects and increased use of chemical fertilizer have slowly lessened dependence on weather. Despite a trade deficit, the balance of payments has been favorable because of an inflow of foreign aid and remittances from tourism and from Indians working abroad. The industrial sector is doing well and inflation is low.

India's population remains a problem. Mrs. Gandhi's program of compulsory sterilization set back the cause of birth control by turning the populace against *all* kinds of family planning. The Desai government supports voluntary family planning, but in the absence of social welfare programs and old-age security, smaller families are not in the self-interest of many Indians.

Under the Desai administration, India is once again a working democracy. There have been no foreign crises, and internal economic development has shown progress. But it remains to be seen whether the Indian system is strong enough to avoid upheavals like the Emergency in the future.

INDONESIA

Political Status: *Independent republic since August 17, 1945. Military-dominated government since March 12, 1966.*
Leadership: *Suharto, President.*
Area: *741,030 square miles.*
Population: *137 million.*
Capital: *Jakarta.*

VIETNAM
PHILIPPINES
South China Sea
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
Jakarta
INDONESIA
Indian Ocean

HISTORY

The "spice islands" that Christopher Columbus was looking for when he discovered America were in reality Indonesia. Long before the arrival of any European adventurers, the islands of the Indonesian archipelago were the sites of Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms influenced by Indian culture. They had fallen under the sway of Islam beginning in the fifteenth century.

The Portuguese were the first Europeans to trade in Indonesia. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Dutch East India Company conquered the area and dominated the spice and agricultural trade. The company was dissolved in 1800 and the Netherlands government assumed authority in the islands. During the Napoleonic wars, Britain seized the island of Java, but it was returned to the Dutch in 1816. Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia was highly exploitive, even by the illiberal standards of the nineteenth century. The Dutch ultimately sought to reform their administration, but their action came too late to erase the bitterness from Indonesian memory.

An Indonesian nationalist movement sprang up in the early twentieth century. Over the next few decades, the Dutch refused to agree to a program of political evolution in Indonesia. The Japanese conquered the territory during World War II, and upon Japan's surrender, nationalists under the leadership of Sukarno and Muhammad Hatta proclaimed Indonesian independence. Only after four years of armed struggle did the new republic succeed in winning Dutch recognition.

In the face of internal disunity, President Sukarno, whose post was intended to be symbolic, assumed increasing power. In 1957, he rejected parliamentary democracy as a model for Indonesia. Sukarno did a notable job of giving the new Indonesia a sense of political and psychological unity. As time went on, however, Sukarno's disastrous economic policies and his collaboration with the Communist Party gravely concerned the nation's officer corps. When the Communists attempted to seize power in 1965, at least half a million Communists or suspected Communist sympathizers were killed in civil strife. As a result of the crisis, Sukarno was forced to transfer his authority to General Suharto in 1966. The following year, Suharto formally assumed the presidency. Sukarno died in June 1970. Backed by Indonesia's military, Suharto remains in control of the country in 1979.

INDONESIA TODAY

President Suharto was sworn in for his third five-year term in March 1978. He has indicated that he will not seek a further presidential term, yet there is no hint of who his successor might be. Meantime, Suharto's military-dominated "New Order" government faces the dual challenge of widespread public disillusionment and economic difficulty.

Indonesian students, who played a key role in the 1966 ouster of President Sukarno, mounted noisy protests against Suharto as the 1978 election approached. Poster-carrying demonstrators accused the Suharto family of amassing great wealth over the years. Students criticized Indonesia's rampant corruption in government, the slow and uneven pace of economic development, and the lack of parliamentary rule. Suharto's response was to arrest hundreds of protesters and to close down newspapers until editors pledged not to print accounts of the turmoil. He also arranged to remove Indonesian General H.R. Dharsono as secretary general of ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) for sympathizing with the student cause.

In the wake of the youth protest, Suharto's re-election was not the clear-cut endorsement he had hoped for. Indonesia's vice president, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, decided not to run again. He cited health as the reason, but he was known to disagree with Suharto policies. In addition, the Muslim United Development Party (PPP) raised objections to proposed government recognition of *kepercayaan*, Javanese mystic beliefs, as formal religions. The Muslim group, which had won nearly a third of the popular vote in the 1977 elections, resisted any move that might dilute the power of Islam, the nominal religion of most Indonesians.

With the continued backing of the military, Suharto carried the day. The Muslims, who form only a small minority in the largely appointed People's Consultative Assembly that chooses the president, fell into line after airing their grievances. Suharto was thus re-elected by unanimous vote. In his acceptance speech, the one-time general asserted that he would not tolerate any dissent that might threaten the nation's stability. He followed up by appointing ten generals to his cabinet, a marked increase in military representation. For vice president, Suharto chose Adam Malik, a veteran politician and Indonesia's former foreign minister.

Suharto has attempted to foster public support in a variety of ways. The respected Admiral Sudomo has been given the job of rooting out corruption from official circles, although everyone agrees that is a monumental task. Suharto continues the slow release of political prisoners who have been held without trial since an abortive Communist coup in 1965. Ten thousand were freed in 1978, and government spokesmen say the release of a further 10,000 in 1979 will leave only a handful in custody. Human rights groups challenge the accuracy of these figures, but many observers credit U.S. President Carter's well-publicized human rights campaign with prompting Suharto's action.

Suharto has done nothing to eliminate one condition that has been troubling many Indonesians, namely the pervasive influence of the armed forces. In addition to their high visibility in the cabinet, officers occupy most provincial governorships. Golkar, the chief grouping in parliament, is dominated by the military. Most state enterprises—including Pertamina, the oil monopoly—are run by generals, and the armed forces own or help control a variety of companies. The government defends the military presence by declaring that it is necessary to counterbalance Indonesia's geographic and ethnic diversity. It is unlikely that any regime could survive without army participation or at least support, since the army forms the only truly reliable national administrative system in Indonesia.

The economic achievements of the Suharto regime have been mixed. Under the "New Order," the economy has grown steadily. Irrigation projects, roads, and other infrastructure are being built. Inflation, which ran at 600 percent in Sukarno's final days as president, has dropped to an annual 10 percent, and per capita income is up to $240 a year, a notable gain. Clothing, food, and shelter are easier for most people to obtain then they were before the Suharto era. The nation is gradually digging its way out of the twin crises of the mid-1970s—a worldwide recession and the financial collapse of Pertamina. Yet a small elite absorbs profits from Indonesia's economic advances, while most citizens remain impoverished. Unemployment and underemployment are estimated at 40 percent in rural regions and 20 percent in urban areas. The rice crop is not keeping pace with population growth. Oil production, the primary source of government revenue, has been leveling off because new oil fields are not coming onstream, although liquid natural gas in northern Sumatra may keep Indonesia financially afloat.

The third five-year plan, presented to parliament in early 1979, attempts to come to grips with some of these problems. Suharto has promised a more "equitable distribution" of the benefits of economic growth. Among his top priorities are improved agricultural output, housing, education, health care, and job and rural business opportunities. A long-time program to encourage mass voluntary migration from overcrowded Java to other parts of the archipelago is finally meeting with some success. Suharto has noted, however, that Indonesia will face increased constraints on public revenue because of a likely drop in oil output. Many economists characterize the five-year plan as overoptimistic; what Indonesia needs, they say, is a fundamental restructuring of the economy to decrease its dependence on oil earnings.

In foreign affairs, Indonesia works closely with the other members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong journeyed to Jakarta on a 1978 goodwill tour, but Indonesia remains wary of Vietnam, which it regards as expansionist. Indonesia is also cool toward China. Sino-Indonesian relations were severed following the 1965 Communist coup attempt, and Jakarta has yet to restore them for fear Peking will stir up trouble in Indonesia's Chinese community of 3.8 million. The Indonesians were disturbed to note that during a visit to three ASEAN states in late 1978, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing refused to withdraw Peking's support for Communist insurgency. China's invasion of Vietnam in 1979 has further dampened any Indonesian interest in normalizing ties with Peking.

Suharto's primary problems are internal, however. Behind Indonesia's relatively calm surface, there appears to be widespread feeling that the regime has fallen far short of its promises. This has fueled criticism of the system, although opposition groups are neither well-organized nor unified. Suharto has admitted that a generational change is certain to begin taking place in the leadership over the next several years. Who will inherit Suharto's mantle and in what direction he will take Indonesia are the unanswered questions for the 1980s.

JAPAN

Political Status: *Constitutional monarchy since May 3, 1947. (First constitution promulgated in 1889.)*
Leadership: *Hirohito, Emperor. Masayoshi Ohira, Prime Minister.*
Population: *115 million.*
Area: *143,750 square miles.*
Capital: *Tokyo.*

NORTH KOREA
JAPAN
SOUTH KOREA
Tokyo
Pacific Ocean
Philippine Sea

HISTORY

The origins of the Japanese people are shrouded in mystery. They may have migrated to the islands of Japan by way of Southeast Asia and Korea. Uniquely, a single imperial family has reigned in Japan for at least the last 1,400 years. According to legend, the first emperor, Jimmu, was a descendent of the Sun Goddess. Over the centuries, the Japanese considered the emperor a living deity, but his temporal power was often exercised by others.

Chinese culture—art, music, the Chinese writing system, and system of government—reached Japan from the Korean peninsula. But Japanese borrowing was selective: the Confucian principle of government by merit, rather than heredity, was not accepted by the Japanese. Buddhism was introduced during the sixth century. The Heian period (794-1185) was celebrated for its cultural achievements. In the era's most famous literary work, the *Tale of Genji*, Lady Murasaki described court life in the new capital city, Kyoto.

Members of the Fujiwara family dominated Japanese government from the ninth to the twelfth centuries, although actual control fell into the hands of the warrior class. An epic struggle resulted in the supremacy of the Minamoto clan. The talented Minamoto Yoritomo inaugurated the Kamakura period (1185-1333), and made himself shogun in 1192. For the next 700 years, the



Great Torii of the Itsukushima Shrine

shogun was the chief military figure in Japan. The samurai also came to play a key role in Japanese society.

Toward the close of the Kamakura period, Japan was twice attacked by Mongol fleets. The attack in 1274 was repelled with the aid of a typhoon which the Japanese called a divine wind, or *kamikaze*. *Nō* drama developed during the Muromachi era (1333-1568), a time of civil strife and uncertainty. Portuguese traders and Jesuit missionaries began to arrive in the sixteenth century.

Hideyoshi, one of Japan's most famous military leaders, restored a measure of unity during the Monoyama period (1568-1600). The arts of Zen Buddhism flourished in the tea ceremony, ink painting, garden designing, and flower arranging. Ieyasu of the Tokugawa era assumed the title of shogun in 1603. Under the Tokugawa (1600-1853), Christianity was suppressed and all foreigners were expelled. Despite Japan's seclusion from the rest of the world, however, the Tokugawa period was one of great creativity.

The country's isolation ended in 1854 when the shogunate signed a treaty with U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry allowing American ships to trade in two Japanese ports. The opening to the West was a catalyst for political ferment, and fourteen years later, the Tokugawa was overthrown.

During the ensuing Meiji Restoration (named after the Emperor Meiji), an energetic oligarchy transformed Japan into a modern state. Banks, trains, and the telegraph were introduced. A constitution was adopted in 1889. By defeating Chinese forces in 1894-95, the Japanese acquired Taiwan and the Liaotung peninsula and gained the upper hand in Korea. Japan emerged as a world power following its victory over Russia in 1905. It annexed Korea in 1910.

Although Japan enjoyed considerable experience with parliamentary democracy, economic depression in the late 1920s strengthened the influence of militant nationalists. In 1931, the Japanese occupied Manchuria and set up a puppet government. War with China broke out in 1937. After allying with Germany and Italy, Japan attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and subsequently conquered almost all of Southeast Asia. The U.S. adopted a military strategy of island-hopping across the Pacific. Japan finally surrendered to the Allies in September 1945, one month

Pacific Ocean
Philippine Sea
Tokyo
Japan
International boundary
National capital
Railroad
Road
International airport
0 100 300 Kilometers
0 100 200 Miles

after the U.S. dropped atomic bombs on the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

American forces under General Douglas MacArthur occupied Japan following its defeat. A new constitution was promulgated which renounced war and abandoned the doctrine of the emperor's divinity. A 1951 peace treaty restored Japan's sovereignty, and the Japanese signed a security pact with the United States in 1952.

Conservative political forces have dominated Japanese politics during almost all of the postwar era. Rival conservatives joined together in 1955 as the Liberal Democratic Party. In 1979, Japan has a Liberal Democratic government.

JAPAN TODAY

Since World War II, Japan has developed into the most stable parliamentary democracy in Asia. It has also become an economic powerhouse. In 1979, Japan's actions on the world stage reflect a growing self-confidence based on these twin achievements.

Japan had an unexpected change of government last December. Masayoshi Ohira, sixty-nine, was chosen to replace Takeo Fukuda as head of Japan's ruling party and thus as prime minister. Fukuda's two-year term as president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) ended in 1978. When the seventy-four-year-old Fukuda decided not to retire, party secretary Ohira announced that he would campaign openly for Fukuda's job.

The Liberal Democrats conducted their poll under newly adopted rules. The party is a broad coalition dominated by powerful factions. Since maneuvering and bargaining over party policies and jobs had come in for so much criticism in recent years, the LDP revised the process of electing a leader to reduce the role of factions. In 1978, the LDP's 1.5 million rank-and-file members voted for the first time for party president with LDP members of parliament making the final choice.

Despite the breadth of the initial round of votes, factions still played a key part. In a membership drive, each faction had gone to great trouble to recruit thousands of members for the LDP. Fukuda's faction was thought to be the largest, while Ohira's was considered number three; noncandidate Kakuei Tanaka controlled the second largest group.

Tanaka, a former prime minister on trial for his role in the Lockheed scandal, and an old friend of Ohira, threw the support of his faction behind the secretary general. When first-round votes were counted, Ohira had scored a stunning upset. Fukuda announced his withdrawal from the second-round balloting and Ohira took office as prime minister.

Japanese observers predict that Ohira will not greatly change the course of government, although some describe him as more liberal on domestic policy than Fukuda. In background, Ohira and Fukuda have striking similarities—both men having begun their careers as finance ministry bureaucrats. Ohira served as minister of foreign affairs, finance, and international trade over the years. His style of leadership is thought to be consensus-seeking rather than confrontational. When his cabinet was announced, it proved to be a careful balance of factions.

Ohira has inherited a thorny economic problem. Since the Second World War, the Japanese economy has expanded at a spectacular pace. From the early 1950s to the early 1970s, Japan's real GNP growth rate averaged nearly three times the American rate. Japanese growth has slowed considerably since 1973, however, chiefly due to the sudden rise in oil prices and the resulting decline in world economic growth.

At the same time, though, Japanese exports are booming. Japan's trading partners, particularly the United States, are gravely disturbed by record Japanese trade and current-account surpluses, especially since they believe that the Tokyo government is protecting domestic industries and farms from foreign competition. Under American pressure, the Fukuda administration pledged in early 1978 to correct the large trade imbalance by promising to liberalize trade and to push Japan's growth rate to 7 percent. A high growth rate, economists believed would enable Japan to soak up domestic production as well as imports. The administration also moved to regulate exports and to initiate an emergency import-buying plan.

The trade-surplus problem has proven difficult to correct. The value of the dollar has dropped sharply against the yen, which had the effect of making Japanese goods more expensive—thus less competitive—in the U.S. However, the United States is suffering higher inflation than Japan, and the difference in inflation rates helped undercut the American trade position. Moreover, the Japanese government comes under attack from its own producer and farm lobbies which oppose moves to facilitate foreign competition.

The United States has kept up a strong lobbying campaign to spur further Japanese governmental action. At a summit held in Bonn in July 1978, President Carter and other Western leaders expressed concern about Japan's trade surplus. Robert Strauss, the Carter administration representative who has been negotiating a new international trade accord, warned the Japanese that unless they made tariff concessions, protectionist sentiments in the U.S. Congress would grow. American Energy Secretary James Schlesinger declared during a November visit to Japan that "if liberal trading practices are to survive, they must survive in a climate in which there is a general balance of trade and payments among the great international trading countries."

The Japanese have faulted America's own performance. Japanese businessmen criticize U.S. industry as noncompetitive and American workers as not dedicated enough. Japanese government spokesmen blame Washington for not bringing American inflation under control or stabilizing the value of the dollar. They are especially vocal about the need for energy legislation that will cut

U.S. oil imports. Japan has experienced great difficulty in achieving the 7 percent growth it was aiming for. In December, incoming Prime Minister Ohira shelved the Fukuda pledge, contending that pushing the Japanese economy would risk higher inflation. Instead, Ohira committed himself to a growth rate of 6.3 percent.

By 1979, Japanese government policies had begun to ease the trade problem to a small degree. Economists estimate that final figures will register a Japanese current-account surplus of more than $16 billion for 1978. Nonetheless, Japanese imports are rising, and measured in yen or volume, exports have begun to drop. In addition, progress has been made in negotiations, known as the "Tokyo Round," on loosening Japanese trade restrictions. Japan's booming exports are still a source of tension between Tokyo and Washington, however, and further improvements appear to depend on U.S. economic stability as well as Japanese cooperation.

In the field of diplomacy, Japan has moved decisively to complete the normalization of its ties with the People's Republic of China. Negotiations for a Sino-Japanese peace and friendship treaty were stalled for several years by China's demand that the accord include an "anti-hegemony" clause that Peking meant as a slap against Moscow. In Japan, there was a strong desire to seal post-World War II reconciliation with China, but the Japanese also wished to avoid gratuitously offending the Russians. The U.S.S.R. played its cards badly. The Soviet ambassador warned Japan openly against tilting toward China. Yet Moscow refused to discuss the status of four islands seized from Japan at the close of World War II, and Soviet armed forces continued to build up strength in Asia.

In June 1978, Japan formally notified China that it was ready to resume talks on the peace treaty. (Prime Minister Fukuda believed that a pact would be well received in Japan and that among other benefits, it would enhance his political image.) The accord was initiated in August. It contained the controversial anti-hegemony clause, but also a clause stating that it did not affect either country's relations with third parties. In Japan's eyes, the phrasing indicated that the treaty was not directed against the Soviet Union.

Many analysts saw the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese treaty as a watershed event in Japan's transition from a passive to a more active political power in Asia. Following the successful conclusion of the Sino-Japanese negotiations, Fukuda flatly asserted that Japan would not sign any peace treaty with the Soviets (thus ending World War II hostilities) until the disputed islands were returned. Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing journeyed to Tokyo in October to exchange treaty ratification documents with the Japanese. At a luncheon given by Japanese Emperor Hirohito, whose armies Teng had fought in the 1930s and 1940s, the Chinese leader declared that China would let bygones be bygones. Besides the political benefit the treaty might bestow, Teng was counting on Japanese help for China's ambitious modernization program. Reinforcing existing Sino-Japanese cooperation, China signed hundreds of millions of dollars worth of new trade and construction deals with the Japanese after Teng's Tokyo visit.

Moscow has reacted with concern. In a diplomatic note, the Soviets declared that Tokyo would be held responsible for "complications" in the Far East. The Russians also reinforced garrisons on the islands adjacent to Japan. Yet the U.S.S.R., like China, wishes to gain from Japanese technology transfers and trade. It also hopes that Sino-Japanese friendship will not develop into an alliance. The Soviets have thus renewed a suggestion that in the absence of a peace treaty, the U.S.S.R. and Japan should sign a good-neighbor accord.

The Soviet military stance has played a crucial role in triggering a new, more positive Japanese attitude toward military preparedness. After their World War II defeat, the Japanese turned their backs on military might. Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution stated that "land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained." From 1954 onwards, Japan supported a small "self-defense force," but there was little discussion of more sizeable armed forces. The United States lowered its military posture in Asia after the close of the Vietnam War, however, and economically powerful Japan began to harbor doubts about the American military shield. The Soviet Union's higher visibility in Asia added to Japan's worries. In addition, China encouraged Japan to think about arms, both in terms of a military force and in terms of weapons sales to Peking.

Japan's 1978 white paper on defense noted that the Soviets are steadily strengthening their naval forces in the Far East. In the summer of 1978, Japan's highest military officer was dismissed for declaring that in the event of surprise attack, the defense forces would take "prompt supra-legal action." His removal strongly reasserted civilian control of the military, but it also stimulated debate about defense. Last autumn, Japanese naval craft held the largest military exercise since the Second World War. In 1979, Japanese leaders have begun to openly discuss such matters as the level of military spending and the nation's weapons systems.

Most Western experts see no reason for alarm in Japan's new interest in defense, pointing out that the Japan of today is closely linked to the West and democratic in government. Japan's new assertiveness appears to stem from the same feelings that have led Tokyo leaders to criticize U.S. economic policy and, over Soviet objections, to conclude a friendship treaty with China. After years of stability and solid economic growth, Japan appears to have gained self-confidence.

KOREA

U.S.S.R.
CHINA
NORTH KOREA
Sea of Japan
Seoul
SOUTH KOREA
JAPAN
Yellow Sea
East China Sea

Political Status: *Divided. Republic of Korea (South Korea) established August 15, 1948. Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) established September 9, 1948.*
Leadership: *South Korea, Park Chung Hee, President. North Korea, Kim Il Sung, President.*
Population: *South Korea, 37 million. North Korea, 17 million.*
Area: *South Korea, 38,025 square miles. North Korea, 46,450 square miles.*
Capital: *South Korea, Seoul. North Korea, Pyongyang.*

HISTORY

The Korean peninsula was unified by the Silla Kingdom in the seventh century. But neighboring China, as a larger, more advanced state, claimed a vague suzerainty over Korea for many centuries. Chinese influence was evident in Korea's adoption of Chinese characters, Chinese laws, and Confucianism. Korea's Yi dynasty (1392-1910) sent regular tribute to China's emperors.

Like China, Korea resisted extensive contact with the West, but Japan ultimately pressured Korean leaders into opening several ports in the 1870s. A modernization program began, and with it came demands for internal reform. Following the 1894-95 war between China and Japan, Japan established hegemony over Korea and introduced Western-style institutions. Japan annexed Korea outright after defeating Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05.

Under the Japanese, Korea was ruled by a harsh military administration, and nationalist sentiments were sternly suppressed. Inevitably, a resistance movement sprang up, and in March 1919, nationwide rallies to support a declaration of independence met with brutal response from the Japanese. The failure of the March First movement and the success of the 1917 Russian revolution made communism increasingly attractive to many of Korea's anti-Japanese patriots in the 1920s. Japan's dominance became even more repressive in the 1930s.

In the Cairo Declaration of 1943, the U.S., Britain, and China pledged that Korea would "in due course" become independent. But instead, the end of World War II saw a division of Korea into Soviet (northern) and American (southern) zones along the thirty-eighth parallel. As efforts to establish a unified Korea collapsed, separate governments were formed in North and South Korea. Kim Il Sung became North Korea's leader, and in the South, Syngman Rhee became president.

In June 1950, Communist North Korea launched an invasion of South Korea in an attempt to unify the nation by force of arms. An American-led United Nations force intervened, and three years later, the war ended in military stalemate. The armistice accord signed at Panmunjom in July 1953 established a cease-fire line and a demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. Since that time, the two halves of Korea have maintained a hostile and uneasy peace.

South Korea's President Rhee was driven from office by demonstrations in 1960 and General Park Chung Hee seized power in a coup the following year. Park has been president of South Korea since 1962.



Korean Elder with Pipe

NORTH KOREA TODAY

Kim Il Sung has been North Korea's leader since his country was created at the close of World War II. Under his aegis, North Korea is one of the world's most closed and totalitarian societies. Kim's primary aims are rapid economic development of the North and unification of the two Koreas under his own control.

When Korea was divided in 1945, the North inherited most of the nation's heavy industry and mineral resources, while the South inherited a larger population and the best agricultural land. In the decades since, the regime has built up the Northern economy with the help of imported industrial equipment. According to Western estimates, North Korea's gross national product more than doubled between 1966 and 1976 to $10 billion a year.

North Korea's economic difficulties are considerable, however. It is in default on a $2.5 billion debt to both Communist and capitalist countries. While its economy is growing, that of South Korea is expanding far more spectacularly. Even with double the number of people, South Korea has recently surpassed the North in per capita GNP. Barring the unforeseen, South Korea's economy will soon be three times the size of North Korea's.

North Korea's problems are the result of several factors. The world recession that followed the 1973 oil crisis and the cost of oil imports are hindering growth. Equally important, however, are Pyongyang's own policies. North Korea spends between 15 and 20 percent of its GNP on the military, and its armed forces are a drain on manpower. The country's xenophobia has prevented it from accepting available foreign technical help, and its highly politicized education system does not adequately train North Korea's managers and workers. Pyongyang has had to cut back its economic goals in a seven-year plan inaugurated in 1978, but Western observers are skeptical that even the revised targets can be met under existing conditions.

A thriving personality cult surrounds Kim Il Sung, sixty-seven. North Koreans hail him as "the genius of the revolution, the outstanding thinker and theoretician and peerless legendary hero."' His philosophy of *chuche*—Korean autonomy or self-reliance—has become the nation's guiding principle. His thinking is ranked alongside Marxism-Leninism as "Kim Il Sungism."

Kim's plans for succession remain unclear. Although his son Kim Chong Il, a Communist Party secretary in his late thirties, appeared to be emerging as heir apparent several years ago, he has dropped out of sight. There have been rumors that Chong Il may have suffered an accident—or that major party opposition may have developed over his ascendancy.

Kim Il Sung's stated ambition is to unify Korea—by force if need be. His invasion of the South in 1950 was halted by a United Nations military force. In the 1960s, Kim sent commando teams into the South to foment trouble. In 1974, a Communist agent attempted to shoot South Korean President Park Chung Hee, but killed Park's wife instead. The North Koreans have also dug numerous tunnels under the demilitarized zone. One found in October 1978 was 6 feet wide, 6 feet high and 435 yards long, drilled through solid granite 73 yards below the surface.

The size of Kim's military forces is of concern to Washington. The Carter administration decided in 1977 to withdraw U.S. ground troops from South Korea while steadily modernizing South Korean forces. In early 1979, U.S. intelligence estimates credited North Korea with an army of 550,000 to 600,000 men (25 percent higher than previous estimates), and with increased numbers of tanks. The revised estimates fueled congressional demands that the U.S. slow or halt its Korean troop withdrawals.

It has been Kim's hope that the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China would back him in a renewed attempt to seize the South. Kim has played his two allies off against each other and received aid from both, although the U.S.S.R. is his primary source of arms. In 1979, Kim appears to be tilting somewhat toward China.

Neither the U.S.S.R. nor China appears eager for any military confrontation on the Korean peninsula; at the least, it would complicate their relations with the West. During his visit to Washington in January, China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing told U.S. officials flatly that there would be no northern invasion of the South. Yet China's influence on the North is limited. If pushed too hard, Kim can retaliate by leaning toward the Soviets in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

In January 1979, Pyongyang responded favorably to South Korean offers to talk. China's friendly relations with the U.S. seem to be a factor in the thinking of both Koreas. Pyongyang has suggested a pan-national congress to discuss reunification, however, while Seoul prefers government-to-government contacts. The two sides began discussions in February, but it remains unclear whether any real agreements can be hammered out. What seems certain is that Kim Il Sung does not want to settle for anything less than unification.

SOUTH KOREA TODAY

The question of national security preoccupies South Korea's government in 1979 as it has ever since the Korean War. Under President Park Chung Hee, South Korea has developed a booming economy and a strong military. Given North Korea's avowed intention to unify Korea, however, Park maintains that rigid internal controls are necessary to provide stability and thus discourage the North from attacking.

Park's hold on political power is grounded in the so-called Yushin Constitution of 1972. Under its terms, he has emergency authority, and direct elections for the presidency have been abolished. Instead, the country's leader is chosen through indirect election by a 2,300-member "National Conference for Reunification."

Park restricts South Korea's political opposition. Poet Kim Chi Ha, Kim Dae Jung (a New Democratic Party leader who nearly defeated Park in the 1971 elections), and other public figures have received harsh prison sentences for political activity. South Korea's human rights record, like that of many countries, has been criticized by the Carter administration and the human rights organization, Amnesty International. Perhaps as a result of such negative publicity, Park released Kim Dae Jung and more than 100 other political prisoners in December 1978.

Despite government controls, students, religious leaders, and other dissenters are active. When opposition groups contested parliamentary elections held in December 1978, the New Democrats (NDP) mounted the chief challenge to Park's Democratic Republican Party (DRP). Nearly 80 percent of the electorate turned out to vote and the government received fewer votes than the NDP. But because of South Korea's electoral law, the DRP won 68 of the 154 contested seats, with only 61 going to the NDP. Moreover, Park himself nominated a third of the incoming legislators, as he was entitled to do by law. Park is thus in firm charge of the National Assembly.

One issue troubling voters was the state of the economy. South Korea has enjoyed spectacular economic development in recent years. The nation's gross national product averaged 11.4 percent annual growth from 1975-77, and exports during this period nearly doubled, reaching over $10 billion annually. In 1978, per capita income exceeded $1,000 for the first time, placing South Korea (by International Monetary Fund measure) in the ranks of the "developed" world. But even as living standards rise, Korean citizens feel pinched by economic development. To fuel the export boom, wages have been kept low by Western standards and in 1978, inflation ran at an estimated 20 percent.

The government's response has been to cut back somewhat on growth. The planning board has set the goal for 1979 GNP growth at 9 percent and citizens are being encouraged to save their earnings. Exports will still be relied on to spark further national development, however, and economists predict the 1979 export figure will hit a record $15 billion. Thus, the continuing problem for Park and his advisers will be how to maintain a balance between growth and inflation.

Militarily as well as economically, South Korea is a strong nation. Nonetheless, North Korea is seen as a threat. South Korea's worst suspicions of the North seemed to be confirmed in October 1978 when a North Korean tunnel under the demilitarized zone was discovered not far from Seoul. It was estimated that the tunnel was large enough for the passage of a division of fully armed troops every hour.

The Park government looks to the United States as a bulwark against North Korean aggressiveness, but relations between Seoul and Washington have been strained in recent years. The so-called Koreagate scandal involving alleged Korean bribery of American congressmen greatly tarnished South Korea's reputation in the U.S. Furthermore, the Carter administration has objected to Park's authoritarian rule.

At the same time, American behavior has puzzled the Koreans. President Carter concluded in 1977 that 32,000 American ground troops stationed in South Korea could safely be withdrawn by 1982, provided the U.S. maintains its air power there and supplies the South with up-to-date weaponry. Influential congressmen and military men, along with South Korean officials, urged Carter to slow or halt the planned pace of U.S. troop withdrawal. U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown paid a visit to Seoul in November 1978 to reassure the Park government that American force reductions would be taken "in a prudent manner" in conjunction with an overall strengthening of South Korea's armed forces. American defense spokesmen have since been vague about the future rate of withdrawal.

The normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States has affected relations between the two Koreas. Peking, which befriends North Korea, agrees with Washington about the desirability of peace on the Korean peninsula. Against this backdrop, President Park proposed talks between South and North during a January press conference. The two sides began meeting at Panmunjom in February 1979. Such contacts may eventually lead to a genuine easing of tensions between the Koreas—or they may be little more than a propaganda exercise.

LAOS

CHINA
VIETNAM
BURMA
LAOS
Vientiane
THAILAND
South China Sea
CAMBODIA

Political Status: *Independent since October 23, 1953.*
A Communist-led Democratic Republic since December 2, 1975.
Leadership: *Souphanouvong, President.*
Kaysone Phomvihan, Prime Minister.
Population: *3.2 million.*
Area: *91,428 square miles.*
Capital: *Vientiane.*

HISTORY

The warrior Fa Ngum founded the first Lao state, Lan Xang, in the fourteenth century. Lan Xang—which means Kingdom of a Million Elephants—included part of what today is Thailand. Under Fa Ngum's successors, Lan Xang fought intermittently with Vietnam, Burma, and Siam (present-day Thailand). In 1637, King Souligna Vongsa ascended the throne, established boundaries with Vietnam and Siam, and presided over a golden age.

Following the death of Souligna Vongsa in 1694, Lan Xang was partitioned into three rival states—Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champassak—all of which came under the control of Siam in the eighteenth century. In 1893, after a show of French naval force off Bangkok, Siam recognized France's right to govern Laos as a protectorate, marking the beginning of French colonial rule.

A nationalist movement against the French was organized after World War II and gained support among the country's elite. France granted Laos self-government and an independent monarchy was proclaimed in 1953. Communist and pro-Communist insurgents of the Lao Patriotic Front, with critical Vietnamese Communist participation, gradually secured control of the northeastern portion of the country. A coalition government of rightists, neutralists, and leftists, created by the Geneva Conference of 1962, was unable to create stability and unity in Laos. By 1965, Laos was, in effect, a partitioned state.

The Lao Communist movement, known as the Pathet Lao (PL), worked closely with the North Vietnamese forces, and the Communist "Ho Chi Minh Trail" supply route to South Vietnam ran through PL-held territory during the Vietnam War. In 1973, the Royal Lao government, which was led by Prince Souvanna Phouma, and the PL, nominally headed by his half-brother, Prince Souphanouvong, declared a ceasefire and formed a coalition. After South Vietnam and Cambodia fell to the Communists in 1975, however, PL forces took over Laos. In December 1975, monarchy was abolished and Laos was declared a "People's Democratic Republic" with Souphanouvong as head of state. Kaysone Phomvihan, secretary general of the Communist Lao People's Revolutionary Party, became prime minister.

Laotian Refugee Face Registers Uncertainty, Yet Resignation, in Bangkok, Thailand

LAOS TODAY

The Laos of 1979 bears only limited resemblance to pre-Communist Laos. Although change has been effected far less brutally than in neighboring Cambodia or Vietnam, Laos is a Communist dictatorship under the strong influence—some would say, control—of the Vietnamese.

Vietnam has an estimated 40,000 troops stationed in Laos to help the Lao military deal with stubborn pockets of resistance and to ensure the survival of Lao Communist rule. Guerrilla groups made up of rightists, neutralists, or defectors from government forces manage to strike at supply depots and ambush Lao army patrols. In the northern hill country, Meo tribesmen are resisting government attempts to control and resettle them. Vietnamese troops rarely appear in Vientiane, according to visitors to the capital. But they are evidently pressing an active military campaign in the countryside.

With the Vietnamese presence so strong, Laos has tilted unmistakably toward Vietnam and its patron, the Soviet Union. Official statements have echoed Vietnamese terminology in calling the Chinese "international reactionaries," and the government has publicly supported the 1978 military alliance between Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. But Laos's position is complicated by the fact that it is a weak nation on China's border with an interest in maintaining friendly relations with Peking. In the past, the Chinese have provided economic assistance to Laos, including a road-building program in the northern region. In a speech in late 1978, President Souphanouvong accused unnamed enemies of spreading rumors that "great China" was helping Lao rebels. Some political analysts believed that Souphanouvong was merely attempting to mollify China, but others suspected that the address might have reflected his unhappiness with the government's pro-Vietnam policy. Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihan is thought to be far more pro-Vietnamese than Souphanouvong.

Lao society is being molded along Communist lines. Major businesses are run by the state, and the government launched a campaign to organize farmers into cooperatives in 1978. Those who disagree with official policy are sent to re-education centers. A number of dissidents have been sentenced to harsh labor camps. Discontent with the regime—and with Vietnamese dominance—has led more than 175,000 Lao citizens to flee the country since 1975.

Laos remains one of the world's poorest countries. Rich mineral resources are unexploited, and there is little industry. Per capita income is less than $100 a year. Recent events have only worsened the economic situation and the flow of refugees has deprived Laos of many skilled people. Government inefficiency and natural disasters have also taken a toll. In 1978, floods along the Mekong River destroyed much of the rice crop in Savannakhet and Champassak. As a result, Laos appealed to foreign nations for food aid.

The Lao government's immediate problems are how to feed the people and how to gain their cooperation. In the longer run, however, the main challenge may be to keep a Lao national identity in the shadow of a powerful and aggressive Vietnam.

MALAYSIA

VIETNAM
THAILAND
South China Sea
BRUNEI
Kuala Lumpur
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
INDONESIA
Java Sea

Political Status: *Independent Federation of Malaya established August 31, 1957. Malaysia established September 16, 1963 with the addition of Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore. Singapore was forced to withdraw in 1965.*

Leadership: *Malaysia's elected monarch, Tunku Yahya Petra, Sultan of Kelantan, died in March 1979; a new monarch will be elected. Datuk Hussein Onn, Prime Minister.*

Population: *13 million.*

Area: *127,316 square miles.*

Capital: *Kuala Lumpur.*

HISTORY

Many of Asia's modern nations are descendants of powerful kingdoms. This is not true of Malaysia. Except for the Malay state of Malacca, a regional power in the fifteenth century, the states that make up Malaysia were formerly local sultanates and chiefdoms. With the advent of European colonialism, many fell under the sway of the Portuguese, Dutch, or British. Siam (now Thailand) also took control of several. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Britain established domination over all of the Malay peninsula. The area fell to Japan during World War II.

Following the defeat of Japan, Britain organized eleven states into the Federation of Malaya (Johore, Kedah, Kelantan, Malacca, Negri Sembilan, Pahang, Penang, Perak, Perlis, Selangor, and Trengganu). But because of the outbreak of an armed Communist insurrection, the British did not grant independence until 1957. In 1963, the nation of Malaysia was formed by uniting Sabah, Sarawak, and Singapore with Malaya. Due to ethnic friction between predominantly Chinese Singapore and the peninsular Malays, Singapore was forced to withdraw from Malaysia in 1965.

Tunku Abdul Rahman, head of the United Malays National Organization (UMNO), was Malaya's—and Malaysia's—first prime minister. During the 1969 elections, bloody riots broke out between the country's Muslim Malays and ethnic Chinese, and parliamentary government was suspended for more than a year. Tunku resigned in 1970 and was replaced by Tun Abdul Razak, who widened the existing coalition government and created a ten-party National Front which absorbed many former opposition parties. The National Front inaugurated a government policy of encouraging greater Malay participation in commerce and industry, which is largely dominated by the Chinese, while trying to improve the Chinese political position. The Front won elections in 1974, but Razak died in office in 1976. He was succeeded by his deputy prime minister, Datuk Hussein Onn.

MALAYSIA TODAY

The government of Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn won a resounding victory in parliamentary elections held in July 1978. But the election results showed that ethnic tension continues to simmer between the Malays, who dominate the government and make up most of the rural population, and the Chinese, many of whom are urban businessmen.* In the countryside, a long-standing Communist insurgency appears to be under control, but it still exists. Malaysian authorities have also been presented with a grave new problem in the form of the "boat people"—tens of thousands of Vietnamese refugees, most of them Chinese, who are landing on the eastern coast.

Prime Minister Hussein, head of the ten-party, Malay-dominated National Front, called the elections a year ahead of the mandatory deadline. Citing the violence of the 1969 election campaign when fighting between Malays and Chinese cost several hundred lives, Hussein banned all political rallies. He based his appeal for voter support on Malaysia's expanding economy, an anti-corruption campaign, and a government program for restructuring society to improve the economic position of the Malays. Under terms of this program, the New Economic Policy (NEP), participation in the economy will be redistributed by 1990 roughly according to Malaysia's racial composition.

When 1978 election ballots were counted, Hussein's Front had won 131 seats in the 154-member parliament. The religious Party Islam lost considerable ground, taking only 5 seats. But the predominantly Chinese Democratic Action Party (DAP) increased its number of seats from 9 to 16, having captured 21 percent of the vote. Analysts believed that the DAP's significant showing was the result of growing Chinese discontent with the New Economic Policy, particularly its education policies. To help achieve economic goals for Malays, the government is sponsoring an affirmative-action education policy which ensures 85 percent of all university places for Malays. The Chinese feel strongly that their children are the target of discrimination.

The "boat people" from neighboring Vietnam became an urgent problem for the Malaysian government late in 1978. Ever since the close of the Vietnam War, Malaysia had pursued a relatively lenient refugee policy, taking in many thousands to await resettlement. In 1978, however, the refugee flow suddenly became a flood—in November alone, 14,000 arrived on the Malaysian coast. Most of the boat people were of Chinese ethnic background, and their departure from Vietnam seemed to be the result of that country's harsh new economic policies. There was evidence that many of the refugees had paid Vietnamese officials an average $2,500 a head to arrange their transit.

The Malaysian government concluded it could not continue to accept the incoming refugees. Hussein and other leaders believed that Malaysia was not equipped—economically or politically—to settle the refugees permanently, and camps already contained 45,000 seeking permission to emigrate to other countries. Meanwhile, Malay public opinion seemed to be turning against the refugees and there were incidents of Malay villagers angrily driving boat people away from the coast. In early 1979, the government announced that boat people would no longer be allowed to land, a difficult policy to enforce. Malaysia continued to appeal to developed nations—particularly the United States—to speed their acceptance of refugees living in camps.

In foreign affairs, Malaysia has worked closely with other members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, while playing host in late 1978 to both Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing. In a swing through the ASEAN states, Dong assured his neighbors that Vietnam would not back subversion in the area. When Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December, Malaysia joined the other ASEAN countries in calling for "the immediate and total withdrawal" of all foreign forces from Cambodia. China's subsequent attack on Vietnam elicited a similar ASEAN statement calling for foreign withdrawal from "all the areas of conflict in Indochina."

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*Malays make up 45 percent of the population; Chinese, 36 percent; and Indians and others, 19 percent.

China's Teng received a relatively low-key welcome in Malaysia. The Hussein government feared he might exacerbate tensions between Malaysia's Chinese and Malay populations. During the course of Teng's stay, Malaysian officials were particularly disturbed by his refusal to halt Chinese backing for the banned Malaysia Communist Party and its rebellion. The Communist insurgency has largely been quelled, and Malaysian and Thai forces have cooperated to eliminate Communist refugees in the remote border areas. Even so, guerrillas still mount an occasional raid, and Malaysian authorities believe that the Communists have no intention of giving up their struggle against the government.

Looking to the future, Prime Minister Hussein told one interviewer early in 1979 that he regarded the search for national unity among ethnic groups as Malaysia's greatest challenge. "I am very optimistic," he declared. But, he added, "I think it is going to take us a generation."

Malaysia's elected monarch, Tunku Yahya Petra, Sultan of Kelatan, died in March 1979. A new monarch will be elected. Datuk Hussein Onn remains prime minister.

PAKISTAN

Political Status: *Independent since August 15, 1947. Republic since March 23, 1956. Martial law government since July 5, 1977.*
Leadership: *General Muhammad Zia ul Haq, President.*
Area: *310,402 square miles, excluding Jammu-Kashmir.*
Population: *77 million.*
Capital: *Islamabad.*

U.S.S.R.
CHINA
AFGHANISTAN
IRAN
Islamabad
PAKISTAN
INDIA
Arabian Sea

HISTORY

The fall of Delhi to the British in 1857 ended eleven centuries of Muslim political and economic influence in much of the subcontinent (see India). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Muslim movements in India began to call for the revival of Islam and for Muslim participation in the colonial government. The All-India Muslim League was founded in 1906 to promote Muslim rights and interests. A number of conferences, held in the 1920s and 1930s, tried unsuccessfully to unite Hindus and Muslims in a struggle against the British. By 1940, Muslim League leaders concluded that separate Muslim states must be founded in the areas where Islam was the majority religion, namely in northwestern and eastern India, and passed a resolution to that effect.

The Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad Ali Jinnah, called for the formation of Pakistan by joining Assam and Bengal in the east and the Punjab, Baluchistan, Sind, and the Northwest Frontier Province in the northwest. During World War II, Britain offered the Indians postwar independence in return for their aid with the war effort. The Hindu Congress demanded immediate British withdrawal from India, but the Muslim League proved more willing to compromise. At the close of the war, however, when London's Labor government agreed to British withdrawal from India, Jinnah called for demonstrations to reinforce Muslim demands for a partition that would accompany independence. In the wake of bloody communal rioting, Britain agreed to divide the subcontinent, and two nations—India and Pakistan—were created on August 15, 1947.*

The two halves of Pakistan—East and West—were separated by 1,000 miles of India. Partition violence between Muslims and Hindus and massive population shifts between India and Pakistan cost an estimated half million lives. Undeclared war broke out over the possession of Jammu-Kashmir and lasted until a U.N.-arranged ceasefire in 1949. Jinnah became governor general of Pakistan but died just a year after independence; his death sparked a power struggle among province leaders. Jinnah's prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, assumed command but was assassinated in 1951 while making a speech in Rawalpindi. Continuing political instability prompted General Muhammad Ayub Khan to take power in 1958.

Ayub ruled until 1969, when mounting unrest led to his resignation. Power was transferred to General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan. In the meantime, East Pakistan complained bitterly that it was under-represented in government and that it had never received a proper share of resources for economic development. East Pakistan broke away from West Pakistan in 1971. Independence for the East—which called itself Bangladesh—came only after a bloody guerrilla struggle and intervention by Indian military forces (see Bangladesh).

Under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan attempted to bind its wounds following the Bangladesh war, and peaceful relations were established with both India and the new government in Dacca. A new Pakistani constitution was adopted in 1973, and Bhutto was designated prime minister. Elections held in 1977 resulted in an overwhelming victory for Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party(PPP), but opposition groups accused the government of fraud, and public order broke down. The army staged a coup, arrested Bhutto, and established a martial law regime. General Muhammad Zia ul Haq took over the government and assumed the title of president in 1978.

PAKISTAN TODAY

When General Muhammad Zia ul Haq staged a coup following Pakistan's disputed 1977 election, he and his military backers pledged to restore democratic government within three months. By early 1979, no new elections had been held, and Pakistani political leaders sharply protested the continuation of military rule. The fate of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto also preoccupied the nation. Pakistan's leader from 1971-1977, Bhutto was executed by the Zia regime in April 1979.

Bhutto was sentenced to death by a Lahore court in March 1978, after he had been convicted of conspiring to kill an opponent before the 1977 coup. Throughout the lengthy trial, Bhutto maintained his innocence. Many Western jurists, following the process of the trial, thought that evidence and procedures permitted in Lahore would not have been allowed in European or American courts of law. Whatever the merits of the case against Bhutto, a principal motive of the prosecution was political. Although Bhutto had been discredited by vote rigging in Pakistani elections, he was still the nation's most popular politician. The Zia regime and parties opposed to Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party (PPP) considered him a political threat.

The imprisoned Bhutto appealed his conviction to the Pakistani supreme court in May 1978. As judicial proceedings continued, his wife, who served as acting PPP chairman, was held under house arrest. The government attempted to emasculate the PPP by arresting many of its leaders and disqualifying others from taking part in the future political process. Officials also released a series of white papers charging Bhutto with election dishonesty, misuse of the news media, and embezzlement of government funds. If his murder sentence were to be overturned, it appeared that the reports might serve as a basis for fresh prosecution of Bhutto.

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*In the end, Assam did not become part of Pakistan.

In February 1979, the Pakistani supreme court upheld Bhutto's conviction by a vote of four to three. Bhutto again sought review, arguing that the death sentence should not be imposed after a divided court decision and raising other legal issues. World leaders, among them Pope John Paul, President Carter, and Soviet President Leonid Brezhnev, urged clemency. Two of Pakistan's closest allies, China and Saudi Arabia, also pleaded for Bhutto's life. Apparently unmoved by foreign protest, Zia declared that the final ruling of the supreme court would be carried out. The court ultimately dismissed Bhutto's petition for review, although it urged Zia to consider defense arguments for commuting the death sentence. Zia ignored the court's suggestion and Bhutto was hanged in the Rawalpindi district prison in April.

Zia's government faced a variety of other problems. Baluch and Pushtun nationalists continued to press for more local autonomy in their regions. Pakistan's economy was a source of concern; economic performance had improved somewhat under military rule, but inflation was high and the country was massively in debt to foreign creditors. In addition, Pakistani political parties pressed Zia to get on with the restoration of democratic procedures. Zia attempted to form a cabinet including a wide variety of politicians from the Pakistan National Alliance, but few of its parties would cooperate with the process, demanding elections instead. In September 1978, President Fazel Elahi Chaudhry resigned his office because of political differences with Zia, and the general assumed the presidency himself. He pledged to hold elections late in 1979.

Pakistan appeared to be turning decisively to Islam. A devout Muslim, Zia backed the preparation of new regulations to transform the nation into a strict Islamic state, stating that only those political parties committed to Islamic theology would be permitted to take part in any future elections. Traditional Islamic punishment would be instituted—hand amputation for theft, death by stoning for adultery, and whippings for a variety of other crimes, including drinking. Zia announced that the government planned to impose traditional Islamic taxes to benefit the poor, and that all forms of usury would be abolished.

Foreign relations posed challenges for Zia and his military colleagues. Revolution in Iran had unsettled southwest Asia, and Pakistan feared that a new pro-Soviet regime in neighboring Afghanistan might stir up trouble among frontier minorities. The Pakistanis maintained close ties with China, and in 1978, the Chinese completed construction of a key highway through the Himalayas linking the two countries. Although Pakistan enjoyed peaceful relations with its longtime adversary, India, the new Pakistan-China highway brought a strong protest from the Indians, since it cut through disputed Kashmir. Relations between the U.S. and Pakistani governments were less close than they had been in the past.

Pakistan's key problems were internal, however. Military rule had not papered over the nation's deep domestic divisions. And the Bhutto case was a potentially explosive issue. While the charismatic Bhutto remained alive, he was an incalculable force in Pakistani politics, even in prison. Dead, he could be considered a martyr in the eyes of millions of his followers.

THE PHILIPPINES

Philippine Sea
Manila
PHILIPPINES
South China Sea
BRUNEI
MALAYS

Political Status: *Independent republic since July 4, 1946*
Under martial law since
September 23, 1972.
Leadership: *Ferdinand Marcos,*
President and Prime Minister.
Population: *46 million.*
Area: *115,830 square miles.*
Capital: *Manila.*

HISTORY

The Philippines is an archipelago of 7,100 islands, stretching for 1,100 miles along the eastern edge of Southeast Asia. Ferdinand Magellan claimed the islands for Spain in 1521, and they were named for King Philip II. During 300 years of colonial control, Spain developed Philippine agriculture and converted much of the population to Catholicism.

Nationalism emerged in the early nineteenth century, as tensions developed between locally born creoles and the *peninsulares* from Spain. When war broke out between Spain and the United States in 1898, a nationalist movement led by Emilio Aguinaldo sided with the U.S. in hopes of achieving Philippine independence. Aguinaldo established a government but, under the terms of the Spanish-American treaty, Spain ceded the Philippines to the United States. President McKinley announced that the U.S. would "educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them." American troops crushed the Philippine revolt.

In 1916, the United States declared its eventual intention to recognize the Philippines as sovereign. The islands achieved commonwealth status under the presidency of Manuel Quezon in 1935, and the U.S. resolved to grant complete Philippine independence in ten-years time.

Japan occupied the Philippines early in World War II, and it was not until 1944 that Allied forces returned under General Douglas MacArthur. Following the defeat of Japan, Philippine independence was achieved in July 1946. In elections over the next twenty years, political control of the country alternated between the Liberal Party and the Nacionalista Party. Nacionalista President Ferdinand Marcos was elected in 1965. In 1972, during his second term in office, he declared a state of martial law, claiming that civil disorder made the action necessary.

THE PHILIPPINES TODAY

The Philippines was once thought of as Asia's showcase for Western-style democracy. Over the years, however, the republic has suffered from corruption, entrenched privilege, poverty, lawlessness, and armed insurgency. In 1972, President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law with the avowed aim of ending these maladies, but many persist. With Marcos exercising dictatorial powers, a key question is whether—and how—political freedom will return to the Philippines.

The United States has exerted pressure on Marcos to curtail his one-man rule. Although Marcos did not run for office himself, he held elections in 1978 for an interim assembly to prepare for re-establishment of a genuine legislature. Oppostion candidates were permitted to campaign in the forty-five days before the April balloting. Benigno Aquino Jr., a Liberal Party leader held in detention under sentence of death, was allowed to run for an assembly seat and made a television appearance from his jail cell. Imelda Marcos, the President's wife, led the government's slate of New Society Movement candidates.

Resentment against the government proved deeper than Marcos had anticipated. The opposition received 40 percent of the vote in Metro-Manila, although the government declared that its own supporters had won all twenty-one of the region's seats. Opposition spokesmen and Roman Catholic Church leaders complained that the government's announcement strained public credulity. During a peaceful protest that followed, 600 demonstrators were arrested.

When the interim national assembly began meeting in June 1978, Marcos retained the Philippine presidency, but he also assumed the office of prime minister. Furthermore, he reserved the right to make laws on his own. Mrs. Marcos, already governor of Metro-Manila, was sworn in as a member of the assembly and Marcos named her head of a new cabinet-level department of town planning. Some Filipinos have speculated that Mrs. Marcos will next be appointed deputy prime minister and that she might eventually succeed her husband.

Mrs. Ferdinand (Imedi) Marcos, Former Beauty Queen and Wife of the President of the Philippines

Marcos' leadership has brought certain economic benefits to the Philippines. The national growth rate is healthy (over 6 percent in 1978), stability has attracted foreign and domestic investors, and the country's infrastructure is being developed. Yet economic power is still concentrated in the hands of a few (including the families and friends of the Marcos's) and the gap between rich and poor remains wide. Foreign debt is rising rapidly, while industrialization is running behind the government targets.

A major drain on the Philippine economy—and a threat to political stability—is the struggle against two insurgencies. In the Sulu Archipelago and the southern island of Mindanao, Muslim rebels of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) are fighting for self-rule. The MNLF has more than 10,000 regulars, and some analysts estimate that the Muslim war against the government has taken 50,000 to 70,000 lives. A smaller but decades-old Communist insurgency festers on, largely on the northern island of Luzon.

Relations between the Marcos government and the U.S. have been uneasy. During a stop in

Manila in May 1978, Vice President Walter Mondale urged Marcos to liberalize his regime. The two governments also discussed the status of U.S. military bases in the Philippines, and Marcos sought increased U.S. payment as well as redefined legal status of the installations. A new agreement, concluded on December 31, 1978, more clearly asserts Philippine sovereignty over the bases and provides for additional U.S. aid to the Philippines.

In the realm of international relations, the United States is still the Philippines' chief partner, although trade with Japan exceeds that with the U.S. But the Marcos government has been reaching out in other directions as well. Mrs. Marcos visited the U.S.S.R. in 1978, and Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Li Hsien-nien and Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong both visited Manila during the same year. The Philippines has also worked closely with ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

With a solid democratic legacy, many citizens of the Philippines are disturbed by President Marcos's one-man rule. Marcos has stated that he does not want to go down in Philippine history as the man who inaugurated martial law but did not know how to end it. In 1979, Filipinos have yet to receive any sign that Marcos intends to share his power with anyone—with the possible exception of his wife.

SINGAPORE

South China Sea
MALAYSIA
SINGAPORE
INDONESIA
Indian Ocean

Political Status: *Independent republic since 1965.*
Leadership: *Benjamin Henry Sheares, President. Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister.*
Population: *2.3 million.*
Area: *224 square miles.*
Capital: *Singapore.*

HISTORY

Sir Stamford Raffles, an employee of the British East India Company, founded the port of Singapore in 1819 on a sparsely populated island off the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. The island's position, commanding the Malacca Straits which lead from the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea, gave it strategic importance to the British empire. In 1826, the ports of Singapore, Malacca, and Penang were combined as the Straits Settlements. Under British dominance, Singapore grew from a fishing village to an active trade center and naval base. Singapore's population was racially mixed, and increasing numbers of Chinese immigrated from South China during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The Japanese attacked Singapore in December 1941, captured it two months later, and held it until the close of World War II. Thereafter, the British made it a separate colony. Singapore received self-rule in 1959 and joined Malaya, Sarawak, and Sabah as part of the independent Federation of Malaysia in 1963. Because of ethnic friction and other problems between Singapore (with its high proportion of Chinese citizens) and the rest of Malaysia, Singapore was forced to withdraw from the Federation and became a sovereign state in August 1965.

SINGAPORE TODAY

Confident is the word that best describes Singapore in 1979. The tiny nation has no natural resources, but in recent years its entrepot activity has been diversified to include a wide variety of industrial enterprises. New petrochemical and electronics industries are thriving. After a decline in its growth rate following the 1973 oil crisis, the economy is expanding at better than 8 percent a year. Government figures report that foreign investment during the first half of 1978 surpassed that of the whole of 1977. Annual per capita income is nearly $3,000, one of the highest in Asia.

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and his People's Action Party (PAP) have led Singapore since it became sovereign in 1965. The PAP won all the legislative seats in the elections of 1968, 1972, and 1976. Lee is an outspoken anti-Communist who combines parliamentary democracy, Confucian paternalism and outright authoritarianism. Although elections are relatively open, opponents of the government have been detained on charges of subversion and promoting ethnic unrest, and Lee has been criticized by international human rights organizations for repressive policies. Against a backdrop of economic prosperity, however, citizens of Singapore seem content to endure Lee's stern internal controls.

Two domestic matters have recently preoccupied Lee. One is the succession question. Although he is only fifty-six, Lee is already working to ensure that by the time he retires, the PAP will have groomed a generation of competent heirs. Lee is also concerned about uniting Singapore's diverse population of Chinese, Malays, and Indians. For this reason—and to promote Singapore as a desirable international business center—he has endorsed English as the primary working language.

Singapore collaborates closely with other members of ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. When Vietnam overthrew the Cambodian government and China later struck Vietnam, the ASEAN group called for "all foreign forces [to] be withdrawn from all areas of conflict in Indochina." Vietnam's Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, on a visit to ASEAN countries in October 1978, had pledged openly that his government would not support subversion in that region. In the wake of Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN fears that Vietnam might embark on a long-term program of expansion that would endanger its members.

Singapore is also wary of China. When Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited in November 1978, Prime Minister Lee took the opportunity to emphasize that Singapore's Chinese, who make up three-quarters of the population, should look to their own nation and not to China as a model or mentor. Singapore has not yet established formal relations with the People's Republic of China.

Looking ahead, Lee Kuan Yew has warned the citizens of Singapore not to allow economic prosperity to make them complacent. He is determined to keep Singapore independent and competitive in an increasingly protectionist international market that includes such dynamic challengers as Japan and Taiwan.

SRI LANKA

Arabian Sea
Bay of Bengal
SRI LANKA
Colombo
Indian Ocean
INDONES

Political Status: *Independent since February 4, 1948. A republic since 1972, when the name Sri Lanka replaced the name Ceylon.*
Leadership: *J.R. Jayewardene, President.*
Population: *15 million.*
Area: *25,332 square miles.*
Capital: *Colombo.*

HISTORY

Sinhalese history, written down in the Mahavamsa chronicle, relates that the Indian prince Vijaya emigrated to Ceylon in the sixth century B.C. and became the island's first king. Both major elements of Ceylon's population—Sinhalese and Tamil—are descended from Indian ethnic groups. Buddhism and Hinduism were brought to Ceylon from India. Thus, throughout its history, the island of Ceylon has had close links with the neighboring Indian subcontinent.

Yet Ceylon has also enjoyed a very separate identity. It was ruled by its own monarchs for more than 2,300 years. In the early sixteenth century, the adventurous Portuguese began to penetrate the Indian Ocean and took control of most of Ceylon. The Dutch supplanted the Portuguese in the seventeenth century and they, in turn, were ousted by the British. In 1802, Ceylon was made a British Crown Colony. A Ceylonese nationalist movement began to assert itself in the nineteenth century, but it was not until 1948 that Ceylon won independence from Britain.

In the years since independence, political power has swung back and forth between the moderate, generally pro-Western United National Party (UNP) and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), a more nationalist and left-leaning group. In 1972, under SLFP Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Ceylon became a republic and reverted to the historical name of "Sri Lanka." Mrs. Bandaranaike lost the general elections held in July 1977. Since then, Sri Lanka has been governed by the UNP, led by J.R. Jayewardene.

SRI LANKA TODAY

Sri Lanka has changed course sharply since its 1977 election. Social welfare programs were cut back and, instead, private investment—particularly foreign investment—is being encouraged. A new constitution has been adopted creating a presidential system and granting major concessions to the vociferous Tamil minority, one-fifth of the population. The man behind all this is President Junius Richard Jayewardene, the seventy-two-year-old elder statesman who heads the United National Party (UNP).

Jayewardene's party swept to power in elections for parliament. Of 168 legislative seats, the UNP won 139, while only 8 went to the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). The election result was a repudiation of SLFP leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who had served as prime minister in the early 1960s and again from 1970 to 1977. (It was in 1972, during her term of office, that the nation adopted the name Sri Lanka.)

Aggressively nationalist, internationally non-aligned, and committed to a socialist economic platform, Mrs. Bandaranaike had come under widespread criticism because of burgeoning economic difficulties. Reform programs instituted by her coalition government, which included Marxists, were mismanaged and costly. For example, nationalization of tea estates removed incentives and resulted in lackluster economic performance. The cost of living rose rapidly and one in six members of the work force was unemployed. Bribery, corruption, and nepotism were commonplace. According to some press reports, Mrs. Bandaranaike's four brothers, her son, her two daughters, a son-in-law, a brother-in-law, and a brother's son-in-law were all given important state jobs. An additional charge against the Bandaranaike government was that it did little to relieve the discontent of the Tamil minority, which was subject to cultural, political, and economic discrimination.

Jayewardene promised to retain some essential elements of Sri Lanka's socialist economy, but to make widespread changes as well. He began by altering the political system. In February 1978, he arranged to be elevated from prime minister to president by a constitutional amendment. In September, a new constitution was promulgated. It gave the island a further name change—Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka—and declared Tamil an official national language. More important, the constitution replaced the former British-style political system with an executive presidential system like that of France. Proportional representation was also introduced.

Jayewardene scaled down Sri Lanka's costly welfare system, which was claiming a third of the national budget. He slashed public rice and sugar subsidies. To provide jobs and to further national development, he stepped up the pace of work on the country's biggest economic undertaking, a program to build dams and irrigation projects on the Mahaweli River. To attract capital from abroad, he promoted a 200-square-mile, free-trade zone where taxes and other customary restrictions on foreign investment are being relaxed.

These programs have met with limited success. The Sri Lankan government reported recently that fifty new projects in the free-trade zone have provided 30,000 new jobs, and that many more workers will soon be employed at the Mahaweli project. Even so, 1.5 million citizens are still unemployed in 1979. Inflationary pressures have been contained somewhat, but inflation is running in excess of 20 percent a year.

Jayewardene's establishment of a strong executive form of government has opened him to charges of grasping too much power. The Tamils, meanwhile, have not been satisfied by their constitutional gain. The inequities of centuries have led some Tamil spokesmen to demand complete Tamil independence from predominantly Sinhalese areas of Sri Lanka. A Tamil terrorist group—the Tamil Liberation Tigers movement—has sprung up, despite a government anti-guerrilla campaign.

The key challenge facing Jayewardene will be to manage a mixed economy which attempts to use the best of both socialist and free-enterprise experience.

TAIWAN

Political Status: *One-party presidential republic.*
Leadership: *Chiang Ching-kuo, President.*
Population: *17 million.*
Area: *13,592 square miles.*
Capital: *Taipei.*

CHINA
MACAO
HONG KONG
TAIWAN
South China Sea
PHILIPPINES

HISTORY

Taiwan is a mountainous island 100 miles off the southeast coast of the China mainland. Portuguese explorers called it Isla Formosa—beautiful island. Taiwan was originally inhabited by people of Malay stock, but Chinese began to migrate there in the fifteenth century. The Dutch established a trading post in the early seventeenth century. Chinese forces soon drove them out, and the imperial government ruled Taiwan, first as a frontier area and later as a province. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, China ceded Taiwan to the victorious Japanese. For the next fifty years, Japanese colonial administrators ran the island and developed its economy.

Taiwan returned to Chinese jurisdiction at the close of World War II. Harsh occupation by Nationalist forces provoked a native Taiwanese uprising which was brutally suppressed in February 1947. When the Communists won the mainland in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek fled to Taiwan with over 1 million supporters. The Nationalist government has been there ever since: it claims to be the legitimate government of all China, located temporarily on the island until recovery of the mainland becomes possible.

Initially, Taiwan was in danger of capture by the Chinese Communists. But following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, President Harry Truman ordered the Seventh Fleet to patrol the strait between Taiwan and the mainland. The United States continued to recognize the ROC (Republic of China) as the government of China, and in 1954, the two countries concluded a mutual defense treaty.

Thanks to a land reform program, pragmatic leadership, and American aid and protection, Taiwan has become an "economic miracle." Although the government remains authoritarian, political participation has been expanded at lower levels and martial law has been eased.

Chiang Kai-shek died in 1975. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, had already become the Nationalists' de facto leader, and he was made chairman of the party and then president of the republic in March 1978. On January 1, 1979, the U.S. de-recognized Taipei in favor of Peking and gave the one-year notice required by treaty to terminate the 1954 mutual defense pact with Taiwan.

TAIWAN TODAY

Taiwan is an island in search of an identity. Both the Nationalists and the People's Republic of China (PRC) agree that it is a province of China. But Taiwan is controlled by the Nationalists, who claim to be China's legitimate government. In 1979, the United States has formally recognized the PRC, and only twenty countries continue to have diplomatic relations with the Nationalist regime. Even so, Taiwan maintains close economic and cultural ties with many nations, including the United States.

Washington's recognition of the PRC had been expected ever since President Richard Nixon's trip to Peking in 1972. Yet when President Carter announced the normalization of Sino-American relations, Taiwan reacted with shock and anger. Anti-American demonstrations erupted in Taipei. President Chiang indefinitely suspended scheduled elections for the legislative council and the National Assembly, and the Nationalist army was put on full alert. When a U.S. delegation led by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher arrived to discuss the nature of U.S.-Taiwan ties following the severance of diplomatic relations, a mob pelted the motorcade with eggs and rocks.

In announcing the opening of U.S.-China relations, President Carter stated that the United States "will continue to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. I have paid special attention to insuring that normalization . . . will not jeopardize the well-being of the people of Taiwan." Moreover, the U.S. announced that it would continue to sell defensive arms to Taiwan even after the termination of the mutual defense treaty at the end of 1979. In February 1979, the United States and Taiwan reached agreement concerning the conduct of unofficial relations between the two countries. The American Institute, a non-governmental but government-funded agency, replaces the American embassy. It performs virtually all the functions of an embassy. The Taiwan equivalent in Washington is the Coordination Council for North American Affairs.

The PRC has refused to rule out the use of force in reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. But Peking has also indicated that it hopes to reach agreement peacefully. PRC spokesmen have proposed unification talks and the establishment of postal, air, and trade links between the PRC and Taiwan. Meeting in January 1979 with U.S. senators, Chinese Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing declared that if Taiwan recognized PRC sovereignty, it could retain its own government, its own security forces, and its own economic and social system. Taiwan responded negatively to Peking's overtures. Indeed, President Chiang asserted in his 1979 New Year speech that "Our anti-Communist struggle will never cease until the Chinese Communist regime has been destroyed."

The Nationalists remain in firm control of the Taiwan government. To defuse dissent among native Taiwanese, who make up 85 percent of the island's population, the Nationalists have allowed Taiwanese to hold more, and more important, government posts. Even so, the number of influential Taiwanese remains small, and government security agencies keep dissent firmly under control.

For the foreseeable future, the Nationalists will clearly be able to defend themselves. Taiwan's armed forces number nearly 500,000 well-trained men, backed up by a large reserve force. The air force is equipped with nearly 400 combat and transport planes, including F-5E jets. Western military analysts say that the PRC is incapable of mounting a successful invasion of Taiwan.

Taiwan's strongest asset, however, is its economy. Intensive development of agriculture and industry has raised the gross national product to an annual $24 billion. The economy grew at 13 percent in 1978. Annual trade of $23 billion makes Taiwan a leading commercial power. To make Taiwan more self-sufficient, an ambitious building program is under way which includes nuclear power plants, steel mills, and a new rail line.

Taiwan's future is a major question mark. To counter Peking, Taiwan could conceivably ally itself with the Soviet Union or develop nuclear weapons. But either of those moves would clearly antagonize the PRC. The evolution of Taiwan's domestic politics is difficult to predict, especially since Chiang Ching-kuo has yet to designate a successor. A further complicating factor is that some native Taiwanese favor the establishment of an independent Taiwan. As one long-term possibility, some Western experts theorize that Taiwan may recognize Peking's jurisdiction but manage to retain complete autonomy. But how the Taiwan puzzle will finally be solved, only time will tell.

THAILAND

Political Status: *Independent monarchy.*
Leadership: *King Bhumibol Adulyadej Head of State. Kriangsak Chamanand, Prime Minister.*
Population: *45 million.*
Area: *198,455 square miles.*
Capital: *Bangkok.*

Bay of Bengal
THAILAND
Bangkok
South China Sea
Indian Ocean
Gulf of Thailand
YSIA

HISTORY

The Thai people originated in Central Asia and came to the area of present-day Thailand via China



Bathing Elephants in Thailand

from the seventh century on. They established the first Thai kingdom at Su Khothai in the thirteenth century. For the next 300 years, Thai princes battled the Cambodians and the Burmese for control of the area. The Burmese managed to sack the Thai capital of Ayutthaya in 1767, but were subsequently driven out. The Chakri Dynasty came to power in 1782, building a new capital city at Bangkok.

The extraordinary abilities of two nineteenth century kings enabled Thailand to remain the only Southeast Asian nation to escape Western colonial domination. King Mongkut—the monarch of "The King and I"—adopted a conciliatory stance toward the West, allowing trade and bringing in Western experts to advise him on modernization. Mongkut's successor, King Chulalongkorn, instituted domestic reforms and abolished slavery. Both men ceded border territory to placate European colonial powers but managed to preserve the core of Thailand intact.

In 1932, members of Thailand's Westernized elite staged a coup and forced the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. During World War II, Thailand was occupied by the Japanese and forced to collaborate. Military juntas have dominated the nation's politics for most of the past forty-seven years, although their rule has not been especially repressive. Several democratic experiments have also taken place, and several constitutions have briefly been put into effect. Since elections held in April 1976, two military coups have occurred. Following the second, General Kriangsak Chamanand became Thailand's leader.

THAILAND TODAY

Military government has been more the rule than the exception in recent Thai history. In 1979, however, Thailand's Prime Minister Kriangsak Chamanand expressed a commitment to further democratic reforms.

General Kriangsak came to power in 1977 when the armed forces overthrew the conservative government of Thanin Kraivichien. The military faulted Thanin for inflexibility in dealing with internal problems as well as with Communist nations. (Thanin's drive against corruption and drug-running also appeared to threaten the private interests of some military leaders.) From the outset, Kriangsak indicated that his aim was to achieve democratic government in four years' time. He included experienced civilian administrators and technical experts in his cabinet as well as military men. An appointed National Assembly was charged with drawing up a constitution that would lead to national elections in April 1979. The constitution that emerged in December 1978 called for an elected two-house legislature and a prime minister chosen by the legislators.

Kriangsak lifted the Bangkok curfew imposed by his predecessor and made other domestic concessions as well. The minimum wage was raised, unions were allowed greater freedom to organize, and the government supported the price of rice to aid farmers. Thailand's five-year plan was revised to place more emphasis on agriculture and to reduce the widening gap between urban and rural incomes.

One area where Kriangsak's government has made little progress is in the struggle against Thai Communist guerrillas. The insurgency, which dates from 1965, has gradually grown until more than half of the country's provinces are subject to Communist raids. There are an estimated 10,000 guerrillas, among them Thai students and intellectuals who joined the movement when the armed forces seized power in 1976. They have received support from the governments of Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China. Vietnam's recent invasion of Cambodia and China's attack on Vietnam appear to have created dissension in the ranks of the Thai Communists, but the insurgents are unlikely to halt their activities.

Refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam present another major problem for Kriangsak's government. By the beginning of 1979, more than 140,000 refugees in Thai camps awaited resettlement. Thailand has appealed to Western nations to raise their immigration quotas for the Indochinese.

Thailand retains close ties with the U.S. and with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations). But Kriangsak has also conducted dialogues with Communist governments. He played host in July 1978 to Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Ieng Sary. Two months later, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Vam Dong made Bangkok the first stop on a round of ASEAN visits. Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolai Firyubin arrived in Thailand in early November. He was followed by China's Deputy Prime Minister Teng Hsiao-p'ing. Teng made news by attending religious ceremonies marking the entry of Thailand's crown prince into Buddhist monkhood for a two-week period. Ironically, after refusing to end China's backing for the Thai Communists, Teng viewed a counter-insurgency exercise staged by the government.

The Thais share Teng's concern about Vietnam's foreign policy aims, and the presence of Vietnamese troops just across the border of Cambodia is worrisome to the Bangkok government. Kriangsak visited Washington in February and received a pledge of military aid as well as President Carter's assurance of an American commitment "to the integrity . . . and the security of Thailand."

Kriangsak's leadership has brought much needed stability to Thailand. His plan for a post-election government involving civilian politicians as well as military leaders and technocrats

appears constructive. What remains to be seen is whether the prime minister can continue to juggle competing interest groups as he resolves Thailand's economic and political problems.

VIETNAM

Political Status:	*Democratic Republic of Vietnam established in the north on September 2, 1945; Republic of Vietnam established in the south on October 26, 1955. Socialist Republic of Vietnam proclaimed July 2, 1976, following the surrender of South Vietnam to the Communists on April 30, 1975.*
Leadership:	*Ton Duc Thang, President. Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister.*
Population:	*51 million.*
Area:	*128,402 square miles.*
Capital:	*Hanoi.*

CHINA
VIETNAM
Hanoi
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
South China Sea

HISTORY

According to legend, Vietnamese kingdoms existed centuries before the birth of Christ. China's Han dynasty conquered the northern area of Vietnam in 111 B.C., and the Chinese dominated the area for the next 1,000 years. The Vietnamese absorbed much of China's culture and its administrative system but maintained their own distinctive culture and society. Following the fall of China's T'ang dynasty in the tenth century, the Vietnamese defeated their Chinese occupiers. Except for a twenty-year interlude in the fifteenth century, Vietnam was independent—though not always unified—until the nineteenth century. The Vietnamese slowly expanded southward, overrunning other kingdoms including much of the Khmer (Cambodian) empire.

The Vietnamese managed to fend off the initial waves of European colonialists. But the French seized Cochin China (southern Vietnam) in 1862, and two decades later they took Tonkin (northern Vietnam) and Annam (central Vietnam). Early in the twentieth century, Vietnamese nationalist movements began to develop. Ho Chi Minh founded the Indochinese Communist Party in 1930, and collaborated with other nationalists to oppose the French. During World War II, Ho's Viet Minh forces fought against the Japanese.

In September 1945, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was proclaimed by the Viet Minh. After a prolonged dispute between the French and the Viet Minh Party, the Indochina War erupted in late 1946. It ended with the defeat of the French at the battle of Dienbienphu in 1954. The 1954 Geneva Conference provided for the temporary division of Vietnam into northern and southern zones. Most of the Communists withdrew to the northern half.

Ho Chi Minh moved to carry out a social revolution in the north. In the south, Ngo Dinh Diem soon consolidated control. Diem refused to hold nationwide elections as called for by the 1954 accords, and the Communists began to expand the underground political and military apparatus they had earlier established in the south. The Communist insurgency widened. With U.S. and South Vietnamese military backing, a coup toppled Diem in 1963; a series of U.S.-backed regimes followed. The American government eventually committed more than half a million troops to defeating Vietnam's Communists and 46,752 Americans were killed in action.

The U.S. effort in Vietnam proved to be as ineffective as France's had been. In January 1973, the United States and North Vietnam concluded a peace agreement and U.S. forces withdrew. After conciliation talks between South Vietnam and the Communists broke down, the Communists launched an overwhelming offensive in late 1974. South Vietnam fell to the Communists in April 1975. In July 1976, the two halves of Vietnam were unified as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

VIETNAM TODAY

Four years after its armies triumphed over non-Communist forces in South Vietnam, Hanoi's Communist government faces severe tests. Relations with neighboring China have soured so badly that early in 1979, the Chinese launched a punitive strike against the Vietnamese. China's thrust followed Vietnam's own lightning-paced invasion of Cambodia, a move that tainted Vietnam's reputation with the world community and left Vietnamese forces struggling to wipe out resistance in the Cambodian countryside. Within Vietnam, economic development is stalled, and the regime's human rights record has become a subject of international concern.

China's incursion began in mid-February. Knifing down from Yunnan and Kwangsi provinces, 80,000 Chinese troops and tanks fanned out across all of northern Vietnam, seizing five provincial capitals. From the first, China said its strike would be limited in time and scope, and Chinese forces advanced no farther into Vietnam than twenty-five miles. Vietnamese troops acquitted themselves well, although the Hanoi government held back its elite units. Two-and-a-half weeks after the attack began, Peking announced that its armies were withdrawing from Vietnam, having "attained the goals set for them."

China's stated reason for attacking was to punish the Vietnamese for border incidents, but analysts believed there was far more behind the Chinese move. In recent years, Vietnam has drawn close to the Soviet Union, even to the point of signing a twenty-five year treaty of friendship in November 1978. Sino-Vietnamese relations have also been roiled by Vietnam's treatment of its Chinese minority. Beginning in early 1978, Vietnam's Chinese residents, claiming persecution, began to flee their homes. More than 180,000 crossed into China, presenting the Peking government with a major economic burden. China charged that the refugees had been driven from Vietnam, and in June, Peking halted all economic aid to Hanoi. In addition, the Chinese have become concerned about Vietnamese actions in Laos and Cambodia. In Laos, Vietnam has become the preeminent foreign influence. More importantly, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in December 1978 in order to overthrow the Pol Pot government, an ally of Peking.

Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia came after several years of border skirmishing between the two nations. But the Vietnamese move was in part the result of a centuries-old ambition to dominate Cambodia. As relations between Hanoi and Phnom Penh steadily deteriorated, the Vietnamese carved out border enclaves inside Cambodia and began to train Cambodian refugees as soldiers. In early December, Hanoi radio announced the formation of a Cambodian national front; three weeks later, 100,000 Vietnamese troops, accompanied by front forces, stormed across Cambodia and installed a new regime. Pol Pot's army retreated to the countryside, where it continues to harass the Vietnamese occupiers.

Vietnam's Cambodian venture enjoyed the backing of the Soviet Union, but it has created diplomatic problems elsewhere. To counter Chinese influence, Hanoi had been courting ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. In autumn 1978, Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong toured all five ASEAN member states to assure them of his government's peaceful intentions. Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia has wiped out much of the good will Dong fostered; it has also heightened Asian fears of Vietnam as an aggressive power.

Hanoi's effort to establish relations with Washington appears to be stalemated. Initially, the Vietnamese said that they would not discuss normalization until after the United States paid them several billion dollars in Vietnam War reconstruction aid. In 1978, Hanoi spokesmen let it be known that they would agree to normalization without any preconditions, presumably because they wished to counterbalance their growing ties with the U.S.S.R. The U.S. government was slow to respond, possibly because it was more concerned about its budding relations with Peking. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia appears to be an added obstacle to diplomatic discussions between Washington and Hanoi.

Overthrowing Pol Pot and fending off China's attack have greatly magnified Vietnam's economic ills. The cost of maintaining armed forces in Cambodia is a severe drain on Vietnamese resources. The Chinese incursion into northern Vietnam caused widespread damage to roads, bridges, and rail lines. Moreover, the Hanoi government has not yet managed to repair the devastation caused by its war with South Vietnam. Intelligence sources report that apathy, mismanagement, and official corruption are undercutting Vietnam's economic efforts. Weather has also delivered a blow; in 1977 and 1978, drought and floods badly damaged harvests.

Yet Vietnam seems determined to forge ahead with measures to integrate north and south. In 1978, North Vietnamese cadres, who have been put in charge of administration in the southern region, ordered a clampdown on small private businesses and pushed the collectivization of agriculture. Authorities began to implement a plan to transfer 10 million Vietnamese to "new economic zones" in underdeveloped areas over the next few years. These moves have met with public resistance and have taken a toll in productivity.

A number of Western journalists, allowed to visit Ho Chi Minh City (formerly Saigon) in 1978, reported that the standard of living remains far higher there than in Hanoi, and that the city retains many of its more flamboyant, Westernized ways. But the government appears to be taking stern measures to wipe out vestiges of the past. Four veteran French newsmen who toured the south recently reported that North Vietnamese officials conduct themselves like an occupation force, and thousands of South Vietnamese continue to disappear into primitive re-education camps. The correspondent of France's *Le Monde* claimed that as many as 800,000 persons are under detention. There is no way of verifying such a figure, but one thing is certain: life in Vietnam is harsh enough to have prompted more than 200,000 people, many of them ethnic Chinese, to leave their homeland by boat and overland in 1978.

APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS

East Asia: Major Events

B.C. 2700	Beginnings of civilizations in East Asia
660	Yamato empire founded in Japan
551-479	Confucius
221-203	Ch'in dynasty in China
A.D. 202-220	Han dynasty in China
50-668	First Korean kingdoms
794-1192	Heian period in Japan
918-1392	Koryo dynasty unifies Korea
1206-1368	Yuan (Mongol) dynasty in China, includes rule of Genghis Khan and Kublai Khan
1271-1292	Marco Polo travels in China
1274-1292	Mongol invasion of Japan
1368-1644	Ming dynasty in China
1392-1910	Yi dynasty in Korea
1542	Portuguese first Western traders in Japan
1603-1867	Edo (Tokugawa) period in Japan
1644-1912	Manchu (Ch'ing) dynasty in China
1839-1842	Opium War between China and England
1853-1864	Taiping Rebellion
1854	Commodore Perry opens Japan ports
1868-1912	Meiji period in Japan
1894-1895	Sino-Japanese War, beginning of Japanese expansion
1900-1901	Boxer Rebellion
1904-1905	Russo-Japanese War
1910	Korea becomes Japanese colony
1912	Sun Yat-sen leadership of Chinese Republic
1924	Mongolian People's Republic established
1928	Chiang Kai-shek leadership of Nationalist China
1937	Sino-Japanese War begins
1941-1945	World War II; surrender of Japan, Korea divided
1945-1952	Military occupation of Japan
1949-1976	Mao Tse-tung leadership of People's Republic of China
1950-1953	Korean War
1971	Communist China seated in United Nations; Nationalist China expelled
1972, 1975	Nixon and Ford good-will trips to China
1979	United States and China establish diplomatic relations

Source: Seymour Fersh, *Asia: Teaching About/Learning From* (New York: Columbia Univ. Teachers College Press, 1978) pp. 60-61, 66-67, 72-73. Reprinted with permission.

Southeast Asia: Major Events

B.C. 500	Malays arrive in region
300	Buddhist missionaries come from India
200	Kingdom of Nam-Viet founded in Vietnam
A.D. 500	Funan (Cambodia) Empire founded
300-1500	Champa (central Vietnam) Empire
802	Angkor Empire founded
939	Vietnamese become independent from China
1044-1287	Pagan Empire in Burma
1200s	Mongol armies of Kublai Khan invade region
1350	Thai kingdom founded
1353	Lao kingdom founded
1498	Vasco de Gama opens new trade routes
1500s	European colonization begins
1511	Portuguese capture Malacca
1521	Magellan claims Philippines for Spain
1619	Dutch begin settlements in Indonesia
1757	Unification of Burma
1777-1802	Unification of Vietnam
1819	British colony of Singapore founded
1887-1893	French Indochina established
1895	Federated Malay States established
1898-1899	Spanish-American War, United States control of Philippines begins
1939-1945	World War II
1945-1965	Era of national independence movements
1945	Vietnam declares its independence of France
1946	Philippines become independent
1948	Burma becomes independent of United Kingdom
1949	Indonesia becomes independent of the Netherlands
1954	Geneva Agreements, Cambodia and Laos become independent, Vietnam partitioned
1961	United States military advisers arrive in Vietnam
1963	Federation of Malaysia established
1965	Singapore becomes independent
1965	Direct United States military involvement in Vietnam begins
1975	Fighting ends in Indochina: Vietnam and Kampuchea (Cambodia) establish new governments
1979	Vietnam invades Cambodia; China invades Vietnam

South Asia: Major Events

B.C. 2700-1700	Indus Valley civilization
1500-1200	Coming of the Aryans
1200-500	Vedic period
563-483	Siddhartha Gautama, the Buddha
543	Sinhalese dynasty founded in Ceylon by Bengali prince
327-325	Invasion by Alexander the Great
322-183	Maurya empire
269-232	Reign of Asoka
A.D. 320-540	Gupta period
1200-1700	Muslim dominance in India
1398-1399	Timur's invasion of India
1498	Vasco de Gama reaches India
1526-1707	Mughal Empire
1556-1605	Reign of Akbar
1747-1826	Durani dynasty in Afghanistan
1757	Battle of Plassey; beginning of British dominance
1769	Kingdom founded in Nepal
1798	Ceylon becomes British colony
1816	Nepal becomes British protectorate
1857-1858	The Indian Mutiny
1885	Congress Party founded
1893	Present Afghanistan boundaries settled
1906	Muslim League founded
1907	Kingdom founded in Bhutan
1869-1948	Mohandas Gandhi
1889-1964	Jawaharlal Nehru
1947	British rule ends; nations of India and Pakistan (West and East) created
1948	Ceylon becomes independent of United Kingdom
1965	Maldives become independent of British
1966-1977	Indira Gandhi prime minister of India
1971	Bangladesh created from East Pakistan

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